SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT

PTOLEMY I - PYRRHUS OF EPIRUS
HIERO OF SYRACUSE - ANTIOCHUS III

By

C. A. KINCAID

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PREFACE.

In my schooldays, now more than forty-five years ago, the boys were not encouraged to enquire into Greek history after the death of Alexander the Great. At that point they were switched off to Roman history. The result was that none of us understood the intimate connexion between Rome and Hellas. Who the Ptolemies, the Seleucids, the Antigonids were was unknown to all the boys and to most, if not all, of the masters.

Since then, however, English scholars have turned their attention more closely to the events that followed Alexander's death. There had been, no doubt, always Thirlwall's excellent History, but he had been overshadowed by Grote; and the latter resolutely closed Greek history at the death of the Great King. In 1895 Professor Mahaffy published his Empire of the Ptolemies (Macmillan and Co.), a work of eminent merit. In 1902 Professor Bevan published his House of Seleucus (Edward Arnold), a composition that the Cambridge University has happily styled a "*liber aureus.*" In 1913 Professor Tarn published Antigonos Gonatas (Clarendon Press), one of the most inspiring works ever produced and my constant companion in India for thirteen years. Since the appearance of these three great books, Professor Bevan has published a History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty (Methuen and Co.), and Professor Tarn his Hellenistic Civilisation (Edward Arnold), two works in no way inferior to their predecessors. Lastly volume six of the Cambridge Ancient History has seen the light.[1] It brings the story of Hellas down to the battle of Ipsus (301 B.C.).

In spite of these notable publications, I still hope that there may be room for the present sketches of some of the eminent men who carried on the work of Alexander or sought to fill his place.

I have sought my materials everywhere that I could trace them. Besides the books mentioned above, I shall here express my gratitude to M. Bouché Leclercq's two histories of the Lagids and the Seleucids, written in the limpid prose, that seems to be the exclusive possession of French writers, namely, Histoire des Lagides (Paris 1903), and Histoire des Séleucides (Paris 1913). The German scholars have worked harder at this period probably than those of any other European nation; and I would especially mention my heavy debt to Dr. Schubert's Geschichte des Pyrrhus

[1]Volume 7 has lately appeared also.

(Koenigsberg 1894), Droysen's Geschichte des Hellenismus (Gotha 1877), Beloch's Griechische Geschichte (Strasburg 1904), Niese's Geschichte der Griechischen und Makedonischen Staaten (Gotha 1893), Holm's Geschichte Sicilien's im Alterthum (Leipzig 1870). All these books are of outstanding erudition.

I have avoided an abundance of classical references; but in my footnotes I have given chapter and verse for any statements likely to be questioned. I shall mention here as my chief Greek authorities, Plutarch, Diodorus, Polybius, Polyænus, Athenæus, Appian, Strabo, Arrian, Dionysius Halicarnassus and Pausanias. My chief Latin authorities are Livy, Justin and Cornelius Nepos.

C. A. K.

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SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER.

PTOLEMY I.

CHAPTER I

THE REGENCIES OF PERDICCAS AND ANTIPATER (323—319 B.C.)

On the evening of the thirteenth of June 323 B.C., Alexander the Great lay dead in his palace at Babylon. It was some time before the Greek world would believe it. To use Demades' phrase at Athens, men thought that if he had died, the stench of his body would have filled the whole earth.[1] The Macedonian generals, who had seen him daily were better prepared for his end; even so, they had no easy task to regulate the succession. The Great King had not married a Greek wife. He left a bastard son Heracles by his concubine Barsine and his Persian wife Roxane was expecting a child. The other members of the royal family were Olympias, Philip II's widow, Arrhidæus, Philip's half-witted bastard son and Philip's three daughters. Of these Cleopatra, Alexander's full sister was legitimate. The other two Thessalonice and Kynna were daughters of concubines. Lastly, there was Kynna's daughter Eurydice, who through her father Amyntas, a son of Perdiccas III of Macedonia, had a claim in her own right to the crown. Eurydice was betrothed to Arrhidæus.

The generals met in council under the chairmanship of Perdiccas, a member of the princely house of Orestis. He was a gallant soldier and to him Alexander, when past speech, had given his signet ring. The generals decided that they would settle nothing until after Roxane's confinement; but the infantry led by one of their commanders Meleager, forced the generals to name Arrhidæus king of Macedonia with the title of Philip III, pending the delivery of Roxane. Soon afterwards, Roxane gave birth to a son. He was named Alexander IV and made joint king with Philip. In view of the imbecility of Philip III and the infancy of Alexander, the council appointed Craterus and

[1] Plutarch. Phok. 22.

Perdiccas as joint regents; but from the first Perdiccas usurped all the power as well as the custody of the royal wards. Perdiccas distributed the satrapies, of whom only the chief need be mentioned. Antipater, who with Parmenion, had secured the throne for Alexander, retained his office as governor of Macedonia and Greece, Eumenes received Cappadocia and Ptolemy, son of Lagos, received Egypt.

Although Ptolemy acquiesced in the regency, he never regarded it as more than a makeshift. Wiser than any man of his time, he foresaw that long before the young Alexander had come to manhood, the generals would have fallen out. He resolved from the first to make himself the independent ruler of Egypt. In later times it was commonly said that Ptolemy was not the son of Lagos, but of Philip II and that his mother Arsinoe had been Philip's mistress. Philip's morals made this quite likely and it is certain that Ptolemy resembled Philip in his caution as well as in his farseeing and persistent ambition. On the other hand, Arsinoe may have handed on quite innocently to her son the qualities of the royal house of Macedonia; for she herself was a member of it. She was Philip II's second cousin[1] and could claim, as he did, that she was descended from Heracles' union with Deianeira. Whatever Ptolemy's parentage may have been, he had already risen to great distinction.[2] He had been one of the Basilikoi paides or pages of the royal household and as such he had been Alexander's playmate. When Philip had quarrelled with his son, Ptolemy had shared the latter's disgrace and exile. On coming to the throne the Great King had appointed Ptolemy to be one of the Somatophulakes or Bodyguards; and when at Alexander's bidding the leading Macedonians took Persian wives, Ptolemy married Artakama, daughter of Artabazus. When Spitamenes sent word to Alexander that Bessus was his prisoner, it was Ptolemy whom the king sent to take delivery of the captive. In the winter of B.C. 327, Alexander invaded Arigaion or Bajaur. He divided his army into three columns. One he commanded himself, the other two he entrusted to Ptolemy and Leonnatus. Ptolemy accompanied Alexander through Swat and the Yusufzai country; and at the storming of Aornos he took a prominent part. This mountain, said to have defied the assaults of Heracles or Shri Krishma, was crowded with refugees. On its summit was a broad ridge fortified partly by nature and partly by art and was surrounded by wooded slopes. Ptolemy with a body of light armed troops was detailed by Alexander to go up a path pointed out by local guides and take the defenders in the rear. Ptolemy did so. Alexander made a frontal attack, but it failed. After-

[1]Beloch vol. III, pt. 2, p 125.
[2]Mahaffy's Empire of the Ptolemies p. 20.

wards he joined Ptolemy and the two commanders succeeded in storming the impregnable stronghold. During Alexander's campaign against the Malloi or Mahlavas of the Panjab, Ptolemy was sent with an independent force to prevent the enemy from breaking back to the westward. Finally in the reduction of the Cossaioi in 324 B.C., Ptolemy commanded one of the two invading columns. At the head of the other was Alexander in person.

Ptolemy probably went with Alexander to Egypt; otherwise he would hardly wished to be satrap there or have been greeted on his arrival, as Diodorus relates, by a crowd of friends.[1] The Egyptians had been well disposed to the Greeks from the time of King Amasis and Greek mercenaries had often fought for them in their many revolts against the Persians. The victorious Alexander had been welcomed with open arms and Ptolemy, a man of courtly manners and pleasing address, was soon extremely popular. The chief problem before him was not an Egyptian one; it was the presence of Cleomenes. The latter was a well born Greek from Naucratis, who had been provisionally appointed by Alexander with other officers to control the finances of Egypt[2]. In time Cleomenes obtained entire control of the Egyptian treasury; and on Ptolemy's appointment as satrap, Perdiccas associated Cleomenes to his government. Ptolemy, however, had got abundant proofs of Cleomenes' corruption and had him executed.

A fortunate circumstance enabled Ptolemy to increase his satrapy by the addition of eastern Libya. On the peninsula that separates the gulf of Tripoli and the Libyan desert from Egypt, Greek colonists from the island of Thera had founded the great town of Cyrene and had given to the whole peninsula the name of Cyrenaica, that it still preserves. Cyrene and the adjoining towns of Barca and Hesperis had joined Alexander as allies and had been directed like other Greek towns to receive back political exiles. They had evaded the order. Seeing no other hope of returning to their country, the exiles of Barca and Cyrene called in a Lacedæmonian soldier of fortune called Thibron. This adventurer had been in the service of Harpalos, the wretched man, whose corruption involved the fall of Demosthenes; but Thibron had murdered his employer and was at the time in Crete with a small fleet and a force of six thousand men. Thibron agreed to restore the exiles and tried at the same time to make himself tyrant of Cyrenaica. He extorted a large ransom from Cyrene and made himself master of Barca and Hesperis. The leading men of Cyrene called to their aid Ptolemy. The latter had an excellent excuse. Cyrene was an ally of the empire and he affected in the interest of the joint kings to save it from Thibron. Ptolemy sent his general

[1]Diodorus XVIII. 14.
[2]Arrian III. 5.

Ophellas with a large force of all arms. Thibron was defeated, caught and hanged in the Cyrene docks. The city submitted to Ophellas and was annexed to Egypt (322 B.C.).

Later in the same year, Ptolemy managed to secure the Great King's body. The council of generals had resolved that Alexander should be buried in the oasis of Ammon and had entrusted the task to one Arrhidæus (not Philip III). Perdiccas, however, had begun to mistrust Ptolemy and tried to prevent Arrhidæus from going to Egypt; but the latter was in Ptolemy's confidence. He insisted on carrying out the orders of the Council. Between Damascus and the Egyptian frontier, Ptolemy met him at the head of an army. Through Syria the splendid bier, drawn by sixty-four mules and followed by a mighty force under Ptolemy's command, passed through admiring towns and villages until it reached Pelusium. There a state barge awaited the Great King's golden coffin and bore it up the Nile to Memphis near Cairo. At Memphis, Ptolemy decided that the catafalque should stay, until he was sufficiently firm on his throne to risk sending it to Alexandria. The decision of the Council to take it to the Oasis of Ammon was quietly dropped.

Ptolemy had thus defied Perdiccas' authority in two important matters and the regent determined to remove him by force from his high office. Things, however, were not going very well with Perdiccas. He was a haughty aristocrat and although he had hitherto been loyal to Philip Arrhidæus and Roxane's infant son, the other generals had begun to doubt his good faith. He had already quarrelled with Antigonus, the satrap of Phrygia, and had summoned him to answer a charge of insubordination. The satrap guessed that his guilt had already been prejudged; and abandoning his post, he fled with his son, afterwards famous as Demetrius the Besieger, to Antipater in Macedonia. To Antipater and Antigonus, Craterus joined himself. Ptolemy, too, allied himself to Antipater by marrying his daughter Eurydice. Perdiccas declared them all rebels and at first intended to march against Antipater; but the news that Ptolemy had won over to his side the Cypriot rulers caused him to change his plans.

Cyprus was at this time divided into several petty governments of which Salamis, Soli, Paphos, Amathus and Marea or Marion were the most important. Ptolemy had succeeded in winning over the first four and his troops and a Cypriot fleet of two hundred sail were now besieging Marea. Perdiccas left Eumenes to guard against all attacks from Antipater and Craterus; he sent a fleet to relieve Marea and accompanied by the kings, Roxane and Eurydice, he marched with all his avail-

able troops against Egypt. Close to the frontier Perdiccas summoned Ptolemy to attend a trial by the army. The latter sent a deputy to represent him at the courtmartial. His written defence was read out and had the desired effect; for the army refused to find Ptolemy guilty. Nevertheless, Perdiccas, as commander in chief, ordered the invasion of Egypt.

The first objective of the regent was the frontier fortress of Pelusium, a little to the south-east of Port Said. There he cleared out the bed of an old canal in order to divert into it the water defences of the fortress; but his engineers were at fault, for the water forced its way back into its old channel and damaged Perdiccas' siege works. The regent bore his ill luck badly and his harshness so exasperated his troops that large bodies of them left his service and deserted to Ptolemy, who welcomed the deserters with handsome rewards. The regent decided to change his plan. He suddenly struck his camp and marched all night along the bank of the Nile, a branch of which here flows almost due east. He crossed the stream and in the morning attacked a strong post known as the Camel's Fort. Ptolemy heard of Perdiccas' movements just in time. With a picked force he raced from Pelusium to the Camel's Fort and at the critical moment brought relief to the exhausted garrison. Even so Perdiccas pressed his assault home. His Indian elephants trampled down the palisades and the earth works, while storming parties brought ladders to scale the walls. Ptolemy met the attack as became the royal house of Macedonia. He had been with Alexander at the battle of the Jhelum and knew that elephants were harmless, if their mahouts were killed. As the leading elephant approached to batter down the walls of the Camel's Fort, Ptolemy stopped its charge with a spear-thrust in the eye and then as the beast turned, killed its mahout. His companions followed his example and shooting down or spearing the mahouts rendered the elephants useless.

Towards evening, Perdiccas gave up the attack and marched all night up the Nile to a spot between Memphis and the bifurcation of the great river. The spot may well have been the site of Cairo, for there in midstream is a big island called " Jezirah " that answers the description of Diodorus[1] and is large enough to shelter an army. The advantage of this operation was that Perdiccas thereby avoided the network of streams into which the Nile divides itself near its mouth; on the other hand the undivided river was a far more formidable obstacle to cross.

Perdiccas got his troops safely on the island, although the

[1]Diodorus Bk. XVIII. Cap. 34.

water was up to the soldiers' necks. On the other side of the island the river was deeper and the current stronger; but the regent found a ford, where a bank of silt ran across the river bed and enabled a man on foot to wade across it. To check the current, Perdiccas lined his elephants upsteam and ordered his troops to cross to the left bank. At first all went well; the vanguard waded along the silt bank with less difficulty than they had waded to the island. Then a fearful disaster occurred. The silt bank trodden by so many feet broke loose and the current carried away the silt. The army was thus cut in two.

Perdiccas lost his head; instead of ordering his men on the left bank to dig themselves in, while he got boats from the nearest villages or helped them across with his elephants and horses, he directed them to recross at once to the island. This was to send all but the strongest swimmers to certain death, for the Nile, like the Indus, has a tremendous undertow. Many of the Macedonians refused to obey and openly deserted to Ptolemy, who was coming from the Camel's Fort as quickly as he could. Others threw away their arms and armour and tried to swim, but the undertow sucked many of them below the surface. Their corpses were carried down stream and drew to the spot quantities of crocodiles, probably sacred animals daily fed by the Egyptians, and these attacked the swimming soldiers. Before the eyes of their panic-stricken comrades, the horrible beasts pulled down man after man. Those who could, turned and swam back to the left bank, where they deserted; many must have died through sheer fright. No less than two thousand perished in the crossing, of whom one thousand were the prey of the crocodiles. In spite of this heavy loss, the regent and his army were still on the wrong side of the Nile. The sight of their comrades drowning and still worse being pulled under effaced what little loyalty was left in the regent's troops. They had put up with his cruelty and his insolence; but they refused to suffer any longer his incompetence. All that night the phalanx mourned its dead. Peithon, one of the most brilliant of Alexander's commanders, called together a hundred of the leading officers, among whom was Seleucus, the founder of the Seleucid kingdom. They decided to remove Perdiccas and collecting a body of cavalry, they rushed in a body to the regent's tent and murdered him.

Ptolemy, posted by now on the left bank of the Nile, heard at once of the murder of the regent. The day following the event, he crossed the Nile with quantities of provisions stored in the many boats at his disposal and entered the dead regent's camp. He greeted the officers and the army and put at their

disposal the provisions that he had brought. He was received with gratitude and enthusiasm and the army acclaimed him as regent in Perdiccas' place. The farsighted statesman knew what dangers beset the guardian of the Great King's heirs and declined the honour. At his suggestion, the assembled Macedonians apointed to be joint regents, Peithon and the Arrhidæus, who had brought Alexander's body to Egypt.

Shortly after the death of Perdiccas came the news that his lieutenant Eumenes had defeated and killed Craterus in Cappadocia. Had this victory been known earlier, Perdiccas might have had a longer lease of life; as it was, it merely removed Craterus from the list of competitors for power. The new regents marched the army back to Triparadeisus in Syria, where the wisdom of Ptolemy's refusal was soon apparent. Eurydice, now the wife of the poor half-witted Philip Arrhidæus, was, although still a girl, possessed with a monstrous ambition. She intrigued with the troops against the regents, whom she accused of withholding from the army their just rewards. The situation became impossible and Peithon and Arrhidæus resigned their offices. Eurydice probably hoped to be installed as sole regent in their stead; but the coming of Antipater destroyed her hopes. Now that Perdiccas and Craterus were dead, there was none among the Macedonian generals who had his claims. He had served with Philip II as well as with Alexander. In the Great King's absence he had won the Lamian War and had reduced Athens to submission. Afterwards he had beaten and killed the Spartan king Agis in the fight at Megalopolis. This wise, experienced man reached Triparadeisus just as Peithon and Arrhidæus resigned and was immediately elected regent by the army.

Eurydice did not hesitate to use against Antipater the same weapons that she had employed against his predecessors and a mutiny ensued. The troops clamoured for money and Antipater was only saved from death at their hands by the courage and wit of Antigonus and Seleucus. Soothing promises and an immediate donation restored order and steps were taken to render Eurydice powerless. The new regent made a fresh distribution of satrapies. Seleucus was appointed satrap of Babylon. Antigonus was raised to the chief command of the army of Asia. Ptolemy was reappointed satrap of Egypt, which was now regarded as his by right of conquest.

A mere redistribution of satrapies was not enough to stay the ambitions of the generals. Each one of them felt himself fit to

[1]Diodorus XVIII. 39.

wear the mantle of Alexander and indeed one or two of them were. This was notably the case with Antigonus, a man of vast ability, high courage and boundless self confidence. He did not openly quarrel with Antipater, but he drove from his staff the latter's son, Cassander, and turned to reduce Eumenes, who after his victory over Craterus, had conquered Asia Minor and refused to give it up. Antipater, who was growing old and ill, left Asia Minor and returned to Macedonia. To secure a peaceful rule in Greece he gave his daughter, Phila, the widow of Craterus, to Antigonus' son, Demetrius, and left to Antigonus the task of safeguarding Asia.

While Antigonus was engaged in reducing Asia Minor, Ptolemy took steps to widen the boundaries of Egypt. The Phœnician cities of Tyre and Sidon and Jewish Palestine invited attack. The province was lightly held by Laomedon of Amphipolis, for Antigonus had drafted all available troops into Asia Minor. Suddenly, a great Egyptian force, led by Ptolemy's general, Nicanor, crossed the desert and poured into Judæa. City after city opened its gates. Laomedon, who would not join Ptolemy was taken prisoner, and with hardly any resistance, the whole of Syria, including Palestine and the Phœnician possessions, was added like Cyrene to the kingdom of Egypt. According to Professor Bevan,[1] it was at this time that Ptolemy's troops occupied Jerusalem by the simple device of entering it on the Sabbath Day, the Jews believing that on the seventh day, it was as wicked to fight as to work (320-318 B.C.). At the same time, Ptolemy, who with his fleet had followed the advance of Nicanor, visited Cyprus and forced the whole island into an alliance.[2]

In the midst of these events, that is to say, in the spring of 319 B.C., Antipater died. He was seventy years of age and he had long been ailing. His death was a national calamity. He was equally great as a statesman and a soldier; and as the friend and companion of Philip and Alexander, he alone could impose, so far as that was humanly possible, any restraint on the ambitions and wickedness of the Macedonian generals.

[1]History of Egypt p. 24.

[2]Mahaffy p.34. Niese 1 p. 230 Droysen II p. 166. Professor Bevan, however, questions the correctness of their views.

CHAPTER II.

The Regency of Polysperchon and the Anarchy. (319—311 B.C.)

Antipater had before his death given much thought to the appointment of a successor. His son Cassander, who had already quarrelled with Antigonus and was younger than the latter or Ptolemy or even Seleucus, could certainly not impose his authority as regent on anyone. At last, Antipater decided to bequeath his powers to Polysperchon, who enjoyed a great reputation as a strategist.[1] The choice proved most unfortunate, for the new regent drank heavily and was in every way unfitted to hold the regent's office. At once Antigonus, Ptolemy and Cassander formally refused to recognise Polysperchon. Polysperchon retaliated by declaring free all Greek cities that held garrisons loyal to Cassander.[2] This spiteful act destroyed such little authority as the regent still preserved and anarchy followed. Indeed the disputes spread to the royal house itself. In October, 317 B.C. Olympias allying herself to Polysperchon, seized the persons of Philip Arrhidæus and Eurydice. The former she executed and the latter she forced to commit suicide. In 316 B.C. Cassander retaliated by putting Olympias to death and imprisoning Roxane and the boyking Alexander IV.

For the moment Ptolemy was little affected by the collapse of the regency. He was king of Egypt in all but name, popular alike with the Egyptians and his army and he could devote his thoughts to other subjects than war. It was probably at this time that, after the manner of the great Pharaohs of the eighteenth and nineteenth dynasties, he restored and enlarged Luxor, which the successors of Cambyses had destroyed. In the temple of Luxor, Ptolemy placed a statue, chiselled in the Egyptian style, of Alexander IV, whom he still professed to serve.

Another matter that engaged Ptolemy's attention after the close of his successful Syrian campaign was a new marriage. Among the retinue of Antipater's daughter Eurydice had come Berenice, herself a grand-niece of the regent. Berenice was no longer young. She had married an obscure Macedonian called Philip,[1] and had borne him a son called Magas and two

[1]Plutarch. Pyrrhus 83.
[2]Diodorus XVIII. 55.56.
[1]Pausanias I, VII.

daughters Theoxena and Antigone. Her husband was dead and she had gone to Alexandria in the train of her kinswoman. She took the opportunity to supplant Eurydice in her husband's affections and in 317 B.C. he married her. Such was the new queen's charm and so great were Ptolemy's tact and knowledge of women, that Eurydice accepted the new arrangement and Ptolemy was happy in the love and esteem of two Macedonian princesses.

It did not take Antigonus many years to make himself master of Alexander's Asiatic possessions. He drove out or killed every satrap, whom he thought unlikely to obey his orders implicitly. Among the former was Seleucus. He fled to Ptolemy, who treated him with the utmost courtesy. This enraged Antigonus and he threatened to drive Ptolemy out of Syria. Ptolemy allied himself to Cassander and Lysimachus, the satrap of Thrace. Antigonus sought an ally in Polysperchon, who, although discredited, still clung to the title of regent. Antigonus was thus able to say that he was acting on behalf of the young Alexander and denounced Cassander as the murderer of Olympias and the jailor of Roxane and the king. Antigonus was now in the position of Perdiccas. He was surrounded by enemies; but he had the advantage of a central position and could strike when and where he pleased.

Antigonus decided first to attack Ptolemy. Following Polysperchon's example, he issued a proclamation that he but wished to free Greece. Ptolemy made a similar announcement. Antigonus' alone achieved its purpose, which was to create unrest in his adversaries' dominions; and there were insurrections both in Cyprus and Cyrene. Early in 315 B.C.[1] Cyrene drove out Ophellas and the Egyptian garrison and declared itself a free city. Ptolemy averse from violence, sent from Alexandria an embassy to remonstrate with Cyrene and to achieve, if possible, some peaceful settlement of the question. The mob of Cyrene put the unfortunate envoys to death. Such conduct even Ptolemy could not overlook. He sent one of his generals, Agis by name, with a numerous army from Alexandria. Agis defeated the rebels in the field and took Cyrene by storm. He then disarmed the inhabitants and sent the ringleaders in chains to Egypt. Ophellas was reinstated as viceroy and Ptolemy was free to turn his attention to Cyprus. Antigonus had sent a contingent there under an officer called Agesilaus. On his arrival, Amathus, Marea and other towns had revolted against Ptolemy. Only Nicocreon of Salamis had remained loyal. He was now being besieged by

[1]The date is disputed; 315 B.C. is the date given by Niese. Beloch and the Cambridge history give the date as 313 B.C.

Agesilaus and a Cypriot force. To Nicocreon Ptolemy sent his brother, Menelaus, and his friend, Seleucus, with a powerful fleet and ten thousand mercenaries. The reinforcements turned the scale in Nicocreon's favour. The rebel towns were forced to submit and Nicocreon as a reward for his loyalty was made governor of the whole island.

The risings in Cyrene and Cyprus had given Antigonus the breathing space that he wanted to mobilize all the men and resources of his vast dominion. He stripped the mountains of Lebanon of their firs, cedars and cypresses and with the help of the shipbuilders of Rhodes rapidly built himself a powerful fleet. In 315 B.C., Antigonus began to move on Syria. Ptolemy with his embarrassments in Cyrene, did not dare await his enemy there. He garrisoned Tyre and withdrew into Egypt. Antigonus reoccupied Syria without opposition and after a siege of thirteen months took Tyre. Ptolemy's garrison were given a safe conduct to Egypt, and the inhabitants, who probably disliked equally the contending Macedonians, opened their gates to Antigonus.

After the recovery of Cyrene and Cyprus, Ptolemy made a raid by sea on the borders of Syria and Cilicia. His object seems to have been to threaten Antigonus' communications with Syria and so cause its evacuation. Antigonus sent against Ptolemy his son, Demetrius, then a youth just over twenty. If any human being ever resembled Satan, as depicted in Paradise Lost, it was assuredly Demetrius. His godlike beauty, his imposing stature, his strength, his courage, his energy, his vast ability, his boundless ambition and above all his incredible wickedness made him the exact counterpart of Milton's fallen angel. It was his first command and he descended on Ptolemy as if the wolves of Lebanon had been upon his track. He left his regular infantry and heavy baggage with Peithon, the former satrap of Sind and Antigonus' most experienced commander; and with cavalry and light armed troops he marched to the Syrian frontier. No obstacles stopped him, no hardships daunted him and although most of his horses died owing to the speed and length of his marches, Demetrius was in sight of Ptolemy's camp at Mallos before the latter could entrench himself. At such a distance from his base, Ptolemy dared not risk a pitched battle. He retreated to the sea and reshipping his troops returned to Egypt. He had partially succeeded in his object, for Demetrius had withdrawn a large part of his forces from Syria; and Ptolemy no doubt designed to invade Syria from the South and overwhelm Peithon and his regular corps, before Demetrius could rejoin him. Fast, however, as Demetrius had marched to Mallos, his return was even swifter. In six days he had rejoined Peithon and the two

generals with their combined armies camped at Gaza, on the edge of the desert that divides Syria from Egypt.

Ptolemy saw that his strategy had failed and he would have acquiesced in the loss of Syria; but Seleucus urged him to action. So did his ally Cassander. Indeed Demetrius' camp at Gaza challenged Ptolemy's rule in Egypt. Demetrius had only twelve thousand five hundred infantry of whom eight thousand were Greek mercenaries and two thousand Macedonians. He had four thousand six hundred cavalry, all Asiatics, and forty-three elephants. If so small an army were allowed to defy all the might of Egypt, Ptolemy could not be deemed a very enterprising leader. In the spring of 312 B.C., Ptolemy with some reluctance decided to advance from Pelusium; but he left little to chance. He took with him an army of eighteen thousand foot, all either Macedonian or Greek mercenaries and four thousand European cavalry. Besides these he had a large auxiliary Egyptian force. Demetrius' advisers urged him to retreat, but the boy's head had been turned by his recent success. He wished to show his father, whom he dearly loved, that Demetrius was not unworthy of Antigonus. He put his views before his senior officers and such were his persuasiveness and his charm, that against their better judgment they acquiesced and Demetrius awaited Ptolemy's advance.

The position of the contending armies was such that Ptolemy would certainly try to roll up Demetrius' left wing. Demetrius, therefore, strengthened his left flank and tried to pierce Ptolemy's centre with his elephants. By this time, however, Ptolemy knew perfectly how to deal with elephants. He covered his centre with pointed stakes, fixed deep in the ground and fastened together with iron chains. When the elephants were checked by the stakes and hesitated while their mahouts sought some other opening, javelin men showered darts on beasts and mahouts alike, until the former became uncontrollable and the latter were shot down. His centre safe, Ptolemy sent Seleucus with all available troops to encircle Demetrius' left wing. Demetrius' horse fought gallantly and a desperate hand to hand fight ensued. The issue remained doubtful until some of Demetrius' riderless elephants broke into the ranks of their own cavalry. Demetrius' Asiatics made no further stand and the whole army broke and fled to Gaza. There the confusion was so great that Ptolemy's horse entered the gates with the fugitives.[1]

The day was lost for Demetrius. Peithon had fallen in the cavalry action. So, too, had all Demetrius' senior officers. No

[1]Diodorus XIX. 82—85 gives an admirable account of the battle of Gaza.

less than eight thousand mercenaries surrendered and all Demetrius' baggage, private servants and effects fell into Ptolemy's hands. The unlucky general rode all that night to Azotus thirty miles from the battle field and thence sent heralds asking for a truce to bury the dead. The truce Ptolemy granted and at the same time returned to Demetrius with exquisite courtesy all his private property. The mercenaries Ptolemy took into his service and sent them to Egypt to replace fresh drafts. He then led his victorious army into Syria. Demetrius could no longer face the Egyptian forces, so Ptolemy without any difficulty again made himself master of the province as far as Sidon. At Tyre Andronicus commanded on Antigonus' behalf. Ptolemy tried to buy him over, but Andronicus rejected the offer with a coarse insult.[2] His troops, however, lacked their leader's loyalty and placed the city in Ptolemy's hands. Andronicus prepared himself for death as the punishment of his unseemly reply; but Ptolemy had in an unsurpassed degree the placid and magnanimous temper that suffers insult without vindictiveness and finds no pleasure in gratifying revenge. So far from executing Andronicus, Ptolemy welcomed cordially the brusque old commandant; and forgiving his brutal speech, he applauded Andronicus' loyalty to Antigonus. He gave the old soldier a high command in his own army and thus won the veteran's lifelong affection.

About the same time Ptolemy took a step destined to have the most momentous consequences. At the request of Seleucus, to whose skill and valour the victory of Gaza had been largely due, Ptolemy gave him eight hundred foot and two hundred cavalry admirably equipped and mounted. With this small army the gallant Seleucus made a dash for Babylon. He had been satrap there and until driven out by Antigonus had been extremely popular. On his appearance a thousand Macedonians under Polyarchus, Antigonus' treasurer, joined him, surrendering the great city. Another thousand under Diphilus took refuge in the citadel, where they were besieged and taken. On their capture Seleucus drafted them into his own corps.

Nicanor, who held the country in Antigonus' interest marched against Babylon with a force of seventeen thousand men, but the local peasantry warned Seleucus of Nicanor's coming. Seleucus hid his men in a neighbouring swamp; and when Nicanor camped on the Tigris, thinking that Seleucus had fled, the latter surprised his camp and took or destroyed his army. Nicanor with a few horsemen escaped; Seleucus' prisoners took service under their captor. Susiana and Media revolted to his

[2]Diodorus XIX. 86.

government and the Seleucid kingdom, destined to endure until the days of Pompey was founded (October 312 B.C.)[1]

Ptolemy was for the moment master of all Syria save for the districts bordering on Cilicia. There Demetrius was trying to raise fresh levies and obtain reinforcements from Antigonus. Ptolemy sent against him a Macedonian officer named Killes with orders either to destroy Demetrius or to drive him out of Syria. Adversity had, however, been useful to the latter and he no longer thought it a point of honour to fight against any hostile force, no matter how superior. He sent spies to follow Killes' movements and in the early dawn of an autumn morning he fell on Killes' camp at Myus with a picked force. Killes was taken completely by surprise and surrendered with his whole detachment. Demetrius sent the news of his success to Antigonus, who, depressed at the defeat of Gaza, was now overjoyed at the victory of Myus. He hastened with a great army to join Demetrius. Ptolemy called a council of war and an animated debate ensued. Had Seleucus been present, the council might have decided on a pitched battle; but the officers were influenced by Ptolemy's caution, the size of Antigonus' force and the latter's immense reputation as a general. A retreat was ordered; during the retirement the country was laid waste and among others the towns of Samaria and Gaza were destroyed.[1]

The evacuation of Syria was followed by its reoccupation by Antigonus. His proximity to the Egyptian frontier enabled him to deal another blow at Ptolemy. Since the abortive revolution in Cyrene, Ophellas had been ruling it as viceroy. Persuaded thereto by Antigonus, whose proximity to Egypt prevented Ptolemy from sending troops to his western frontier, Ophellas declared Cyrene a free city and himself its independent ruler (312 B.C.)[2] Ptolemy retaliated by stirring up the Nabatæan Arabs of Petra against Antigonus. The latter ordered one of his officers, Athenæus, to chastise them. Athenæus chose his time well. He waited until a great fair had attracted a large number of Arabs with their women and children to Petra. Travelling night and day for seventy two hours, Athenæus reached the neighbourhood of the town. He rested his forces until midnight and attacked. The Arabs taken unawares, offered but little resistance. The bulk of the inhabitants were slaughtered; some were taken captive and a few wounded were left behind. The Macedonians left as suddenly as they had come; but when they had nearly reached safety, they relaxed

[1]Diodorus XIX. 92.
[1]Diodorus XIX. 93.
[2]Droysen II. p. 91.

their guard.[1] The Arabs of the neighbouring villages had learnt from the wounded left in Petra what had happened and followed the Macedonians at a safe distance. When they saw that the Macedonians were no longer vigilant, they surprised Athenæus' camp and slaughtered him and his whole force, save only fifty wounded horsemen, who contrived to escape.

Another attempt made by Demetrius to punish the Arabs had little better success[2] and an attempt made by Antigonus to drive the Arabs from the Dead Sea and so deprive them of their profits from the sale of the bitumen ended in a disaster. The task was entrusted to Hieronymus of Cardia, the historian, but several thousand Arabs launched rafts and either shot down or put to flight Hieronymus' soldiers. Antigonus was furious, but before he could take any further steps against the Arabs, the news reached him that Seleucus had ambushed Nicanor's army and had made himself master of Babylon.[3] The danger was so pressing that he detached Demetrius to retake Babylon. Demetrius did retake Babylon, only to lose it again (311 B.C.)

These alternating defeats and victories convinced Antigonus that it was for the time, at any rate, impossible to realise all his ambitions. He needed some breathing space in which to reorganise his kingdom and above all to destroy Seleucus. To this end he made peace with Cassander, Lysimachus and Ptolemy. Cassander was left in possession of Greece and the custody of Roxane and Alexander. Lysimachus kept Thrace. Ptolemy kept Egypt, and the border towns of Arabia. Antigonus was left master of Asia. Seleucus' name was not mentioned and Antigonus no doubt demanded a free hand against him; at the same time it is certain that Ptolemy and his allies privately assured Seleucus of their continued support.

[1]Diodorus XIX. 95.
[2]Plutarch Demetrius 7. Diod. XIX. 97.
[3]Diod. XIX. 100.

CHAPTER III.

The Five Kingdoms (311-306 B.C.).

In the Macedonian empire the anarchy was over. There no longer ruled an incompetent regent, unable to control his subordinates; but five resolute autocrats, all governing their own dominions, awaited the favourable moment to extend them at the expense of their rivals. Indeed even the pretence of a regency was no longer possible. In 311 or 310 B.C., shortly after the treaty, Cassander murdered Roxane and her son, the unhappy heir of the Great King. The young prince was in his thirteenth year and a movement in his favour had begun to spread among the Macedonian peasantry and aristocracy. By what right, they asked, did Cassander keep the son of Alexander and the grandson of Philip a prisoner? Let the prince be set free, and trained in the administration and in a year or two placed on the throne of Heracles and his descendants. Cassander, however, had made Roxane and her son his deadly enemies and he knew well that the first act of the new sovereign would be his own arrest and execution. To save his own life, he must murder his master. He issued secret orders to Glaucias, Alexander's jailer, to kill Roxane and her son and bury them in the precincts of their prison. Unhappily for Cassander, the secret got out and his enemies made the most of his crime. Polysperchon sent for Barsine, the daughter of Aztabazus, widow of Mentor and a former mistress of the Great King and her son Heracles. The boy was seventeen and Polysperchon proclaimed him as the heir to the throne. But he was both illegitimate and a half breed and roused no enthusiasm. Two years later, Polysperchon had the wretched claimant murdered and himself entered Cassander's service (309 B.C.).[1]

The murder of the young Alexander had long been foreseen by Ptolemy and he realised, too, that the peace was but an armistice between the contending generals. In 310 B.C., Antigonus attacked Seleucus, intending to destroy him before he dealt with the signatories of the recent treaty. Ptolemy saw through Antigonus' designs and at once declared war. He sailed with his fleet to the coast cities of Cilicia and Asia Minor and declaring them free, drove out Antigonus' garrisons; but his success was short lived, for Demetrius descending with his usual

[1]According to the Cambridge Ancient History Vol. VI p. 493 this Heracles was an impostor, Diodorus XX. 28.

speed on the coast defeated Ptolemy's commanders and forced him to re-embark.

Antigonus had persuaded Ophellas to revolt. He now won over to his cause the chief ruler of Cyprus. Nicocreon, Ptolemy's faithful friend and ally, was dead and his successor Nicocles opened negotiations with Antigonus and fortifying Paphos, declared himself king of it and ruler of a free people.[2] Ptolemy stamped out the rebellion before it could spread. His brother Menelaus, sent to Cyprus with a large force, surprised Nicocles and forced him to commit suicide. Then followed a horrible tragedy. Axiothea, Nicocles' wife, hearing of her husband's death, butchered her daughters and persuaded the wives of Nicocles' brothers to die with her. Lastly Nicocles' brothers shut themselves up in the royal palace, set fire to it and perished. Although Ptolemy had not desired the wholesale destruction of Nicocles' house, it yet made his task easier. He reduced Cyprus to an Egyptian province and appointed his brother Menelaus as his viceroy.

In the following year (308 B.C.) it occurred to the ingenious mind of Ptolemy that he might by yet another marriage gather into his own hands the entire heritage of Alexander. Philip Arrhidæus and Eurydice had been murdered by Olympias. Olympias and Roxane and Alexander IV had been murdered by Cassander. Heracles had been murdered by Polysperchon. Kynna the mother of Eurydice had been murdered by Antigonus. There remained only Thessalonice and Cleopatra. The former Cassander had married and the marrige had undoubtedly strengthened his position as king of Macedonia; but after all she was only a concubine's daughter. On the other hand, Cleopatra was the legitimate daughter of Philip II and the full sister of the Great King. If Ptolemy, himself a member of the Royal house, could marry Cleopatra, he might lay claim to all Greece and all Asia. The great lady lived at Sardis and on receiving Ptolemy's proposal of marriage, she accepted it; but the danger to Antigonus of the proposed marriage was too great. He had Cleopatra killed by her maidservants and then with well feigned indignation executed them. Foiled in this scheme, Ptolemy, nevertheless made a descent on Greece. He drove Antigonus' garrisons out of Cos and Andros and induced Polysperchon's daughter in law, Cratesipolis, to surrender Corinth and Sicyon. This was all his success. If he had hoped that Macedonia would rise in his favour as a member of the royal house, his hopes were not realised. Thessalonice, illegitimate, though she was, was yet a daughter of Philip II and the Macedonians were quite content that she should

[2]Diodorus XX. 21. Cambridge Ancient History Vol. VI p. 494.

be their queen and Cassander their king. It was in this year 308 B.C. that his wife Berenice bore to Ptolemy, his best beloved son, afterwards Ptolemy II, known to history as Ptolemy Philadelphus. The birth of this boy may have made up to the Macedonian for his failure in Greece; and not long afterwards a stroke of extraordinary good fortune enabled him to recover Cyrene.

In 310 B.C., Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse, had sailed with a great armament against Carthage. This remarkable man was the son of one Karkinos of Rhegium. His father, learning from an oracle that his son would be the cause of great calamities, ordered him to be exposed. Agathocles' mother saved him and her brother brought up the boy to be a potter. The boy's youthful beauty won him the affection of a rich man called Damas and afterwards the hand and wealth of Damas' widow. He became a captain of mercenaries in Syracuse and then in Italy. In 317 B.C., by a massacre of the leading citizens he established himself as a tyrant of Syracuse. As a ruler of the great city, his wickedness was almost incredible; nevertheless he managed to retain the esteem of his soldiers and to win by their help several battles against the Carthaginians. At last, his fortune turned and after a severe defeat at Punic hands in the valley of the southern Himeras, Agathocles formed the desperate design of carrying war into the enemy's country and invading Carthaginian Africa. At first, he had astounding success. He won a great battle near Tunis, while his lieutenant at Syracuse defeated the besieging force. Still disease and battle took toll of the invading army and Agathocles looked about for reinforcements. There were none to be had from Syracuse; so he invited Ophellas to his aid, promising him Carthage as his guerdon. He, Agathocles would be content to rule over Sicily, freed from the Punic menace. The deluded Ophellas fell into the snare. With all the men he could raise in Cyrene and Greece, he marched to Tunis.[1] There Agathocles treacherously murdered him and added the army of Cyrene to his own. On Ophellas' death Ptolemy without difficulty reconquered Cyrene and appointed Magas, a son of Berenice by his first marriage, to be his viceroy there (307 B.C.). He gave Theoxena, sister of Magas, in marriage to Agathocles, possibly to reward him for having made possible the recapture of Cyrene. Theoxena and Agathocles lived happily together until shortly before the latter's death, when the dying tyrant sent back to Egypt Theoxena and her children.[2]

Ptolemy had at this time the greatest naval power in Europe, but Antigonus was determined, if he could, to destroy it. All

[1]Justin XXII. 7.4. and Diodorus XX. 40—42.
[2]Justin XXIII. 2.

through the year 308 B.C. he had been preparing and organising his naval services. In 307 B.C. his fleet was ready and Demetrius with two hundred and fifty ships and a large force of all arms made a sudden dash at Athens. Demetrius of Phaleron, who had governed the city from 318 B.C. was friendly to Ptolemy and thought that the ships came from Egypt. He did not discover his error until the hostile vessels were inside the harbour. The young admiral made the flimsy pretence that he had come to free the city. He drove out his namesake Demetrius of Phaleron, but he garrisoned Athens with his own troops. There he stayed for the rest of the year and married Ophellas' widow Eurydice a descendant of Miltiades, to give himself a claim both to Cyrene and Athens. In the spring of 206 B.C. Demetrius received orders from his father Antigonus to reduce Cyprus.

Demetrius first demanded a contingent from the Rhodians, but they had no quarrel with Ptolemy and politely refused. Nevertheless without their assistance and in spite of the fleet and garrison that he had to leave in Athens, Demetrius collected a hundred and ten warships and a number of transports. On board the transports were fifteen thousand soldiers and four hundred cavalry. He landed on the northern point of Cyprus and established a fortified camp there. Having dug himself firmly in, he protected his flanks by storming the neighbouring towns of Carpasia and Ceryneia.[1] He then advanced against Salamis where Ptolemy's brother Menelaus had massed all his available troops. Menelaus might have done better if he had awaited Demetrius at Salamis itself; but he thought it advisable to lead out his army to a spot about fifteen miles away. Menelaus was no match for the ripening genius of Demetrius. He was completely defeated with a loss of a thousand killed and three thousand prisoners and fell back on Salamis. Demetrius first drafted the prisoners into his own army; but as they deserted whenever they could, he shipped them to his father, who was amusing himself by building a new city, known as Antigoneia on the banks of the Orontes.[2]

Having driven Menelaus into Salamis, Demetrius sat down in front of it and in the course of the siege shewed such amazing powers of invention and such resource that he won for all time the nickname of Poliorcetes or the Besieger. Ptolemy, however, had learnt of his brother's defeat and was hastening to Cyprus with a hundred and fifty warships and two hundred transports, carrying an army of ten thousand men. He sailed to Paphos and thence to Cition, whence he sent by land orders to Menelaus

[1]Diodorus XX. 47. 2. Diodorus gives the name of the second town as Ourania, but Niese vol. I, p. 318 conjectures it to be Cerȳneia.
[2]Diodorus XX. 47.

to send his sixty warships to meet the Egyptian armada. Demetrius shewed in this crisis extraordinary talents for naval warfare. It was vital to him to prevent the junction of the two fleets, for their combined numbers would far exceed his own. He therefore " bottled " Menelaus' fleet in the harbour of Salamis by stationing five quinqueremes across its narrow mouth. He himself with his entire fleet attacked Ptolemy. He made up for his inferiority in numbers by putting on board many of his siege engines and thus had a great superiority in artillery. Each commander was victorious on his own starboard wing. Ptolemy destroyed Demetrius' port wing, but his own port wing was overwhelmed by Demetrius. The latter pursued his success with invincible energy and rolled up Ptolemy's entire line from the left. In the end, Demetrius won a decisive victory. Of the Egyptian Grand Fleet, Ptolemy saved only eight ships, the rest were taken or sunk. Most of the transports were captured together with eight thousand men. Demetrius lost only twenty ships. When Menelaus managed at last to break out of the harbour, the day was already lost and he had to sail back to Salamis. There he could not hold out indefinitely ; and in no long time he surrendered with his fleet, and his army of nearly seventeen thousand men. These Demetrius took into his own service. Menelaus and other relatives of Ptolemy Demetrius sent courteously back to Egypt.

The news of this great victory the Besieger sent by Aristodemus of Miletus to Antigonus. The messenger kept secret his good news until the last possible moment. Then he called out aloud " Hail King Antigonus ! " and delivered his message. The Syrian mob in a transport of delight insisted on crowning Antigonus. He, in turn, sent a crown to Demetrius and conferred on him, too, the title of " Basileus." Ptolemy, however, could not allow his enemies thus to triumph over him. He also took the title of king and his example was followed by Lysimachus, Seleucus and Cassander. There were thus six kings and five kingdoms, where once had ruled Alexander son of Philip, king of Macedon.

CHAPTER IV.

The Campaigns in Egypt and Rhodes (306-304 B.C.).

The conquest of Cyprus spurred Antigonus and his son to make an attempt on Egypt itself. Ptolemy had no longer any fleet capable of holding the seas against Demetrius; and no matter how he might fortify Pelusium and the eastern arm of the Nile, his fortifications would be useless if they could be turned by a hostile fleet. All that summer, Antigonus and Demetrius worked continuously to ensure the success of their Egyptian campaign. By October, Demetrius had collected at Gaza, an army of eighty thousand foot and eight thousand horse with eighty-three elephants. To accompany the army, were collected in Gaza harbour a hundred and fifty warships. No such disciplined force had yet been gathered together in the history of mankind.

At the beginning of November 306 B.C., the great armament was ready. The pilots on the warships begged Antigonus to delay a little; for the Pleiades were about to set and storms were to be feared. Antigonus brushed aside the pilots' objections. It was all important, in his judgment, to move on Egypt before Ptolemy could make good his naval losses. He set out at midnight for Pelusium. Each soldier carried provisions for ten days. Thousands of camels, hired from the Arabs, carried food and fodder, while the fleet was laden with vast quantities of arms and ammunition. The troops suffered, in spite of all precautions, considerable hardships on the march, as they tramped first through the sands near Gaza and then through the marshes near Pelusium.

At first the fleet met with fair weather and Antigonus congratulated himself on his decision. Then a strong north wind blew and the fleet was scattered. Some ships were cast ashore, others were blown into the open roadstead of Raphia, a few miles south of Gaza; others were driven back to their starting point. A few made Casion near Pelusium, but found the shore held by Egyptian outposts. They anchored off the land, but three quinqueremes dragged their anchors, went ashore and were captured. The others would probably have met the same fate, had Antigonus and the main army not arrived in the nick of time and covered their landing. On Antigonus' advance, the Egyptian outposts fell back on Pelusium and Antigonus waited at Casion for his stragglers to come up. Then he marched on Pelusium.

He found that Ptolemy had made the fortress impregnable and with a great force was guarding the left bank of the Nile, which, at its height in September, was still flowing strongly in November. While Antigonus halted, uncertain what to do, light boats manned with archers rowed up and down the Nile, picking off the unwary and inviting Antigonus' mercenaries to desert. To each soldier who deserted, Ptolemy offered a bribe of two minas (£7 10s.) and to each officer a bribe of one talent (£235). There was such a rush to change sides that Antigonus had to post special guards to stop the deserters. All caught attempting to do so, he tortured cruelly to death.

In time the bulk of the fleet reassembled and Demetrius tried to turn Ptolemy's position with his ships. He sailed to a small mouth of the Nile to the west of Pelusium, but Ptolemy's men followed the warships along the shore and when Demetrius tried to land, he was beaten off. That night Demetrius sailed still further west, fastening to his masthead a bright light which he bade his other vessels follow. In the darkness nearly all went astray and Demetrius had to wait for their arrival. While he waited, Ptolemy learnt his whereabouts and hastened to guard the coast. It was hopeless to land in the face of the formidable army that watched Demetrius'' movements; the rest of the Delta, too, was protected not only by Ptolemy's men, but by swamps and quagmires. Demetrius, abandoning the design of turning Ptolemy's defences by sea, gave orders to sail back to Antigonus. On the way, his fleet was caught by a storm. Three triremes and several transports were wrecked, and the other ships only made their harbour with the greatest difficulty. Demetrius thought for a moment of sailing up the Pelusium arm of the Nile, but found that Ptolemy had thrown a boom across it. Provisions were getting scarce, the troops were growing mutinous and Ptolemy's bribes to deserters seemed more alluring than ever. Antigonus remembered only too well the fate of Perdiccas and he summoned a council of war. Should the army stay on and fight to the bitter end or should they retreat into Syria and await the fall of the Nile and a more favourable season? The council were unanimously in favour of a retreat. Antigonus approved their decision. He struck his camp and marched back to Gaza, Demetrius and the fleet accompanying him close to shore. Not unnaturally Ptolemy gloried in his enemies' retirement. They might well threaten a later attack in a more favourable season. He had twice repulsed projected invasions and he could deal with a third, if the time came. He wrote letters to Seleucus, Lysimachus and Cassander, in which he announced to them his victory and the number of mercenaries, who had deserted to his service. They were probably very many; for once Antigonus had ordered a retreat,

thousands of his men must have slipped away rather than face the severe march back across the desert to Gaza. Ptolemy claimed that he was king of Egypt by the right of a double conquest and returned in triumph to Alexandria (306 B.C.).

His failure on the Nile seems to have affected Antigonus' judgment. He had before his march on Egypt invited the help of Rhodes; but the islanders had pleaded their friendship with Ptolemy. Antigonus had then sent warships to stop Rhodian merchantmen from going to Alexandria. The Rhodians had manned a fleet and driven off the warships. This gave Antigonus, embittered by his recent reverse, an excuse for declaring war on Rhodes. The little island had at one time been of small importance and her three towns Lindos, Ialysos and Kamiros mere villages.[1] About 408 B.C., they united and founded together the town of Rhodes on the northern point of the island, facing the coast of Asia Minor; even so the new city did not for many years rise to any great celebrity. It fell under the dominion of the Achaemenian kings and was only freed by Alexander. He garrisoned it with a Macedonian corps; but on his death the Rhodians drove out the garrison and having won liberty succeeded in retaining it. From this time onwards, the Rhodian merchants became rapidly rich and their seamen the most skilful in the Greek seas. The decline of Athens deflected the vast trade of Asia Minor, Egypt and Syria into the docks and counting houses of the new emporium. Indeed it became the boast of Rhodes' sailors, to use the striking phrase of Professor Tarn, that " every Rhodian was worth a warship."[2]

Rhodes was not overrun, like Athens, by a quarrelsome, dissolute mob. The government of the town and island was aristocratic; but the poor were cared for and the small Rhodian army was well disciplined and devotedly loyal to the city.[3]

Rhodes had hitherto been friendly to Antigonus, especially since his proclamation, granting freedom to Greek cities. The Rhodians had built him ships and furnished him with supplies. They had, however, persistently refused to take sides in the wars of the Macedonian generals. They maintained a rigid neutrality and busied themselves in suppressing, so far as they could, the piracy that battened on the disturbed condition of the civilised world.

It was on this new seapower that Antigonus wished to vent the illhumour, provoked by his failure on the Nile; but he was

[1] Diodorus XIII. 75—Niese vol. 1 p. 324.
[2] Tarn's Antigonus Gonatas p. 85.
[3] Strabo XV. 652—Niese vol. I, p. 325.

prompted not only by spite. Could he but make himself master of the great naval dockyards and merchant marine of Rhodes, he might again try to overcome Ptolemy. The Rhodians did their utmost to appease Antigonus' anger. They raised statues to him and to Demetrius; they offered him any honours that he desired; indeed in the end they offered to help him openly against Ptolemy. To all the Rhodian envoys Antigonus made the same answer. They must give a hundred of their leading citizens as hostages and allow Demetrius and his fleet to enter their harbour. This, however, meant the surrender of Rhodian independence; and the islanders resolved, since they could not have an honourable peace, to defend themselves to the last man.

Demetrius collected in the harbour of Loryma, a seaport on the mainland opposite Rhodes, two hundred warships of all sizes and a hundred and seventy transports. On them he shipped an army of nearly forty thousand men with a number of horses and a vast store of food and war material. In addition, he took with him nearly a thousand ships owned by merchants to buy up the expected plunder of the rich city. While making these gigantic preparations, Demetrius did an abominable thing. He summoned to his standard all the pirates, against whom the merchant princes of Rhodes had waged an unceasing war.

When the great armada was ready, Demetrius put out to sea. He deliberately sailed past the city close in to shore. It was a fine day and the sun shone on the armour and weapons of his soldiers and the iron engines of war that had been fitted to the prows of his warships and transports. The soldiers and citizens of Rhodes ran to the walls, while the women and the old men thronged the windows of the houses, that rose in tiers like the seats in a theatre and gazed with terrified eyes, as vessel followed vessel in an endless procession.[1] Not far to the south of the town, but out of range of the Rhodian artillery, Demetrius disembarked. He made a strong palisade round his camp and built a mole to protect his ships against the weather. Having done this, he sent his pirates to lay waste the suburbs and countryside.

Whatever fears the display of Demetrius' warships may have roused in Rhodian breasts, the cruelties of the pirates turned them to flaming fury. They sent envoys to Ptolemy, Cassander and Lysimachus and begged their help; but at the same time they did all that men could do to help themselves. Every burgher of Rhodes was called to arms and all respectable, resident foreigners were invited to help defend the city. Even the slaves were enrolled and promised liberty and citizenship. All other aliens were

[1]Diodorus XX. 83.

expelled. Nor were the wives and children neglected. The government decreed that those who fell should be given public funerals and that their widows should be provided for at the state expense. Their sons on reaching manhood should be publicly crowned at the March festival of Dionysus and their daughters dowered by the Treasury. These measures roused still further the spirit of the citizens. The rich gave voluntarily their wealth; the poor gave their skill and labour for the purchase and manufacture of arms and munitions. Thus when the siege began the antagonists were not unevenly matched. On the side of the defenders were boundless energy and patriotism; on the other was the superhuman personality of Demetrius the Besieger, who at this time was in the very flower of his Satanic beauty, vigour and genius.[1]

The Rhodians did not tamely await Demetrius' attack. Before he had completed his preparations, they sent their three fastest ships to hinder them. The three vessels succeeded beyond expectation. They surprised Demetrius' merchant vessels and sank and burnt many; at the same time they took back with them a large number of captives, whom the Besieger ransomed at a fixed rate of a thousand drachmas for each freeman and five hundred for each slave. Not long after this sortie, the siege began. It was vital for Demetrius to make himself master of the Rhodian harbours of which there were two; for so long as they were in the hands of the defenders, it was impossible to blockade the town effectively. His first attempt was made in daylight with floating batteries and towers higher than the walls of Rhodes, from which his archers could shoot down the harbour guards. Behind the batteries came transports laden with picked troops; but a heavy sea favoured the Rhodians and dispersed Demetrius' ships. Shortly afterwards on a still night, the Besieger got a footing on one of the moles of the outer harbour and was very near to taking the town. For eight days his attacks continued. At one time, various parts of the walls were in Demetrius' hands, but in the end the storming parties were all killed, taken or put to flight. Demetrius was forced to take his war engines back to his own harbour. Even there they were not in safety; for the gallant burghers manned three of their largest ships and forcing their way into Demetrius' docks, set fire to and destroyed a number of his vessels and siege batteries. Demetrius waited for seven days, repaired the damage done by the raiders and made a fresh siege engine or Helepolis three times the size of his former ones; but a strong south wind sprang up and scattered his fleet. The Rhodians

[1] A wonderful description of Demetrius at this time is to be found in Diodorus XX. 92. Demetrius' good looks were extraordinary and his presence was so regal that strangers followed him in the streets, merely to stare at him.

took advantage of the weather and surrounding the men, whom Demetrius had left on the mole, forced them to surrender.

Ptolemy had received the Rhodian envoys, but he had no fleet that could match the Besieger's. He rightly decided that he could best help the beleaguered city by sending from time to time small squadrons of supply ships and transports specially built for speed, so that they might run the blockade. So long as Demetrius' men were entrenched on the Rhodian mole, no supplies could reach the city; but directly the men surrendered, Ptolemy's first squadron with five hundred mercenaries on board, many of whom were Rhodians in Ptolemy's service, sailed into the harbour. About the same time, a hundred and fifty mercenaries from Cnossos in Crete managed to slip into the city through Demetrius' patrols.

The Besieger, undaunted by his failures at sea, resolved to storm Rhodes from the land side. For this purpose he built a new Helepolis, an immense tower forty eight cubits broad and sixty six cubits high. It had several stories and could be wheeled sideways, forwards and backwards. To enable it to move up to the walls thirty thousand men were employed in levelling the ground; but the Rhodians met Demetrius' engines by building inner walls as fast as the Hellepolis battered down the outer ones. To get stone they pulled down their theatre and even their shrines, soothing their outraged divinities, by promising to rebuild them fairer temples in happier times.

About this time, the burghers fitted out nine ships, three of which they entrusted to Damophilus, three to Menedemus and three to Amyntas.[1] The two first commanders patrolled the coast of Asia Minor, the third the neighbouring islands. All three squadrons made great captures of transports and supply ships. Menedemus was so lucky as to catch off the coast of Cilicia a four-banked ship, that was carrying to Demetrius a quantity of splendid cloths and armour sent him, by his wife, Antipater's charming daughter Phila. This booty immensely pleased the Rhodians, who sent it as a gift to Ptolemy in Egypt. Amyntas, however, made a more useful haul. He captured a convoy of merchantmen, that were taking fresh war engines to Demetrius and was able to tow them into Rhodes and use them to defend its walls. Some of the burghers after this success made a proposal in the Rhodian assembly to throw down the statues of Demetrius and Antigonus, erected when they were the friends of the Rhodes. The majority with rare good sense rejected the proposal. The reason given was that Antigonus had deserved well of Hellas, by freeing her cities; but the real motive was the burghers' unwillingness to exasperate

[1]Diodorus XX. 93.

the fiery old prince and his son and so to render later negotiations impossible. Demetrius came to hear of the Rhodians' debate and to show his appreciation returned to them a beautiful picture painted by Protogenes. It had won the esteem of no less a judge than Apelles and Demetrius had secured it while plundering the suburbs.[2]

Demetrius failing to carry the walls from the land side by assault, tried to mine them; but when the mines had almost reached the town, some deserters betrayed them and the garrison successfully countermined and killed the miners. Demetrius next attempted to corrupt a Milesian captain called Athenagoras, whom Ptolemy had appointed to the command of the Egyptian contingent. Athenagoras promised to let in a body of Demetrius' soldiers and afterwards revealed the plot to the Rhodians. Thus when the Besieger's men entered the town, they were all made prisoners. The grateful burghers bestowed on the loyal mercenary a golden crown and five silver talents.

Since the attacks by land, the mines and the bribes had all failed, the Besieger renewed his efforts from the sea; but while the issue was still undecided a second Egyptian squadron laden with supplies entered the harbour. Demetrius hid his utmost to stop them, but the vessels admirably handled and favoured by the breeze, sailed before his eyes into Rhodes. Shortly afterwards some supply ships from Lysimachus and Cassander made the port in a similar way. Elated by these welcome succours, the burghers made a sudden sortie at night and burnt most of the Besieger's engines.

While Demetrius was repairing his artillery the burghers repaired their walls. Amyntas, who with his squadron was patrolling the Agean, was so lucky as to capture a pirate ship commanded by the arch corsair Timocles; and just as the siege was again being pressed, a third convoy from Ptolemy sailed into the outer harbour. On board were no less than fifteen hundred troops and abundant supplies. The convoy was shortly afterwards followed by missions from all the leading towns especially Athens; negotiations were opened but failed. Demetrius still insisted on garrisoning Rhodes with his soldiers. On the failure of the negotiations, Demetrius made an even more furious assault on the city and actually forced his way through a breach in the walls and established himself in the theatre; but the burghers, aided by the reinforcements from Egypt, counterattacked and after a desperate struggle retook the

[2]Plutarch Demetrius XXII. Cicero saw this picture at Rhodes and admired it (Orat. 2.5). Strabo (XIV p. 652) also saw it there in the reign of Augustus. Afterwards it was taken to Rome and put in the temple of Peace, where it was destroyed by fire.

theatre and drove out the storming party. This was the last great assault on Rhodes; for Antigonus, alarmed at the fearful waste of men and material, and also at the activity of Cassander in Greece, bade Demetrius get the best terms that he could and raise the siege.

Since everyone in Hellas, including the combatants, was anxious for peace, the terms were easily agreed upon. Antigonus dropped his demand that Rhodes should accept a garrison. The Rhodians were to retain their complete independence; in return they promised to be Antigonus' allies in all his undertakings, save only against Ptolemy. Thus in 304 B.C., the great siege ended after a year's duration. Demetrius had raised the whole art of siege warfare to a higher plane by his marvellous inventive genius; but he had wasted an entire year when time was precious and he had squandered vast resources with no result; for the terms on which he granted peace to Rhodes were less favourable than those offered to him by the burghers before the siege began. On the other hand, the Rhodian citizens suffered but little from the siege, for their gain in prestige and moral was enormous. Their sailors had made good their boasts and had kept the sea in spite of Demetrius' superior armaments. The Rhodian patrols now chased the pirates with fresh vigour and keener hatred. The Rhodian merchants, who had never lost their markets, fitted out bigger argosies than ever before. Nor did the burghers in the hour of victory forget the promises made in the hour of need. They freed their most valiant slaves, they rewarded their bravest fighting men and they built for their gods, whose temples they had pulled down, richer and nobler dwelling places than of old. With the money realised by the sale of war machines and other booty captured from Demetrius, the burghers erected a gigantic statue to Apollo. In ancient times it was deemed one of the wonders of the world. It is still remembered as the Colossus of Rhodes.

It was on Ptolemy that the grateful Rhodians showered most honours. They sent a mission to ask the oracle in the oasis of Ammon, whether they might worship Ptolemy as a god. The oracle told them that they might. The burghers thereupon built within the city itself a noble fane. It stood in the midst of a sacred enclosure and was surrounded by four collonnades. They named it the Ptolemaion. Therein they worshipped the Macedonian prince as Ptolemy the Saviour and sang hymns in his honour.[1] The descendant of Heracles, Zeus and Dionysus had become a god in his own right.[2]

[1]Diodorus XX. 100; Athenæus XV. 52. 696f.

[2]Deianira, the mother of the Macedonian dynasty, was, according to the accepted legend, the daughter of Dionysus. Both Heracles and Dionysus were sons of Zeus.

CHAPTER V.

Ipsus; The Battle of the Kings. (304-301 B.C.)

The siege of Rhodes over, Antigonus at once ordered Demetrius to Greece. Cassander had on Ptolemy's defeat at Salamis managed to secure Corinth; while Polysperchon acting for Cassander, had conquered most of the Peloponnesus. In the spring of 304 B.C., Cassander marched on Athens and defeated the Athenian fleet in a sharp action, reduced Attica and laid siege to the beautiful city. Demetrius set sail with three hundred and fifty ships and a powerful army. He disembarked near Aulis in Boeotia. Chalcis in Euboea opened her gates and Cassander, his communications with Macedonia threatened, was forced to retreat. All Central Greece from the Isthmus as far north as Thermopylæ, declared for Demetrius and six thousand of Cassander's mercenaries changed sides.

That winter Demetrius spent in Athens, where the Athenians paid him extravagant honours. In the spring of 303 B.C., Demetrius invaded the Morea. He stormed Sicyon garrisoned by Ptolemy. Corinth opened its gates, driving out Cassander's garrison;[1] and Polysperchon was soon reduced to the limits of Messene and Elis. Returning in triumph to Corinth, Demetrius renewed the Corinthian League founded by Philip II and he was elected as general of the free cities of Greece. Cassander sued for peace; but Antigonus would only grant it on complete submission. Cassander turned in despair to his brother kings, Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Seleucus, who were alike threatened by the all grasping ambition of Antigonus and his son. Indeed Demetrius at this time boasted that even the limits of Alexander's empire were too narrow for him.[1]

The four kings entered into an offensive and defensive alliance against Antigonus and Demetrius. Antigonus was at the time at Antigoneia on the Orontes, where he was holding high revel in honour of his new city and of his son's successes in Greece. He had sent at great expense for the most famous singers and actors of Greece and in spite of his age—he was nearly eighty—he was enjoying himself as if he had been as young as Demetrius. In the midst of this gay scene a bombshell burst. The news

[1]Diod. XX. 102, 103 Plut. Demetrius 25. Polyæn IV, 8.
[1]Niese Vol. 1 p 338.

came that Lysimachus had crossed the Hellespont and had invaded Asia Minor. Antigonus' general Docimus had betrayed his trust and had gone over to the enemy. Phrygia, Lydia and Perganum were in Lysimachus' hands; so, too, were many cities on the Ionian coast, notably Ephesus. There Lysimachus had found the hostages given by Rhodes to Demetrius and he had sent them home, thus freeing the Rhodians from their treaty obligations. It was high time for the old king to attend to business. He distributed two hundred talents among the Greek players and collecting a formidable army, marched against Lysimachus. The latter skilfully retreated before Antigonus into Phrygia, where he halted in a strong place near the town of Synada. Antigonus followed him and offered him battle; but Lysimachus wished first to unite with Seleucus. Antigonus tried to force his enemy to fight by cutting off his supplies; but Lysimachus was as great a master of the art of war as Antigonus. One night he retreated to Dorylæum on the borders of Bithynia. Antigonus again followed him and tried to wall him in; but before the circumvallation was complete, Lysimachus and his men slipped through the besieging lines and retreated northwards towards Heraclea. There Lysimachus was within easy reach of seaborne supplies, while Antigonus was far from his base and exposed to the winter storms, that shortly afterwards burst with great severity. The ground where Antigonus was camped turned into a morass; disease attacked alike soldiers and cattle. Antigonus fell back. His plan to destroy Lysimachus before he could unite with Seleucus had failed.

On Antigonus' retirement Lysimachus entered Heraclea, which he secured by marrying the Achæmenian princess Amastris, whom Alexander had assigned to Craterus, when he distributed Persian brides among his generals. For his part, Ptolemy had also not been idle; with a great force he had reconquered Syria. The danger to Antigonus was pressing. Demetrius' victories in Greece were useless if Asia was lost. The old king sent an urgent message to Demetrius, recalling him. The latter patching up a peace with Cassander that neither intended to keep,[1] sailed with his army to the Ionian coast, where he rapidly recovered Ephesus and the other cities taken by Lysimachus.

Cassander, rid of Demetrius, sent a force of twelve thousand men under his brother Pleistarchus to help Lysimachus, but only two thousand reached their destination. The rest were wrecked or taken by Demetrius' patrols. Seleucus' efforts to help his allies were more successful. At one time he had hoped

[1]The chief clause in the treaty was that all Greek cities whether in the provinces of Antigonus or of Cassander should be declared free.

to reconquer Alexander's Indian provinces, which had been overrun by Chandragupta; but that able prince had in the meantime overthrown the Nanda dynasty of Magadha and was now emperor of Pataliputra or Patna. The forces that he could oppose to Seleucus were such that although the latter had managed to fight his way across the Indus, he thought it better to secure his flanks and rear by a timely peace, thus leaving himself free to oppose the ambitions of Antigonus. He gave Chandragupta his daughter in marriage and resigned to him all his Indian possessions; in return he received a gift of five hundred war elephants. With four hundred and eighty elephants, twenty thousand foot and twelve thousand horse, Seleucus entered Cappadocia, within easy reach of Lysimachus and there spent the winter of 302—301 B.C.[1]

Lysimachus and Seleucus joined forces in the spring of 301 B.C., and Ptolemy sat down in front of Sidon. Before he could take the town, news reached him that Antigonus and Demetrius had overcome Lysimachus and Seleucus and were marching on Syria. Ptolemy raised the siege of Sidon and retreated to Egypt. He has often been blamed for this retreat, but it is difficult to know what else he could have done. If Lysimachus and Seleucus had really been defeated, their mercenaries would certainly have changed sides and Antigonus' army, swollen by new contingents and elated by victory, would have overpowered any force that Ptolemy had in Syria. The only hope left to Ptolemy was to retire behind the Nile and trust to its waters for his safety.

The news, however, was false. Lysimachus and Seleucus had not yet moved. Shortly after Ptolemy's retirement, the allies advanced on Phrygia, possibly intending to recover the Ionian cities and so shorten their line of communication. Near the frontier of Phrygia, at a town called Ipsus, Antigonus and Demetrius met them. The enemies were not unequally matched. Antigonus had more than seventy thousand infantry, ten thousand cavalry and seventy five elephants. Seleucus and Lysimachus had fifty four thousand infantry, ten thousand five hundred cavalry, four hundred and eighty elephants[2] and a hundred and twenty scythearmed chariots. The contest was bound to be decisive and Antigonus, who, ordinarily on the morning of a battle was in high spirits, was on this morning, gloomy and uncertain of success. The omens, too, seemed against him. Demetrius had dreamt the previous night that he had seen Alexander in brilliant armour. The Great King asked Demetrius what their watchword was. Demetrius answered that it was " Zeus and Victory." Indignant that it was not " Alexander and Victory," the Great

[1] Diodorus XX. 113.
[2] Diodorus XX. 113. Plutarch gives the number of elephants as 400.

King had gone away, saying that he would go to Lysimachus and Seleucus. Again when Antigonus was about to join the phalanx, he tripped and fell, hurting himself badly. Nevertheless, the stout old man, eighty years of age, rose to his feet and stretching his hands towards Heaven, prayed to the gods for victory or a painless death before defeat.[1]

The battle was opened by Demetrius. His cavalry drove the bulk of Seleucus' cavalry off the field, but in doing so bared the flank of his own phalanx. Seleucus, seeing this, rallied the remainder of his horse and so threatened Antigonus' phalanx that part of it deserted. The rest with Antigonus were ringed in by the great mass of Chandragupta's elephants. When Demetrius returned from his pursuit, he found his father completely cut off and he could do nothing to help him. The old king still hoped against hope for help from the victorious Demetrius, until he fell pierced by innumerable javelins. The Immortals had vouchsafed him his second prayer. On the death of the old king the battle was soon decided. The survivors of the phalanx surrendered and all that Demetrius could collect out of his vast host was five thousand foot and four thousand horse. With these and his brother in law Pyrrhus, the exiled king of Epirus, whose sister Deidameia he had married, Demetrius fled to Ephesus and thence set sail for Athens, only to find her harbour closed against him.

To use Plutarch's phrase, the conquerors carved up Antigonus' kingdom, as if it had been a carcase.[2] To Seleucus fell southern Phrygia and Syria and part of Cappadocia. To Cassander was given all Greece and his brother Pleistarchus was given Cilicia. To Lysimachus was allotted the rest of Asia Minor. Ptolemy was left out of this arrangement; but on the news of Ipsus, he reoccupied Hollow or southern Syria. Seleucus protested that this was part of his spoils; but to this agreement, Ptolemy had not been a party. It was idle to say that Ptolemy had not fought at Ipsus and therefore deserved nothing. He could not possibly have done so, for Ipsus was several hundred miles from his Egyptian frontier. By threatening Antigonus' rear, Ptolemy had prevented the withdrawal of the Syrian garrisons. Indeed the Egyptian king had so much reason on his side that Seleucus after an idle threat, took no steps to occupy that part of Syria in Ptolemy's possession.

[1] Plut. Demetrius XXIX.
[2] Plutarch's Demetrius XXX.

CHAPTER VI.

The Last Years (300—283 B.C.)

The loss of Hollow Syria rankled in Seleucus' mind and he and Ptolemy began to seek alliances against each other. Seleucus actually sought the friendship of the terrible Besieger, whose fleet was still mistress of the seas and whose genius was in its full maturity. To confirm the alliance Seleucus married Stratonice, Demetrius' daughter. Ptolemy sought the friendship of Lysimachus and gave him in marriage Arsinoe, his daughter by Berenice and gave to Agathocles, Lysimachus' son, Lysandra, his daughter by Eurydice. The unfortunate Amastris, no longer useful to Lysimachus, was sent back to Heraclea, where she was afterwards murdered by her sons.

Demetrius took advantage of his new relationship with Seleucus to conquer Cilicia at Pleistarchus' expense. Thereafter he attacked Ptolemy's possessions in Syria, seizing Samaria. Ptolemy, to keep Demetrius quiet, offered him the hand of yet another daughter of Eurydice, Ptolemais. Demetrius, who had quarrelled with Seleucus over Cilicia, accepted the offer and the bride. To get rid of Pyrrhus, whose sister Deidameia was dead, Demetrius sent him as a hostage to Egypt. There Pyrrhus won Ptolemy's affection and married Antigone, a daughter of Berenice by her first husband Philip (299 B.C.).

In 298 or 297 B.C, Cassander died and his death roused all the sleeping ambitions of his neighbours to the throne of Macedonia. Ptolemy did not contend for the prize himself, but he watched closely the movements of the Besieger, who was striving with dæmonic energy to repair in Hellas the disaster of Ipsus. In 297 B.C., Ptolemy sent Pyrrhus with men and money to Epirus to recover his kingdom and, if possible, to keep in check the Besieger. This stroke of policy proved eminently successful. Pyrrhus soon displayed talents for war hardly, if at all, inferior to the Besieger's. He at once established himself in Epirus, first as its joint ruler and after 295 B.C. as its sole ruler. Against Demetrius, Pyrrhus achieved all and more than all that Ptolemy could have wished. In 294 B.C., Demetrius, by treachery and murder, made himself king of Macedonia and a new terror to the other kings. In 287 B.C., he was again a fugitive, for Pyrrhus had driven him out and had established himself as king

of Macedonia in Demetrius' place. The latter, having no longer a throne in Europe, sought to drive Lysimachus from Asia Minor. He failed in his attempt, surrendered to Seleucus and died in confinement near Apameia on the banks of the Orontęs (B.C. 283).

While Demetrius was engaged in Greece, Ptolemy stripped him, when possible, of his possessions, elsewhere. In 295 B.C. Ptolemy sent a fleet to relieve Athens, then besieged by Demetrius. The attempt did not succeed and Athens fell; but Ptolemy consoled himself by retaking Cyprus. When in 286 B.C. the Besieger's offensive against Lysimachus had definitely failed, Ptolemy induced Philocles, a prince of Sidon and Demetrius' viceroy in Phœnicia to surrender to him Tyre and Sidon and all the seacoast of Phœnicia. Shortly afterwards Philocles, now in the Egyptian service, took the town of Caunos in Asia, the Cyclades and Delos; nor was this all. Ptolęmy's fleet sailed to Athens, drove out Demetrius' mercenaries and declared it a free city.

If Ptolemy did not take an active part in the fighting in Greece, he devoted himself wholeheartedly to the organisation of the kingdom of Egypt. He had one great advantage over the other kings, in that Egypt had had a regularly organised government for centuries; but much of the old fabric had crumbled away during Persian misrùle and Ptolemy had to rebuild the ancient structure, modifying it as he thought fit. Since Ptolemy claimed to have conquered Egypt, the country was his private property; it was " dorikteton " or won by his spear. Even the priestly domains became his. Having thus abundant lands in his gift, he attracted to Egypt Macedonian settlers, by the offer of rich allotments. His object was to create a permanent recruiting ground for his armies. The fellaheen of Egypt had been too long oppressed to make good soldiers; in any case they could hardly be expected to fight well for a foreigner. He also founded a Greek city Ptolemais near Suakim, which Ptolemy II greatly developed, in order to create a Hellenic centre in Upper Egypt.

Alexander seems to have intended to govern Egypt through Egyptians, but Ptolęmy I definitely departed from that policy and governed Egypt, as the English have until recent times governed India, through his own countrymen. The kingdom was divided into three great provinces, the Delta or Lower Egypt, Central Egypt and the Thebaid or Upper Egypt and over each province was a governor or Epistrategos. The provinces were divided into " nomes " or as we should say in India, collectorates. Over each " nome " was a strategos or collector, the unit of administration. The " nomes " were again divided

into " topoi " or to use the Indian term, " talukas "; and the " topoi " were subdivided into " komai " or villages.[1] The strategos had his epistates or district judge, his epimeletes or Treasury officer and his epistates of the phulakatai or District Superintendent of Police. It was the duty of the Strategos, as it is the Collector's, to gather in the revenue and administer the " nome." The revenue when collected was forwarded to the Epistrategos and by him to Alexandria. There the accounts were checked by the office of the Dioiketes or Finance Minister. Under the Dioiketes was the Oikonomos or, to use again an Indian term, the Comptroller General. The whole administration was under the personal supervision of Ptolemy, helped by the office of the Epistolographos or Private Secretary. The Nile formed a splendid administrative highway. Nowhere, except in the Delta, was the land cultivated at a greater distance than ten miles from each bank; and up and down the great river patrolled the royal fleet, ready to suppress at its inception any revolt against the godking's rule. Another fleet patrolled the Red Sea and chased or sank the dhows of the Arab pirates; for Ptolemy's admiral Philon had sailed as far as the straits of Babel Mandab and hugging the rocks of Perim Island had gazed in silent awe at the unknown sunlit waters of the Gulf of Aden.[1]

The choice of a capital must have given Ptolemy anxious thought. Two cities, both of which had once been capitals, still existed. One was Memphis near Cairo, just above the Delta. The other was Thebes, a considerable distance up the Nile. Thebes, Ptolemy probably rejected at once as far too hot for European settlement. Memphis could well be inhabited all the year round by Greeks, but it was far from the sea; and once Ptolemy had decided to make Egypt a Macedonian kingdom, he must be in touch with Greece. In other words Ptolemy's capital must be on or near the Mediterranean, so that it might continuously draw towards Egypt, not only Greek merchandise, but Greek men and Greek ideas. Naucratis, an ancient Greek city, was not far from the sea, but its traditions were too democratic, to be a suitable metropolis for a Macedonian autocrat. There was Pelusium; but it was a frontier fortress and therefore too exposed to the risks of war to be a convenient capital. One city remained, Alexandria. It stood on the extreme west of the Delta, near the mouth of the Canopic arm of the Nile, so called

[1] I have no space in this little book to do more than touch on Ptolemy's administration. Those who would know more are advised to read Bevan's History of Egypt, Tarn's Hellenistic Civilisation, Beloch's Griechische Geschichte, Bouché Leclercq's Histoire des Lagides and Strabo XVII p. 787.

[1] Beloch's Griechische Geschichte 3rd part vol. I, p. 292.

from the old Egyptian city of Canopus on its banks. There had long been, near the site of Alexandria, a native town called Rakotis, which served as an outpost against the wild tribes of Libya. Seven stadiums or about two miles from the coast lay the island of Pharos, the home of Proteus and his seals in the Odyssey. Behind Rakotis was the Lake Mareotis, which was separated from the sea by a stretch of limestone rock. On this stretch of rock the Great King had founded Alexandria. He had entrusted the planning of the town to a famous architect named Deinocrates, but the creation of the harbour was his own idea. This he effected by joining the island of Pharos to the mainland by a mole, on which, widened by the silt of the Nile, stands the modern city. Deinocrates fixed the boundaries of Alexandria on so generous a scale that his white marking earth gave out and his men were forced to use flour instead. A vast multitude of birds swooped down to eat the flour and this was regarded as an omen of the town's future greatness.

It is, however, doubtful, whether the omen would have proved true, had Ptolemy not applied his powerful mind to the development of the infant city. The first problem was to find inhabitants for its immense perimeter. The population of Rakotis was small, but Canopus was a large town. Ptolemy compelled or cajoled the bulk of the inhabitants of Canopus to exchange it for Alexandria. In this way he filled the Egyptian quarter. Next he had the singular foresight to induce great numbers of Jews to migrate to his new city from Palestine. This strange people could in ancient as well as modern times be of great help to those whom they liked. The Assyrian and Babylonian conquests of Samaria and Judæa had scattered the Jews throughout western Asia. Everywhere were to be found Jewish banks and Jewish correspondents. They had not only furnished an unrivalled financial machine, but also an amazing intelligence department. They helped Cyrus to take Babylon. It was largely due to their powerful help that Alexander had achieved the conquest of Syria and Egypt. They now at Ptolemy's call flocked to his capital. Indeed Egypt had always had a great attraction for the Jews. Even in the earliest times, certain among them had preferred the fleshpots of Egypt to the regions of the Sinai desert. After their occupation of Palestine they frequently migrated there and lost their faith. The dislike felt by their orthodox priesthood to this emigration may be gathered from the fiery denunciations of the Hebrew prophets. There were now, at any rate, no political objections to Jewish movements from Palestine to Alexandria, because both places were under a common government. Having settled in Alexandria, the Jews were never a source of trouble to the administration. The Ptolemaic like the English govern-

ment had the capacity and good sense to absorb its Jews and they gave to Alexandria their genius for trade, their unrivalled business capacity, their tireless patience and their unceasing labour. In course of time, the Jews, after the manner of their race, identified themselves wholly with the interests of their adopted country. Indeed they forgot their own tongue so completely, that the Old Testament had to be translated from Hebrew into Greek, so that the Jews of Alexandria might read and understand their own Holy Writ.

But Alexandria, the capital of a Macedonian king must above all be a Greco-Macedonian town. The Macedonian mercenaries were settled throughout the country, for a peasant stock was needed to furnish soldiers. Therefore to attract a civilian Hellenic population was the next problem and Ptolemy solved it thus. He first conveyed the body of Alexander, till then lying in its golden coffin at Memphis, to Alexandria. There he built over it a splendid Sema or Mausoleum and established a cult of the dead king and appointed priests to conduct it. This naturally attracted Macedonians and Greeks from all parts of the world. To make the tourists stay in Alexandria, something more was needed. To this end Ptolemy to his eternal glory founded the great Museum. In Demetrius of Phaleron, he discovered an admirable Director. Demetrius of Phaleron had, while autocrat of Athens, given much attention to education. Until his time education was not encouraged by the Athenian state; but Demetrius acquired the gardens adjoining the Lyceum and there built colonnades and open rooms, where teachers might instruct their pupils. This spot Demetrius called the Mouseion or temple of the Muses. So great a success had the Athenian Museum been, that when Demetrius of Phaleron was driven out of Athens in 307 B.C. by the Besieger and took refuge in Egypt, Ptolemy entrusted him with the foundation of a similar but larger Museum in Alexandria.

The king saw to it that the new University was adequately housed and had courts and cloisters, halls and lecture rooms. He endowed it with a splendid library and it very soon justified its existence. Theodorus and Hegesias came from Cyrene to teach philosophy; Stilpo and Diodorus taught dialectics and rhetoric; Philetas taught grammar, while Hecatæus presided over a department of Egyptian antiquities. Yet it was in mathematics and surgery that the greatest results were achieved. Euclid was appointed lecturer in mathematics by the king and wrote in the Museum, his Stoicheia or Elements of Geometry; and among his pupils was the immortal Archimedes. Anatomy and Physiology were entrusted to Herophilus or Chalcedon, who made some of

the most remarkable discoveries of antiquity. Allowed to vivisect condemned criminals, he found out among other truths that the nerves were connected with the brain, which was thus the seat of all passions and feelings; that the pulsation of the arteries was directly connected with the heart and was not induced by air as previously believed; and that the blood, owing to the action of the heart, was in constant circulation.

The poetic glory of Alexandria was to dawn later, but many students were busy with history. Hieronymus of Cardia wrote the story of Greece from the death of Alexander to the wars of Pyrrhus. Manetho, an Egyptian priest was persuaded by the king to write in Greek the annals of his own country. He has left us a book, that in spite of its many errors has yet laid down for all time the dynasties of ancient Egypt. Finally Ptolemy himself took up the pen and wrote an account of his own campaigns. The style was so simple and so modest that it was read with interest and pleasure many centuries later. Arrian made it the groundwork of his own history and its simple diction may well have influenced the style of the de Bello Gallico.

Ptolemy was not content with making his capital learned, he was resolved to make it rich too. One of his most notable feats was to introduce instead of the old copper coins of Egypt a really sound silver coinage. He issued the Alexandrian drachma or franc, first making it equivalent to the Rhodian and afterwards to the Phœnician standard. He also made current a tetradrachma or four drachma piece. His successors kept it at parity and it became the U.S.A. dollar of the ancient Levant.

The harbour of Alexandria and its means of transport were the king's special care. He added breakwaters to Alexander's mole, adding to the natural harbour an artificial basin known as Eunostos, now the harbour so familiar to passengers by the Messageries Maritimes. Leading out of Eunostos, he constructed a haven for his fleet, known as Kibotos.[1] He also joined to Eunostos Lake Mareotis and the Nile by an artificial canal. On the Island of Pharos he directed Sostratus of Cnidos to build the great lighthouse, the first of its kind and the forerunner of countless successors.[2] The light was created by an immense beacon fed with resinous wood. Convex mirrors increased its power. By day the gigantic column was visible to all merchantmen sailing off the Egyptian coast; by night the reflected glare of the beacon could be distinguished a hundred miles away. In this manner Alexandria became a mighty emporium. Its harbours

[1]Tarn's Hellenic Civilisation p. 146.
[2]Beloch's Griechische Geschiechte Part III vol. I. p. 291.

were crowded with Rhodian, Athenian and Syracusan vessels; while to pay for the Alexandrian imports, an endless succession of dahabeahs brought down the Nile cargoes of wheat and of oil—a royal monopoly—from the Delta towns; hides, ostrich feathers and ivory from Upper Egypt and the Soudan; emeralds from Aethiopia and pearls and spices from India and the Persian Gulf.

Alexandria, however, was not merely a port of transit. It soon became the busiest industrial city in the world. It had almost a monopoly of paper manufacture; for the papyrus plant grew only in Egypt. Alexandrian carpets and perfumes acquired fame all over southern Europe. The result was that before Ptolemy died, Alexandria had grown to be twice the size of Syracuse, three times the size of Athens and far bigger than Rome. The riches that came to Ptolemy from the wealth of his capital city and the immense extent of his wheatlands and his oil monopoly, he spent in beautifying Alexandria. It was the first town in antiquity to have streets built for horse traffic. Two mighty thoroughfares, each more than a hundred feet wide, intersected the city at right angles, while many other smaller roads were wide enough for carriages to pass each other. On each side of the streets ran endless colonnades to protect the wayfarer from the hot summer sun. The royal quarter or Brucheion with its barracks and palace and its endless gardens overlooking the tideless sea, must have been extraordinarily beautiful. Close to the Royal private park, Ptolemy laid out a public one, in the centre of which he made a zoological garden. There visitors from Greece could see gigantic pythons, panthers, buffaloes, lynxes and African deer and antelope of many kinds, while round the cages grew tropical trees and plants from all parts of Egypt and Cyrene.[1]

Still, perhaps the master piece of Ptolemy's policy was his conciliation of the Egyptian priesthood. The Persian kings and nobles were ardent monotheists, worshipping only Ahura Mazda; they disliked equally the polytheism of Greece and Egypt and they had destroyed impartially Greek and Egyptian temples. The result was that the Egyptian priests were the Persians' worst enemies and the many revolts against the Achæmenian kings were all fostered or abetted by them. A Hellene, however, had no fanatical dislike for the gods of Egypt; and Ptolemy sought for some formula that would enable Macedonians and Egyptians to worship the same divinity. Eventually he found the formula in the cult of Osirapis or Sarapis. Long before Ptolemy's time the Greeks settled in Egypt had adopted as their own the wor-

[1]The " Zoo " was greatly improved and enlarged by Ptolemy II; but it seems to have been created by Ptolemy I.

ship of Osir Hapi. Hapi was the name given by the Egyptians to the sacred bulls kept at Memphis. During its lifetime the sacred bull was deemed to embody the divine soul of the river of Egypt; sometimes it was identified with Ptah the Sungod. When the bull died it became still more sacred. It was identified with Osiris the god of the Lower World and received the name of Osir Hapi. It was embalmed and mourned for seventy days and then buried in a splendid temple near Memphis. The Greek residents had turned Osir Hapi into Osarapis or Sarapis and had called the Memphis temple the Serapeion. Ptolemy now installed the god Sarapis as the patron god of Alexandria. He pretended to have had or had a dream, wherein he received a divine order to bring a Greek idol from Sinope in the Black Sea, that resembled Asclepius. The new divinity became immediately popular with all classes; for the Greeks identified Sarapis sometimes with the god of healing and sometimes with Hades the god of the Lower World. On the other hand the Egyptians identified Sarapis with Osiris and so associated the new god to Isis, Horus and Anubis. Ptolemy erected in Alexandria a second Serapeion, gave it ample revenues and appointed to its service Egyptian priests. The grateful acolytes became Ptolemy's warmest admirers and so long as his dynasty lasted, it could always count on the devotion of the Egyptian priesthood.

At last, however, Nemesis looked with a malignant eye on the boundless prosperity of the Greek Pharaoh. In his old age he came to learn what other polygamous princes have learnt, that although a husband may compose the differences of jealous wives, he cannot so easily check the rivalry of their offspring. Eurydice's son Ptolemy was the eldest son and therefore the natural heir to the throne of Egypt; but he was an ungracious lad with a temper so violent that he was nicknamed Keraunos or the thunderbolt. Although Demetrius of Phaleron favoured the eldest son's claims, Ptolemy I decided to pass him over for Berenice's son, the talented and gracious Ptolemy II. The result was that life at the Egyptian court became impossible. At last the old king took his courage in both hands and to avoid a war of succession abdicated in his younger son's favour (285 B.C.). Eurydice and Ptolemy Keraunos fled to the court of Seleucus and Ptolemy II reigned in his father's stead. Ptolemy I was eighty three when he abdicated. He lived for two years afterwards, attending his son's court as his faithful subject. He died in 283 B.C. in the eighty sixth year of his age.

So passed away the first and, as I think, the greatest of my heroes. He had not the military genius of Antigonus or Seleucus, nor had he the superhuman energy of Demetrius the

Besieger; but he had what they lacked, a perfect knowledge of his own limitations. From the outset he saw that he could not claim with success the entire heritage of Alexander and he fixed his eyes on the throne of Egypt. Only once was he tempted from the course that he had laid down, namely when he sought to contract a marriage with Cleopatra. Nor was his ambition then unreasonable, for the husband of the Great King's sister might well, whatever his own abilities, lay claim through his wife to world dominion. Cleopatra dead, Ptolemy fell back on his first design and contented himself with the crown of the Pharoahs. Having won it, he made it more splendid than it had been since the days of the great Amenhoteps of the Eighteenth Dynasty. His fleets ruled the seas. His capital was the first city in the world; his treasure was immense and the pay that he could give his troops attracted to his service the best soldiers from all parts of Hellas. Cyrene was his and Palestine and Cyprus and the Grecian Archipelago. Courage, talents and good fortune had made this Macedonian noble the greatest man in three continents.

Of Ptolemy's appearance we know little. His coins show a fullfaced, capable man; and the charm of his manners lives in the pages of Diodorus. He was probably stout, for in later years stoutness was a family characteristic of the Ptolemies. Of all the dynasties founded by Macedonian captains his endured longest. Nor did his successors greatly deteriorate from the standard set by Ptolemy I. The wealth of the Lagid treasure reached almost fabulous dimensions. The Museum gained in glory as the years rolled by. There Theocritus wrote his Idylls, there Callimachus his epigrams and Apollonius Rhodius his epic of Argo and the quest of the Golden Fleece. There, too, Aristarchus commented on Homer, Eratosthenes compiled his geography and Aristophanes the Grammarian discussed Aristotle and Plato. The last descendant of Ptolemy to rule Egypt was the almost divine Cleopatra. Her charms and wit clouded the judgment of Cæsar and Marcus Antonius; and had the former not been murdered and had the latter not thrown away Actium, Alexandria would certainly have become the capital of the world and the Eternal City would have dwindled into a provincial township. Nor did the Roman conquest injure the prosperity of Egypt. Augustus claimed to have inherited the country from Cleopatra through Julius and he continued the Ptolemaic system of government. Under the Roman peace the daring Greek sailors of Egypt became more audacious still. The eastern trade so increased that Indiamen could be counted by scores in the harbour of Myos Hormos. Other argosies explored the Malay Peninsula and brought back such wealth that it acquired the name of the Golden Chersonese. Yet other merchant captains more reck-

less still, found too narrow the limits of the Indian Ocean; sailing ever towards the rising run, they burst into the Pacific and sold Mediterranean merchandise in the ports of China. Indeed, even to-day, evidence exists how well and truly the first Ptolemy laid the foundations of his kingdom. The tourist from India or Europe will, when passing through the streets of Cairo or Alexandria, be at once attracted by the endless succession of notices, written in the capital letters of ancient Hellas, over curio shops, tobacco shops and taverns and by flaming advertisements of the wines, the products and the newspapers of modern Greece.

PYRRHUS OF EPIRUS.

CHAPTER I.

Infancy and Boyhood.

Pyrrhus did not get his name from his red hair, as Macaulay seems to have thought,[1] but because his family claimed direct descent from Achilles, whose son Pyrrhus or Neoptolemus played a great part in the storm of Troy. Pyrrhus was the second cousin of Alexander the Great and the first cousin once removed of the Alexander of Epirus, who in 331 B.C. perished in Italy fighting for Tarentum against the Lucanians.

The father of Pyrrhus, Aiacides, had been placed on the throne by Olympias and shared in her downfall. After Cassander had captured and murdered Olympias, he drove Aiacides from Epirus and put in his place Neoptolemus[2] a son of the king Alexander, who had fallen in Italy.

Aiacides found shelter in the camp of Polysperchon. His enemies unable to reach him tried to kill his son Pyrrhus, who, born in 319 B.C., was an infant only two years old. Two devoted retainers Androcleides and Angelus hid the little boy and tried to carry him out of Epirus into the Macedonian town of Megara, where they hoped to find among strangers, the pity that was no longer to be found in their own land. As they were encumbered by nurses and attendants they were overtaken as they fled. The party then divided. Androcleides and Angelus gave the child to three trusted servants, Androcleion, Hippias and Neander and bade them flee to Megara. Androcleides, Angelus and the rest of the party stayed behind to parley and, if needs be, to fight to the death with their pursuers. They succeeded so well that darkness came, while they still fought and negotiated. Under cover of the night, they fled and caught up Pyrrhus and his guardians, only to be delayed by a flooded river close to Megara. After trying in vain to make themselves heard above the roar of the torrent, one of Pyrrhus' companions took a piece of bark and wrote on it the princely birth and grave peril of the infant fugitive. He then tied the bark either to a javelin or a stone and threw the

[1] "Ho! Bold Epirotes whither, Has the Red King ta'en flight?"
[2] See Genealogical tree.

message across the stream. The villagers, roused at last, made a floating bridge of logs and crossing it, helped the tired exiles to the further bank. By a happy chance one of the villagers who took in his arms the infant Pyrrhus bore the inspiring name of Achilles, the child's own heroic ancestor.

It was impossible to linger in Megara; so as soon as the fugitives had rested, they made their way to the court of the Illyrian king Glaucias. The barbarian monarch was sitting at home with his wife, when Pyrrhus' companions entered. They put on the ground the tiny boy and implored shelter for him. Glaucias was a kindly man and his feelings prompted him to befriend the little homeless prince; but he was no knight errant and the fear of Cassander was great in the land. The pitiless Macedonian, who had murdered Olympias, would not hesitate to invade Illyria to murder Pyrrhus. Just then the little boy crawled to Glaucias' feet, seized his dress and pulled himself upright; tired and hungry, he began to cry. The king was touched and said to his wife that since the prince had come to his knees as a suppliant, he could not send him away. Laughing, he picked up the little exile and putting him in the queen's arms, he bade her look after him, as if he had been her own son.

Having yielded to his humanity, Glaucias took steps to face the consequences. He opened negotiations with Polysperchon and Aiacides who were in Aetolia and in spite of an offer of two hundred talents from Cassander, he refused to surrender Pyrrhus. Thereupon Cassander attacked Aetolia and Illyria simultaneously. Against the former, he sent his general Lyciscus and he himself took the field against Glaucias, whom he defeated in several actions.[1] Then he was called away to Caria to fight against Antigonus the One-eyed. Aiacides took advantage of Cassander's departure to reenter Epirus, drive out Neoptolemus and again seize the throne. Not content with this success, he went, in 313 B.C., to the relief of the Aetolians. He was defeated and not long afterwards died of wounds.[1] There were now three claimants to the throne of Epirus. Pyrrhus, the son of Aiacides had the best title, but he was only six years old. Alcetas an elder brother of Aiacides was a grown man, but his cruelty and dissolute life had forced his father to banish him. Lastly there was Neoptolemus, the son of Alexander, who had already been king. The Epirots decided in favour of Alcetas' In 307 B.C., six years later, Alcetas. cruelties so exasperated his subjects that they rose and murdered him and his sons. Thereupon Glaucias brought Pyrrhus back to Epirus and the Epirots accepted him, although only twelve years old.

The young king prospered for a few years and in 303 B.C.,

[1]Diodorus XIX. 67.
[1]Paus. 1. XI. 4.

the marriage of his sister Deidamia with Demetrius the Besieger, strengthened his position. Then Demetrius was recalled by his father, Antigonus the One-eyed, from Greece to Asia Minor to join the operations, that preceded the battle of Ipsus; and in 302 B.C., the treacherous Epirots took advantage of a short absence of Pyrrhus at Glaucias' court to depose him and to recall Alexander's son Neoptolemus. Pyrrhus fled to the camp of Demetrius and played a distinguished part in the campaign. It ended badly for his side. In 301 B.C. at Ipsus, Antigonus the One-eyed was defeated and killed and his kingdom was divided between Lysimachus and Seleucus. His son Demetrius sent Pyrrhus to save, if possible, the remains of the Antigonid kingdom in Greece; but there was little left to save. Athens turned from the Besieger and the rest of Greece followed her lead. But Demetrius still had a powerful fleet and to secure its services, Seleucus took in marriage the Besieger's daughter Stratonice. The alliance of Seleucus and Demetrius led to another with Ptolemy the First of Egypt. On the death of Pyrrhus' sister Deidameia, Demetrius married Ptolemais, daughter of Ptolemy I, and as a hostage for the ensuing treaty, Demetrius sent Pyrrhus to Alexandria.

At the court of the wise and farseeing Ptolemy I, Pyrrhus throve greatly. Always averse from dissipation and skilled in all martial exercises, he won the favour both of the Greek Pharaoh and of his wife Berenice and received from them the hand of the latter's daughter Antigone. In 297 B.C.,[1] four years after Ipsus, Ptolemy lent his son in law a body of Greek mercenaries and some transports and bade him go and reconquer Epirus. Pyrrhus was only twenty two, but he was fearless and thoughtful beyond his years. The condition, too, of Epirus was favourable to a young adventurer. There was a numerous faction in the little kingdom, who had always hated Neoptolemus and his recent cruelties had alienated nearly all his subjects. On Pyrrhus' advent, the Epirots rose against Neoptolemus and he would again have fled the country; but Pyrrhus saw that were Neoptolemus to flee, he would seek the aid of some foreign power. Pyrrhus, therefore, offered him a share in the government. Neoptolemus accepted the offer, but burning with resentment, began soon to plot his cousin's murder. One day, during the annual sacrifices to Zeus at Passaro, a partisan of Neoptolemus, called Gelo, gave Pyrrhus two yoke of oxen. Pyrrhus' cupbearer Myrtilus begged them of his master. The latter refused and gave them to another. Myrtilus was offended and Gelo urged him to poison Pyrrhus' wine. Myrtilus although vexed was no traitor. He told his master and further testimony was obtained from a herdswoman called Phænarete,

[1]Schubert Geschichte des Pyrrhus p. 121.

who overheard Neoptolemus discuss with his sister Cadmeia the murder of Pyrrhus and reported the matter to the queen Antigone. Acting on this evidence, Pyrrhus had his cousin tried and executed. Pyrrhus thereafter was sole ruler.

The new monarch had none of the beauty of his second cousin Alexander of Macedon. His features inspired awe rather than admiration; and one strange peculiarity must always have marred his looks. The teeth of his upper jaw were not separated one from the other; they formed one continuous mass, slight depressions alone marking where the teeth should have been divided. But his lofty bearing, his frank, open expression and his cordial manner made up for his lack of beauty and it was not long before he was as popular in Epirus as Neoptolemus had been disliked.

CHAPTER II.

PYRRHUS' EARLY MANHOOD.

In B.C. 297, Cassander died of consumption[1] and his death opened a field for Pyrrhus' warlike talents. Cassander left behind him three sons, Philip, Antipater and Alexander; but Cassander had been a usurper and Pyrrhus, the cousin of Alexander the Great, had at least as good a claim as Cassander's sons. For the moment he disguised his ambitions and let Cassander's heirs ruin themselves by their own folly. Philip died of consumption not long after his father. Antipater and Alexander contested the succession. Their mother Thessalonice[2] tried to settle their quarrel, but was murdered by Antipater, who then drove Alexander out of Macedonia. The exiled prince sought help simultaneously from Pyrrhus and the Besieger. The latter was heavily engaged in the Morea. Pyrrhus offered the pretender his help in return for the border districts of Macedonia. Alexander agreed and Pyrrhus rapidly made himself master of his new acquisition. He made Ambracia his capital and building in it a famous palace known as the Pyrrheion, he adorned it with numerous works of art.

Yet if he delayed in his appointed task, he performed it efficiently once he set about it. He drove Antipater out of the rest of Macedonia and handed over to Alexander the diminished kingdom. Lysimachus, however, was Antipater's father-in-law and he would gladly have seen his son-in-law a vassal king of Macedonia. At this time, however, he was too busy to take any action himself, for he was preparing to meet Demetrius the Besieger, whose vast ability and restless spirit kept the whole civilised world in a fever. He, therefore conceived an ingenious fraud. He forged a letter from Ptolemy I, whom Pyrrhus all his life revered as a father, and in it, requested Pyrrhus to accept three hundred talents from Antipater and leave him in possession of Macedonia. Lysimachus, however, overreached himself, for Ptolemy had been in the habit of addressing Pyrrhus as a father was wont to address a son.[1] Lysimachus ignorant of this affectionate custom, began the letter with the formalities usual between the Hellenistic kings. Pyrrhus detected the fraud and sent Lysimachus a severe rebuke; at the same time he agreed

[1]Tarn's Antigonos Gonatas p. 12.
[2]Thessalonice was a daughter of Philip II.
[1]Plutach Pyrrhus VI.

to open negotiations with Lysimachus, inspired like him by a common fear of the Besieger.

The negotiations, however, did not end in a treaty. Whether Pyrrhus on reflection changed his mind or was influenced by his protégé Alexander, is uncertain; but when Pyrrhus, Lysimachus and Alexander met to ratify the proposed treaty by the usual sacrificial oaths and a bull, a boar and a ram had been led up for the sacrifice, Pyrrhus took advantage of the sudden natural death of the ram to pretend that the gods were unfavourable and to break off all further discussion of a peace. Alexander thus became king of Macedonia; for Lysimachus on the approach of Demetrius refused to fight against Pyrrhus on Antipater's behalf. The victory profited Alexander but little. He had, as I have said, summoned to his aid both Pyrrhus and Demetrius. The former had received as reward a large part of Macedonia; Demetrius wished for a similar reward. Alexander received the Besieger courteously, but assured him that his services were no longer wanted. Demetrius concealed his annoyance and invited Alexander to a banquet in Larissa to celebrate his success. The unsuspecting prince put himself in the Besieger's power and was murdered at the banquet. With all speed Demetrius marched on Macedonia and proclaimed himself king (294 B.C.).

It was about this time that Pyrrhus' first wife Antigone died. She had given him a son, the gallant Ptolemy and a daughter Olympias. On Antigone's death Pyrrhus married three wives. The first was Lanassa, the daughter of Agathocles, king of Syracuse; she brought to Pyrrhus Corcyra as her dowry. By her he had a son Alexander. The second was Birkenna, the daughter of Bardylis, king of Illyria. By her he had a son Helenos. The third was a lady whose name has not survived, but who was the daughter of Audoleon, king of Paionia, a little state on the northern frontier of Macedonia. But in his numerous marriages Pyrrhus did not find happiness. Lanassa resented the presence of the younger queens and in 291 B.C., went to Corcyra. There she invited Demetrius to join her and gave herself and the island into his keeping. The loss to Pyrrhus of Lanassa and Corcyra and the designs of Demetrius on the districts assigned to Pyrrhus by Alexander, meant war between the former friends and brothers-in-law.

In 289 B.C., the storm burst. With a great force of cavalry and infantry, the terrible Besieger invaded Aetolia, which was friendly to Pyrrhus, plundering as he went. Pyrrhus went to meet him. Demetrius left a body of men under his general Pantauchos to hold Aetolia, while he himself marched against

his brother-in-law. In the wooded hills of the Aetolian frontier, the two kings missed each other and Demetrius laid waste Epirus unopposed; but the peasants of Aetolia led Pyrrhus to where Pantauchos was encamped and a decisive battle ensued. Pantauchos, who was a man of great physical strength and skill at arms, challenged the king to a duel. To the joy of the Epirots, Pyrrhus accepted the challenge and overcame the challenger. Pantauchos was dragged away badly wounded by his staff. Pyrrhus, who had been only slightly hurt, led his troops to the attack. Fired by the spirit of their heroic leader, they were irresistible. The Macedonian phalanx was broken. Their losses in killed were very heavy and five thousand spearmen surrendered. The victory had the happiest results for Pyrrhus. Never again did the Epirots plot to drive out their king. From the day of the battle they were his devoted slaves. He became their idol, their god. They named him the Eagle and bore him aloft alike in victory and disaster. They claimed for him that while the other Hellenistic kings sought to copy Alexander's mannerisms and the peculiar poise of his head, Pyrrhus alone resembled the conqueror in his skill at arms and in his valour on the battle field.

The news of Pantauchos' defeat led Demetrius to evacuate Epirus and collecting the few remains of the beaten army, he retreated to Pella. There he fell dangerously ill. Pyrrhus was tempted by the news of his enemy's illness to invade Macedonia. At first the countryside offered no opposition, for the Macedonians bore no loyalty to Demetrius. But Pyrrhus' advance raised the Besieger from his sickbed. He assembled his troops and such was his diligence that he was close to Pyrrhus, before the latter realised that he had left his couch. Pyrrhus did not dare meet the great captain far from his own frontiers. He retreated skilfully to Epirus, which he managed to reach with the loss of part of his rearguard. Demetrius was at this time planning nothing less than the reconquest of his father Antigonus' old dominion. In the same year, he made peace with Pyrrhus confirming him in his Macedonian districts, but he kept Corcyra and Lanassa.

In the Autumn of 289 B.C., Demetrius, free from danger on the side of Epirus, began to collect the largest army and to create the largest fleet, that the Greek world had yet seen. His infantry numbered ninety-eight thousand, his cavalry twelve thousand; he laid the keels of five hundred ships, of which many had fifteen and sixteen banks of oars. Ptolemy, Seleucus and Lysimachus, the Greek kings of Egypt, Syria and Thrace, realised that by these preparations Demetrius was aiming at the

sole possession of Alexander's empire. Urgent letters went from all three to Pyrrhus, urging him to attack Demetrius at once and not to wait until the Besieger had conquered them and could devour Epirus at his leisure. At the same time, the threatened kings took action themselves. A great Egyptian fleet sent by Ptolemy sailed to Athens and in the winter of 289/288 B.C., supported a successful rebellion against Demetrius' son, Antigonos Gonatas, who held the city for his father. Lysimachus invaded Macedonia from the north-east and marched as far as Amphipolis, where he met Demetrius and suffered a severe defeat.[1] The Besieger pursued his beaten foe with his customary energy and had all but driven Lysimachus out of his European possessions, when to his dismay he learnt that Pyrrhus, persuaded by the instant prayers of Ptolemy, had invaded Macedonia from the west and had taken Beroia.

Demetrius had to abandon the pursuit of his first enemy to meet the second; but his change of plan affected grievously the moral of his army. They had to give up their dreams of the plunder of the rich cities of Thrace and Asia Minor and to return to Macedonia to fight the conqueror of Pantauchos. Of this discontent Pyrrhus became aware and skilfully turned it to his own advantage. He treated the captive garrison of Beroia with great generosity and sent many officers and soldiers back to Demetrius' camp. With them, Pyrrhus sent several Epirots disguised as Macedonians. Both captives and Epirots joined in praising Pyrrhus as both openhanded and invincible, the former to excuse their defeat, the latter because they had been sent by their king for that very purpose. When the hostile armies sighted each other, one Macedonian regiment after another garlanded themselves with oakboughs, the emblem of Epirus, and deserted. At last, those who remained true to Demetrius advised him to flee, as the whole army meant to transfer their allegiance. The Besieger acted on his friends' counsel. Disguising himself in a soldier's cloak and a broad-rimmed hat, he fled unattended. His troops plundered his tent; but Pyrrhus riding up, restored order and master alike of Demetrius' army and treasure, he became, without a further blow, King of Macedonia (287 B.C.).

The sudden collapse of his great plans seems at first to have clouded Demetrius' judgment. Dressed as a private citizen, he went to the Greek cities, garrisoned by his generals and mercenaries, as if he were a suppliant of their favours. When he found his garrisons still devoted to his cause, his courage returned. Assembling eleven thousand men, he appeared suddenly before

[1]Pausanias I. X. 2.

Athens. The unhappy Athenians were in despair. Thinking that Demetrius was powerless, they had let Ptolemy's fleet go back to Alexandria; and here was Demetrius with a large force beneath their walls. They sent messengers to Pyrrhus imploring his immediate aid; at the same time they sent a deputation of philosophers, led by Crates, to negotiate with Demetrius until Pyrrhus should arrive. Crates played his part so skilfully that he not only gained time, but actually persuaded Demetrius that it would do him no good to take the city. Demetrius embarked his troops and sailed for Asia Minor, hoping to win a new kingdom there, that would make up for the loss of Macedonia. After a brilliant campaign, he fell ill, was deserted by his men and in B.C. 285 was forced to surrender to Seleucus. In B.C. 283, the Besieger died in captivity.

Pyrrhus had hastened to Athens on receiving her appeals for help, but Demetrius had already departed. Pyrrhus behaved in a manner worthy of him. He ascended the Acropolis, sacrificed to Athene and returned the same day. As he bade the Athenians farewell, he warned them against ever opening their gates to another king. He was thinking of Lysimachus; for that skilful soldier was believed to be planning a descent on Attica. On leaving Athens, Pyrrhus at first made peace with Demetrius; but afterwards he drove his garrisons out of Thessaly and retook Corcyra. Once, however, Demetrius had surrendered to Seleucus, Lysimachus turned against Pyrrhus. The latter was not taken by surprise; foreseeing the treachery of Lysimachus, he had allied himself with Demetrius' son Antigonus Gonatas. But the allied forces were unable to make head against the Thracian army, led by the consummate skill of the old king. Pyrrhus was driven into Edessa where his supplies were cut off. At the same time, Lysimachus sent letters to Pyrrhus' Macedonian officers, upbraiding them with their loyalty to a foreigner, while he, Lysimachus, was a purebred Macedonian and a personal friend of the great Alexander.[1]

These tactics succeeded admirably. Pyrrhus had, it seems, caused some discontent by appointing Epirots to high offices in Macedonia and Lysimachus' letters fanned the discontent into open flame. So mutinous did the Macedonian troops become, that Pyrrhus withdrew from Edessa with his Epirots and marched back to Epirus. He thus after a short reign lost Macedonia precisely as he had won it (B.C. 285).

[1]According to Pausanias I. IX. 5. Lysimachus was one of Alexander's Macedonian bodyguard. One day, Alexander in a rage threw Lysimachus into a lion's cage. Lysimachus killed the lion single handed. Thereafter Alexander treated him as one of the noblest Macedonians.

In Pyrrhus' stead, Lysimachus became king both of Macedonia and Thessaly. Three or four years later he, too, came to grief. In his old age, he married Arsinoe the half-sister of Lysandra the wife of his son Agathocles and daughter of Ptolemy I. Arsinoe bore Lysimachus children and for their sakes began to plot against Agathocles. In course of time, she succeeded in poisoning Lysimachus' mind against his son; and in yet another Ptolemy, her half-brother, she found a skilful ally. This last known as Ptolemy Keraunos was full brother of Lysandra but had been disinherited in favour of his half-brother Ptolemy, afterwards known as Philadelphos. On his exclusion from the throne, Ptolemy Keraunos fled to Seleucus,[1] who made him promises but never carried them out. Ptolemy Keraunos left Seleucus' court in disgust and took shelter with Lysimachus. He was well received because of his two sisters. He, however, found them at daggers drawn and he, at first, hesitated to whose cause he would adhere. Finally he resolved to support Arsinoe and with his help, the young queen made Lysimachus believe that Agathocles was a traitor and order his execution. Lysandra fled with her children to Seleucus' court.

The ambitions of Seleucus and Lysimachus had long thwarted each other and the former above all wished to end his days as king of Macedonia. In his way stood Lysimachus and Seleucus gladly snatched at the wrong done to Agathocles to declare war against his murderer. On a summer day of B.C. 281, the two great old men, one eighty and the other over seventy, fought a decisive battle at Courupedion, a plain to the north of Magnesia, where a hundred years later, Scipio was to wrest from Seleucus' descendant the sovereignty of Asia Minor. Lysimachus fell in the battle and his army went over to the conqueror. Among those who surrendered was Ptolemy Keraunos. Seleucus greeted him cordially, but soon let him understand that he had no intention of putting him on the throne of Egypt. Seleucus was the only companion of Alexander left and to him, so he deemed, had now fallen the whole heritage of his master.

Seleucus openly declared that he would end his days as king of Macedonia and of all her appanages. There was only one way to defeat the old man's schemes and that was to murder him. Close to Lysimacheia, Ptolemy Keraunos struck down Seleucus with his own hand and fled into the city. The Macedonian veterans of Lysimachus declared for him as the avenger of their old leader and he proclaimed himself king of Macedonia.

[1]Tarn's Antigonos Gonatas p. 124. Ptolemy Keraunos was *twice* at Seleucus' Court.
[1]Memnon 12.

He had various rivals to face. Seleucus' son Antiochus declared war on him, but Antiochus was the son of Apama, the daughter of the Persian Spitamenes. His mother's blood strengthened his hold on Persia, but to the Macedonians he was a half-caste and no more popular with them that a half-caste pretender would be in England. Antigonus Gonatas claimed Macedonia as the son of Demetrius, but Demetrius had no better title than Ptolemy Keraunos. The Macedonians showed no wish to fight for Antigonus and in the spring of 280 B.C., Ptolemy Keraunos destroyed his fleet at sea. Lysandra and her children suddenly disappeared from the scene; probably the dungeon of some fortress saw their end. There remained Ptolemy Keraunos' half-sister and Lysimachus' widow, Arsinoe and her children. Ptolemy induced her to marry him and then brutally murdered her sons, Lysimachus and Philip.[1] There was yet another rival, Pyrrhus. His claims to Macedonia were the strongest of all, for he was the second cousin of Alexander; but he had already experienced the instability of the Macedonian throne. A wide field, moreover, for his ambition had suddenly opened in Southern Italy. He thus did not oppose Ptolemy Keraunos' accession and the murderer of Seleucus became king of Macedonia.

[1]Justin 24. Cap. 3.

CHAPTER III.

The First Italian Campaign.

In 281 B.C., an embassy from Tarentum had reached Pyrrhus, inviting his help against the Romans. The Tarentines were no strangers to the Epirot prince. When he recovered Corcyra, he had been helped by the Tarentine fleet.[1] Moreover, the Alexander of Epirus who had fought for Tarentum, was his first cousin once removed. The cause of the embassy was the swift and terrible rise of Rome.

Formerly it was the Lucanians and Samnites who pressed on the Greek cities of the south; now the Lucanians, Samnites and Hellenes were united by their common dread of the "wolves of Italy." In 283 B.C., the Gallic Sennones had been expelled from the north. In B.C. 283 and B.C. 282 the Boii and the Etruscans had been defeated at Vadimo and Populonia. In B.C. 282 the consul Gaius Fabricius Lucinius defeated the Lucanians in front of Thurii and garrisoned that town as well as Rhegium. The Tarentines had observed with sullen resentment the Roman successes, but the garrisoning of Thurii exasperated them. They had themselves on a previous occasion rescued Thurii and they regarded the Roman occupation as a direct blow at their position among the cities of Magna Graccia. Their exasperation came to a head when a Roman fleet under Publius Cornelius, in spite of an ancient treaty by which the Romans had bound themselves not to sail their ships to the east of the Lacinian promontory, cast anchor without apology or warning in the harbour of Tarentum. The festival of Dionysus was in progress and it is probable that the Romans came on the invitation of the aristocratic party to overthrow the existing government. If that was their purpose, they did not achieve it. The Tarentine mob rose, boarded the Roman ships, killed Publius Cornelius and either butchered or enslaved the sailors; they then marched on Thurii, drove out the Roman garrison and inflicted on the town severe penalties for having joined with the barbarians against Hellas.

The Romans had no wish for war with Tarentum. They were sufficiently occupied elsewhere, but they could not desert their aristocratic allies in Thurii and other Greek cities. They sent an embassy under Postumius and demanded by way of satisfaction the release of the captive sailors, an indemnity to the

[1]Paus. I. XII. I.

Thurian aristocrats and the surrender of the ringleaders concerned in the attack on the Roman ships. The mobleaders of Tarentum were in terror of their lives. If they were surrendered to Rome, they would certainly be executed. On the other hand if Postumius were granted a hearing, he might convince the Tarentines that the surrender of a handful of demagogues was better than the risk of a war with Rome. The Roman envoys entered the theatre, but the demagogues had packed it with their own adherents. They mocked loudly at the envoys' dress and when Postumius began to speak in Greek, they shouted with laughter at his barbarous accent. While he still strove to make himself heard, a certain Philonides went close to him and smeared his dress in the filthiest way possible. The mob applauded the coarse insult reckless of consequences. Postumius gave up the attempt to deliver his message. He spoke to the Tarentines in tones so solemn that they were constrained to listen and foretold them that their laughter would be turned to weeping and that his soiled robe would soon be washed clean in their blood.

In spite of the envoy's threat, the Roman Senate resolved to give the Tarentines yet another chance. An army under Lucius Aemilius Barbula, who had been sent into Samnium, moved south towards Tarentum and again offered the burghers the same conditions as Postumius. But the democratic leaders had already sent a mission to Pyrrhus and were not going to make any treaty with Rome that involved their surrender. They sent against Lucius Aemilius Barbula a body of town militia, who were without difficulty dispersed. The consul then laid waste the Tarentine fields and country houses. This again put the question in doubt and a certain Meton, a worthy individual and no doubt a member of the aristocratic party, dressed himself as a reveller and with a garland round his brow and a flute girl in front of him, went dancing into the assembly. The mob laughed and called on Meton for a song. Meton's behaviour was but an artifice of rhetoric. Instead of singing a song, he turned to the crowd and bade them laugh and sport while they could, for when Pyrrhus came, they would have neither taste nor time for amusement. The orator's device had a great effect and had votes been counted then and there, the Roman terms would have been accepted. But the demagogues were playing for too great a stake. They sprang to their feet, reviled Meton as a drunkard and had him turned out of the assembly. War with Rome was immediately proposed and decreed.

On the arrival of the Tarentine embassy, Pyrrhus insisted that he should be given the sole and unfettered command of the allied troops. This the envoys were not empowered to confer

on him. So they returned to Tarentum for further instructions. On the declaration of war the Tarentines sent a second embassy, granting the Epirot king all his demands. Pyrrhus had already begun his preparations in spite of the remonstrances of Cineas, the Epicurean philosopher, his favourite adviser. A charming story is related by Plutarch how Cineas tried to disuade the Epirot king from the expedition. The Epicurean asked the king what he intended to do after he had conquered the Romans. Pyrrhus replied that he meant to conquer all Italy, " And then?" asked Cineas—" I shall then conquer Sicily." " And then?" I shall go and take Carthage." " And then?"—"I shall return and with my vastly increased resources I shall recover Macedonia and rule over all Greece." " And then?"—" Then," answered Pyrrhus with a smile, " we shall sit and drink and talk together." " In that case " replied Cineas, " why not sit and drink and talk together now, instead of wearing out your life in pursuit of what you have already attained?" Pyrrhus very rightly refused to be moved by this sophistry and indeed Cineas' advice was contemptible. Had Pyrrhus stayed at home and " soaked " his life away, he would probably have been driven out of Epirus by a rising and replaced by a worthier monarch. He would then have been an exile and probably unable to procure himself food, much less drink. And he would certainly have had nothing whatever to talk about.

Heedless of Cineas' counsel, Pyrrhus enlisted in Epirus all the men whom he could and asked the other Hellenic kings to assist him. Ptolemy Keraunos, who was glad to make a golden bridge for his one serious rival, sent him five thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry and a number of elephants, that Demetrius had brought from Asia and that had passed from one Macedonian ruler to another. He also bestowed on the Epirot king the hand of his daughter Ptolemais and no doubt promised him further help. Pyrrhus obtained from Antigonus Gonatas the loan of a few transports. He asked for and may have received money from Seleucus' son Antiochus.

In the autumn of 281 B.C., and before he had fully completed his preparations, Pyrrhus sent to Tarentum, Cineas and an experienced officer named Milo with three thousand troops. They arrived none too soon. The Tarentines had already begun to repent of their decision and had sent Agis, a man favourable to the Roman cause, to reopen negotiations with the consul Lucius Aemilius Barbula. The arrival of Milo and his contingent put a stop to the vacillation of the Tarentines. Under Milo's leadership they drove the consul out of their territory and from their warships

[1]Schubert's Pyrrhus p. 168.

harried his retreat, as he marched along the coast. The Tarentine envoys had promised Pyrrhus an allied force of three hundred and fifty thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, but Milo wrote to inform Pyrrhus that the force in question had no existence. On receiving this proof of Tarentine mendacity the king redoubled his labours; and by the spring of B.C. 280, he had assembled on the coast a fine army. It numbered twenty thousand regular infantry, two thousand archers, five hundred slingers, three thousand cavalry and twenty elephants. With the king went the king's two younger sons : Alexander and Helenus. His eldest son Ptolemy a splendid lad of fifteen, stayed in Epirus as regent.

On a fine spring day the royal transports set sail. But a sudden gale overtook the Armada at the mouth of the Adriatic. The ships were scattered, many were dashed against the rocky coast. Pyrrhus himself sprang into the raging waves from his galley, as it was about to crash upon the cliffs. His devoted officers sprang into the water after him; and although many lives were lost, the king struggled safely to shore. He wasted no time. He did not await the arrival of the scattered transports, but marched with two thousand men, a few troopers and two elephants on Tarentum. On the way, Cineas with a portion of the garrison met him and their united forces entered the city. Pyrrhus took no definite action until his ships had brought the rest of his troops safe to land. He then demanded of the Tarentines the vast army that their envoys had promised him. As they could not produce it, he set to work to create one. He levied money from the rich citizens and enlisted the Tarentine youth. In vain the Tarantines objected that they had not contracted to fight, but only to defray the king's expenses. He replied with justice that they themselves had broken the contract by not producing the promised three hundred and fifty thousand men. Many of the conscripts succeeded in escaping to Rome; but the king stopped this leakage, by closing the city gates and posting Epirot guards at all the exits. The aristocratic element began to plot against him. He retorted by quartering his troops in their houses and sending a number of them as hostages to Epirus. The most unruly he put to death. In this way he made himself master of Tarentum and was able to turn his attention to Rome.

The Romans had in the meantime had their own difficulties. The news of the landing of Pyrrhus had spread unrest throughout Italy. The Romans overcame the unrest by garrisoning the doubtful towns and executing a number of the more patriotic citizens. They levied a great subsidy, required full contingents from their allies and enrolled a number of the proletariat, who ordinarily were exempt from service. One Roman army remained

in reserve at Rome. A second army under Tiberius Coruncanius marched into Etruria. A third was sent to overawe the Samnites. The largest army of all, numbering fifty thousand men was sent under the consul Publius Laverius Lævinus to seek out Pyrrhus. In one place the Roman activities defeated their own ends. The Roman garrison consisting of four thousand Campanians and Sidicines mutinied and massacred the citizens of Rhegium and seized their wives and daughters. They then took and killed the Roman garrison at Croton and Caulonia and sought an alliance with Pyrrhus. The king refused to accept the friendship of bandits, who had treacherously seized a Greek city; by this refusal he incurred their lasting enmity.[1]

Lævinus' plan of campaign was judicious. In May, 280 B.C., he marched on Heraclea, which was on the banks of the Siris river and near the sea coast between Tarentum and Thurii. His object was to overawe the Lucanians, whose country was on the western coast south of Naples; they were known to be anxious to rise in Pyrrhus' favour. It was, therefore, essential for Pyrrhus, if he wished to obtain the help of the Lucanians, to drive Lævinus out of Heraclea and reopen communications with them. Pyrrhus first, probably to gain time, sent a herald to Lævinus' camp, offering his services as mediator between Rome and Tarentum. Lævinus haughtily replied that the Romans neither needed him as a mediator nor feared him as a foe. Pyrrhus in the meantime was rapidly advancing and pitched his camp between Heraclea and Pandosia, that is to say on the left or Tarentine bank of the little river Siris.

From where his army halted, Pyrrhus could see the Roman camp. Riding with his staff to the river bank, he gazed long and earnestly at the Roman troops manœuvring. Their tactics were such as he had never seen before. He had fought against barbarian hordes and trained spearmen, but he had never beheld a Roman legion exercising. Two points must at once have struck him. First the open order in which they drilled as opposed to the dense mass of the phalanx; secondly their preference for swords instead of spears. He turned to one of his staff officers, named Megacles and said: "The discipline of these barbarians is not barbarous; but the result will show us whether it has any real merit."[1] He probably thought that the Roman swordsman, although he seemed to know his drill, would in a hand to hand fight, be no match for the phalangist; and in spite of a great inferiority in force, he resolved to give battle to the Romans.

[1]Holm. Gesh. Sie Vol. 2 p. 280, see also Niese Vol. 2 p. 32. Dion. Hal XX. 4 puts the number at 800 Campanians and 400 Sidicines.

[1]Plut. Pyrrhus XVI.

Lævinus on his side was confident of victory and did not realise that the Epirots and Macedonians, led by the first Greek soldier of the time, might prove more serious enemies than the town militia of Tarentum. Pyrrhus had posted patrols at different points along the Siris, but Lævinus had no difficulty in crossing it. While the Roman infantry feigned a frontal attack, their cavalry forded the river, both up and down stream and outflanked the Greek patrols. These fell back pursued by the Roman cavalry. Pyrrhus covered their retreat by sending against the enemy some of his own three thousand horse. At the same time he drew up his infantry in the serried order of Macedon and led them to attack the legions, that were now crossing the river unopposed.

Conspicuous in his splendid armour, Pyrrhus attracted all eyes in both armies. His swordmanship, his presence of mind, his courage and resourcefulness rejoiced the Epirots, but so annoyed the Romans, that an Italian captain of horse named Ophlax or Oblacus, resolved, either of his own accord or because he was detailed to do so, to engage the king in a personal combat and kill him, if necessary, at the cost of his own life. Happily a Macedonian called Leonnatus, observed Ophlax' movements and warned the king against him. Pyrrhus replied carelessly: "Leonnatus, what is fated no man can escape. But if that Italian or any other come to fight me, he will rue it." The words had hardly left the king's lips, when Ophlax charged and drove his spear into the king's horse. Leonnatus at the same moment struck down Ophlax' horse and king and captain fell together. The Italian was soon despatched by the royal staff and Pyrrhus was at the same time dragged to his feet. In spite of his previous indifference, the king profited by the lesson and calling up Megacles, the same officer to whom he had criticised the Roman army, exchanged with him armour, cloak and helmet. He then took his place by the phalangists, who were giving way before the legions. The battle raged for several hours and seven times in turn victory inclined to the Romans and to the Greeks. At last a Roman called Dexous or Decius cut down Megacles, spoiled him of Pyrrhus' cloak and helmet and riding up to Lævinus, shouted that he had killed the king. The Romans were as elated as the Epirots were dejected; and the battle would soon have been a victory for Lævinus, if Pyrrhus had not with great daring, ridden in front of his lines with uncovered face and head and encouraged them with the news that their Eagle king was still alive and unwounded.

At this point Lævinus, who had kept in reserve a body of cavalry ordered them to charge the phalanx in flank. Pyrrhus

met this move by calling up his elephants. The Roman cavalry horses, whose riders had, it must be remembered, no stirrups, became uncontrollable and broke back through the legions. Through the gaps that they created followed the elephants. The legions fought valiantly but had to give ground. Upon the retreating Romans, Pyrrhus loosed his Thessalian cavalry, lent him by Ptolemy Keraunos. They were the most famous horsemen in Greece. The retreat became a rout and then a flight. Indeed, had not the first hastate of the fourth legion Gaius Minucius wounded the leading elephant which turned and spread a panic among the Epirot infantry, the Roman army would have ceased to exist. As it was, the Thessalian horse took a fearful toll of the fugitives. Seven thousand legionaries lay dead on the field. Six thousand wounded were carried off by their comrades. Two thousand prisoners fell into the king's hands. The Roman army still greatly exceeded that of Pyrrhus; for his forces had never numbered more than twenty-five thousand men. But the moral of the legionaries was badly shaken. Lævinus had no other wish but to put the greatest possible distance between himself and his enemy. He and his men fled into Lucania where he collected the garrisons, that he had left there and he never rested until he had marched into Apulia and sheltered himself behind the river Aufidus.

Pyrrhus had indeed lost heavily. Four thousand Epirots and Macedonians lay dead on the field. Among them were several of his staff and of his higher officers. That, however, was not the reason why he did not pursue the enemy. His victory was complete. He had gained everything for which he had fought. His communications with the Lucanians were now unhindered and they and the Samnites and the Bruttians openly declared for Pyrrhus. All the Greek cities, except Rhegium, followed suit and a Roman garrison—so great was the terror of Pyrrhus' name—allowed themselves without resistance to be surrendered by the burghers of Locri.[1] In other words, Rome, as the result of this "Pyrrhic victory," lost nearly half her dominion. This was not all. The Etruscans, who had been depressed by a series of defeats, took new courage. No fresh troops could be raised at Rome to meet the growing danger and the Senate began to think that it might be well to make peace.

Pyrrhus had, no doubt, excellent sources of information; for at this point, while the senate were still irresolute, the silver-tongued Cineas appeared in the great city. He prefaced his negotiations with flattery and with the offer of presents to the leading senators; but the terms that he was instructed to hold

[1]Justin XVIII. I.

out were hard. He demanded the freedom of all the Greek towns in Italy and the restoration of the recent Roman conquests to the Samnites, Lucanians and Bruttians. Had the terms been a little less severe, the Senate might perhaps not have rejected them; but to have accepted these terms would have shattered the Roman supremacy in Italy.

Even so, there was a large party in favour of peace. At last the question was settled by the timely arrival of Appius Claudius. This venerable senator had been forced by blindness and old age to give up his public duties; but exasperated at the rumour that the Senate thought of accepting the severe conditions of Pyrrhus, he had himself carried in a litter to the Senate house. At the threshold his sons and sons in law lifted the old patrician out of his litter. Plutarch has handed down to us a fine description of the fiery old noble's speech. He sneered at the Romans for having boasted, as indeed throughout their history they continued to do, that if Alexander the Great had come to Italy, he would have failed to achieve anything; yet here they were ready to make peace with Pyrrhus, a man with none of Alexander's resources. Why, he was not even a Macedonian, scoffed Claudius, but a wretched Epirot, who had been driven with ignominy out of Macedonia when he aspired to rule it! If the Romans yielded now to Pyrrhus, they would have to make fresh concessions to other Greek adventurers. The old senator then indicated the real way to create a fresh army. Let them grant Eturia a favourable peace. Isolated as she was, she would snatch at it and the legions that were holding the Etruscans in check would be available against Pyrrhus. The eloquence, the reputation and above all the sound sense of the venerable statesman carried the day. The august body informed Cineas that if Pyrrhus wanted peace, he must first leave Italy. Then they would willingly grant him their friendship and alliance; but so long as he and his foreign soldiers remained on Italian soil, the Roman people would continue the war.

Cineas took back the reply of the Senate and Pyrrhus renewed his warlike preparations. He first tried to win to his side his two thousand Roman and Latin prisoners. They were not mercenaries but conscripts and they firmly refused his offers. He then resolved to march into Campania, hoping, no doubt, that Capua and Naples would rise in his favour, just as the Samnites and Lucanians had done. In the meantime, the arrival of a large number of Roman youth who, although under age had patriotically volunteered, had restored to some extent the moral of Lævinus' army. He moved from Apulia and successfully protected Capua and cut the king's communications with Naples. Pyrrhus then

marched into Latium and so great were still the consul's fears, that he allowed Pyrrhus to surprise Fregellæ,[1] force the passage of the Liris and reach Anagnia[2] not more than forty miles from Rome. The king had thus shewn the Italians that he could insult with impunity the imperial city. But to his disappointment neither Campania nor Latium rose. The Campanians had no wish to fight on the same side as their ancient enemies the Samnites. The Latins were too closely allied by speech, blood and custom to desert Rome at the call of a foreigner. Pyrrhus' advanced position now became dangerous. Tiberius Coruncanius, the consul who commanded in Etruria, had carried out the Senate's instructions and had made peace. He would soon join Lævinus with an unbeaten army. In Rome there was a reserve under Cnæus Domitius Calvinus, who had been appointed dictator. Pyrrhus had reduced his army by garrisoning the conquered towns and were he to go nearer Rome, he would find himself encircled by three hostile forces, each larger than his own. The fair season was drawing to a close. He decided to retreat. The retirement cost him some loss of reputation; for it shewed those Italians who were waiting on events, that Pyrrhus was not yet strong enough to besiege Rome. The king quartered his troops among the Greek cities in southern Italy. He himself passed the winter in Tarentum. He had plenty of work on his hands; for he had to make an army out of the various allied contingents and he had to decide how best to make their formations work with his. The native Italians had their own system of drill, which resembled the Roman system. Should he let them continue their movements as before or should he train Italians and Italian Greeks alike to the use of the sarissa.

The question must have cost him anxious thought. The time was short to teach the Lucanians and Samnites new manœuvres and he might turn good legionaries into useless phalangists. On the other hand two different formations would increase the difficulties of his staff. He eventually decided, as Dundee decided before Killiecrankie, to leave his allies to their own methods. He kept his Epirot phalanx in the centre. On the wings he put his Lucanian and Samnite cohorts and posted bodies of Macedonian troops trained in the Italian drill between the Italians, so as to cement them together.[1]

In the spring of 279 B.C., Pyrrhus again took the field and marched into Apulia, wherein Lævinus had sheltered himself after Heraclea. The Romans would either have to fight or resign themselves to the loss of their Apulian allies. But the loss of

[1]Florus I, 18, 24. [2]Appian. Samn. 10.
[1]Polyb. XVIII. 28. 10.

Apulia would mean that Pyrrhus would have uninterrupted communication with Samnium and through Samnium with Etruria. Rome and Latium would have been menaced by enemies on three sides. The Romans were forced to accept the king's challenge. Pyrrhus reached Apulia first and had taken several towns when he was faced near Asculum, now known as Ascoli di Puglia, by a great Roman force, commanded by the two consuls, Publius Sulpicius and Publius Decius. The armies on both sides were formidable in size; Pyrrhus had still sixteen thousand Epirots and Macedonians, and with the allied contingents, his troops numbered no less than seventy thousand infantry. The Roman infantry were still more numerous and no less than twenty thousand were Roman citizens. Both commands could dispose of about eight thousand cavalry.[1] Of his twenty elephants, Pyrrhus still had nineteen; on the other hand, the Romans had constructed a number of war chariots from which poles with iron spikes projected. It was thought that if the poles were dropped suddenly, the iron spikes would stop the charging elephants.

The Romans had entrenched themselves behind a swift river with steep and wooded banks, hoping thereby to check the Thessalian cavalry and the Indian elephants, both of which they greatly feared. The position was well chosen, but Pyrrhus did not hesitate to attack it. His phalangists forded the river in their eagerness to engage the legions. The phalanx, however, lost half its value in broken ground and seeing the spearmen advance in loose order, the legionaries rushed forward to meet them. All day long the battle raged and when night fell, the honours of the drawn battle rested with the Romans; but although the Roman troops were in no way inferior to the Greeks, the consuls were inferior in generalship to the king. In the early morning, while the Romans still slept in their fortified camp, he sent his light troops to seize the opposite banks of the river and the broken country in which the Romans had put their trust. When day broke, he rapidly got his cavalry and elephants across the river and was able to draw up his phalanx in close order on level ground. The Romans could no longer fight on a scattered front, for the very woods that should have protected their flanks were now in the hands of the enemy's archers and slingers; and among the trees, awaiting the king's orders, the legionaries could make out in the morning light the giant forms of the Indian elephants. The sight must have affected the legionaries' nerves. Nevertheless they fought as became Roman soldiers. Sword and shield in hand, they tried to break into the phalanx, as Aemilius' Paulus' men did afterwards at Pydna. But the ground was too smooth and the gallant Roman youth died uselessly on the Epirot spear points.

[1]Mommsen. Beloch puts the number much lower.

When the tide was turning, and Pyrrhus ordered his elephants to advance against them, the valour alike of conscripts and veterans was in vain. The war chariots proved of no value, for the light troops ran in and cut the traces. For a second time the Roman army broke and fled. Two circumstances prevented Pyrrhus from taking full advantage of his victory. In the course of the battle he had been wounded in the arm by a javelin and although the injury was not severe, it had to be attended to. Secondly, by a strange chance, a body of Daunian troops, sent from Arpi to join the consuls, arrived at the end of the battle. They made a detour and coming behind the Greek army, overpowered the guards in the king's camp and plundered it. Pyrrhus had to send some of his cavalry and elephants to disperse the Daunians and so was deprived of their help in pursuing the broken enemy.

The losses on both sides had been severe, but not unduly so, if we bear in mind the duration of the battle and the great numbers engaged. Plutarch has recorded that Pyrrhus exclaimed at the close of the day that if he were victorious in one more battle with the Romans, he would be utterly ruined. Yet seeing that he had only lost three thousand men out of his immense army, while the Romans had lost six thousand, it is difficult to understand what cause for complaint he had. No doubt he had lost many of his Epirots but so, too, had Rome lost many of her citizens. If Rome could make up her losses by fresh drafts, so could Pyrrhus. He sent for and obtained, without difficulty, money and reinforcements from Epirus. What, however, did the king harm was that " his allies were becoming indifferent."[1] After the manner of barbarians, the Lucanians and Bruttians thought that because they had won a battle, they were invincible and began to regard Pyrrhus' presence in Italy and their subordination to him with increasing dislike. The Tarentines who had stipulated that Pyrrhus was to leave when his presence in Italy was no longer needed, began to hint that the time for his return to Epirus had now arrived.

On the other hand, the news of Asculum had given a great handle to the defeatists in Rome. Of what use, they exclaimed, was the valour of Rome against the elephants of Hindustan? Any peace with Pyrrhus was better than a series of defeats, which might end in the loss of the entire Roman dominion. The war party was proportionately depressed and the Senate ordered the consul Caius Fabricius, the leader of the democratic party at Rome, to go as special envoy to Pyrrhus. As both parties wanted peace, the terms were soon arranged. The Romans were to acknowledge the independence of all the king's allies, that is to

[1]Plut. Pyrrh. XXI.

say of the Greek cities in Italy, of Samnium, Lucania and Bruttium. The territories conquered by the Romans were to be restored to the allies and prisoners on both sides were to be exchanged. As Etruria had made a separate peace, she was naturally not included in the treaty. Caius Fabricius, no doubt, expected that Rome would make the Etruscans and the Gauls in the north pay for her discomfiture in the south. When Caius Fabricius returned to Rome after a cordial leave taking of Pyrrhus, Cineas went with him to sign the treaty, for it still had to be ratified by the Senate and the people. No doubt the king and both envoys regarded the ratification as a mere formality. Unhappily for Pyrrhus, the good fortune that was true to Rome for so many centuries did not desert her on this grave occasion. The Carthaginians, who were besieging Syracuse, had come to know that the Syracusans had sent to Pyrrhus an urgent message for help. Now that Tarentum was out of danger, let the king come across the narrow straits and save another Greek city even more hardly pressed. But were Rome to make peace with the Epirots, there was little doubt but that Carthage would next feel the weight of his invincible arms. For Carthage, therefore, it was all important that Rome should continue the war against Pyrrhus, at any rate until the fall of Syracuse. One morning when the Senate were about to discuss the ratification of the peace with Pyrrhus, the news came that the masts of one hundred and twenty ships could be seen off Ostia and that the Carthaginian admiral Mago was himself coming up the Tiber to offer to the Senate an offensive and defensive alliance against Epirus. Once again, the Roman spirit rose; Mago came into the Senate and delivered his message. At its close, the peace party ceased to exist. With the mighty resources of Carthage at Rome's disposal, what did the elephants of Pyrrhus matter? The Senate refused to ratify the draft treaty and Cineas returned to Tarentum with the same reply that he had received after Heraclea. Let Pyrrhus leave Italy and Rome would willingly be his friend.

The first act of the new allies was to transport on Mago's ships a Roman force to Rhegium. Rome could never forgive the garrison of that city. The murder of Greek burghers was not unpardonable; for the Romans later forgave the Mamertines, who had been guilty of a similar offence. But the garrison of Rhegium had deserted and, worse still, they had massacred the Roman garrison of Croton. Rome, therefore, left Pyrrhus for the moment and decided to attack Rhegium. To this course, the Carthaginian admiral readily agreed. The Mamertines of Messina were the allies of Carthage and if Rhegium became Roman, the narrowest part of the straits would be in the hands of her allies. But the Rhegium deserters fought with the courage

of despair. For them, as they knew, the scourge and the axe waited and such was their frenzied valour, that the Roman attack failed entirely. On its failure the Carthaginian fleet sailed on and blockaded the north of the Syracusan harbour.

CHAPTER IV.

The Sicilian Campaign.

Syracuse the great city that had defied Athens and had for so many years been a match for Carthage, was at this time in desperate plight. In 289 B.C., Agathocles, the mercenary soldier, who first made himself tyrant and then king of Syracuse died of poison given him by Mainon, a beautiful youth from Segesta, whom the old man loved. Mainon fled to the camp of Archagathos a grandson of Agathocles and succeeded first in gaining his confidence and then in murdering him and in winning over his army. Mainon next tried to make himself tyrant of Syracuse; but Hiketas, the Syracusan general refused to admit him. Mainon then called in the Carthaginians. They forced the Syracusans to receive back Archagathos' army consisting mostly of Campanian mercenaries. They were barbarians and the Syracusans paid them a large sum to get rid of them. The mercenaries set out to return home and halted at Messina where they were hospitably received. Finding the town to their liking, they killed or drove out the burghers and took to themselves their women and children. Having achieved this cowardly feat, they called themselves Mamertines or followers of Mamers or Mars, the Italian god of War. It was their example that led astray the Campanian garrison of Rhegium.

Having paid off the Campanian mercenaries, the Syracusans fell under the dominion of Hiketas, who from general became tyrant. Other tyrants arose elsewhere. Tyndarion became tyrant of Tauromenion, Heraclides of Leontini and Phintias of Akragas or Agrigentum. In 279 B.C., Thoinon overthrew Hiketas and became tyrant of Syracuse in his stead. Shortly afterwards one of his subordinates Sosistratos seized the city while Thoinon still held the island. They both professed themselves loyal generals of Syracuse, but were both aiming at the tyranny. Their senseless quarrels raged all through the city. In the midst of the universal confusion, the Carthaginians overran the Greek districts, took Agrigentum and laid siege to Syracuse. Bewildered by the Carthaginian menace, Sosistratos, Thoinon and the leading Syracusan citizens made up their differences and sent an appeal to Pyrrhus for help. When Mago's fleet appeared in the Syracusan harbour, a second appeal of the most urgent character was sent to Pyrrhus at Tarentum.

Although the peace negotiations with Rome had failed, there was no real reason why Pyrrhus should not go to the help of the Syracusans. The Italians gave him to understand that they could now deal with Rome without his help. Tarentum wished him to go. Sicily was near. If the Romans became too menacing in southern Italy, Pyrrhus could easily return. Moreover Syracuse had special claims on him. He had married Lanassa, daughter of Agathocles; her son Alexander had stayed with his father, when the fickle princess had preferred to Pyrrhus the glamour and beauty of the Besieger. If Pyrrhus saved Syracuse from the Carthaginian, the fair city would surely accept Alexander as her king; and while Alexander was a minor, Pyrrhus would rule the kingdom for his son. New dreams of conquest, the noble glory of delivering a Hellenic town from the grip of the barbarian, the charm of a great adventure called the romantic soldier king across the straits to Sicily. One consideration alone held him back. The throne of Macedonia was again vacant. In the spring of 279 B.C., a numerous body of Gauls under a leader Belgius had invaded Macedonia and demanded a sum of money as the price of their goodwill. Ptolemy Keraunos refused to pay blackmail and with foolhardy rashness rushed to meet them with a small body of troops, instead of waiting to collect the Macedonian levy. The fire of the Gallic attack broke Ptolemy's phalanx. His force was destroyed and he was killed. Thereafter anarchy reigned in Macedonia. One incompetent ruler succeeded another. At last the whole country called for Pyrrhus. A deputation waited on him at Tarentum, offering him the throne of Alexander the Great.

Pyrrhus pondered long and deeply which course he should adopt. To Cineas he petulantly abused Fortune, that she dangled before him two such prizes at one and the same time. At last after full consideration he resolved to go to Sicily. After all Macedonia could wait. He owed nothing to her. He had been her king and she had let him be driven out with treacherous levity. Let her now suffer the consequences and when she was duly sobered by calamity, she would give him a truer welcome. He had no rivals. Antigonus and Antiochus were fighting an obscure battle somewhere in Asia Minor. Once master of Sicily, and still lord of Magna Græcia and king of Epirus, Macedonia would drop like an overripe fruit into his hands. There was no doubt but that Pyrrhus was right. Although his affairs did not in the end prosper in Sicily, yet when he returned to Greece, he had no difficulty in overrunning Macedonia. He sent Cineas ahead to interview the Greek leaders in Sicily and much to the disgust of his Italian allies, he left strong garrisons behind him, under the command of his son Alexander, who took up his

quarters at Locri. They were nominally left as a protection against a Roman attack, but really to secure the fidelity of the allies.[1] This was especially necessary in Tarentum, where the democratic leaders would not have hesitated to call in the Carthaginians to save them from the rods and axes of Rome.

In the summer of 278 B.C., when Pyrrhus had secured the necessary transports and the weather was set fair, he sailed with a fleet of sixty ships carrying ten thousand men and all his elephants from Tarentum to Locri. It was impossible to cross the straits at the narrowest point, because the Campanian mercenaries in Rhegium were bitterly hostile and the Mamertines had allied themselves to Carthage. The sea passage from Tarentum to Locri took ten days, no doubt because the fleet had to evade the Carthaginian patrols.[1] From Locri Pyrrhus sailed direct to Tauromenion, a town due south of Messina, where the tyrant Tyndarion became his enthusiastic ally.

From Tauromenion, Pyrrhus sailed to Catana where the citizens hailed him as their saviour and crowned him with a golden crown. At Catana, Pyrrhus disembarked his men and marched along the coast to Syracuse, while his fleet sailed not far off shore. Thirty of the Carthaginian fleet were at sea looking for the Epirots. The remaining Carthaginian ships did not dare oppose the entry of the king's vessels into the harbour. Nor did the Carthaginian land army that numbered fifty thousand men stand their ground. They retreated and Pyrrhus and his troops marched triumphantly into Syracuse. There Thoinon and Sosistratos pledged him their common obedience. Thus without a blow the brilliant soldier king became master of the vast resources of the mighty city. No less than a hundred and forty war ships and immense war material of all kinds came into Pyrrhus' possession. Other successes followed. Heraclides the tyrant of Leontini, who had seen the royal army march at no great distance past his town, sent a herald placing himself and his little army of four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry under the king's orders. Many other cities followed the example of Leontini and came over voluntarily to the liberator's cause.

Pyrrhus now felt himself strong enough to begin the offensive. His first objective was Akragas or Agrigentum. The latter part of his march was along the sea coast, while his fleet now swollen to two hundred sail, accompanied the army. As he neared Agrigentum, a number of ships sailed to meet him and announced joyfully that the burghers had driven out the Carthaginian garrison and were impatiently awaiting his arrival. The

[1] Justin XVIII. Cap. II. Itaque relicto Locris Alexandro filio, firmatisque Sociorum civitatibus valido praesidio in Siciliam exercitum trajecit.
[1] Diodorus XXII; 7; 8.

king sent ahead Sosistratos, now an Epirot commander, and he received the surrender of Agrigentum and of no less than thirty other towns. With Agrigentum, Pyrrhus became master of eight thousand eight hundred picked troops, in no way, according to Diodorus, inferior to the Epirots themselves. They were probably a body of Greek mercenaries in the Carthaginian service, who now left it for that of Hellas. Pyrrhus had by this time under his orders thirty thousand foot and two thousand five hundred horse; and besides these he had his nineteen war elephants.

The Carthaginian fear of the elephants was far greater than their fear of the Greek troops. The latter they had often fought with success; but rumour had spread and magnified the terror of these mighty beasts with their strange, dark Indian mahouts. The Romans had faced them and died; the Carthaginians scampered off the field of battle. Unopposed, Pyrrhus marched through the open fields of Sicily. Selinus, Heracleia and Segesta all fell into his hands. The first real opposition that he met was at Eryx. It was deemed impregnable to all but Heracles, who had won it in a wrestling match from Eryx, its king and eponymous founder. Dionysius had indeed possessed it, but it had yielded to him of its own free will. But what Heracles had achieved was not deemed impossible by the offspring of Achilles. The Carthaginians fought well behind their walls; there at least they were safe from the feet and tusks of the elephants. Pyrrhus brought a siege train from Syracuse and battered down the Punic defences. Once a breach was made the Eagle king assembled his troops. He would lead them in person through it and he vowed that when Eryx was won, he would disarm the jealousy of Heracles by games and sacrifices. Led by their adored king in person, the Epirots were invincible. Their task was not light; the Carthaginian garrison fought until the Epirots in order to advance, had to heap the bodies of the Punic dead on each side of their path. At last there were no defenders left and Eryx was the king's; he kept his vow nobly and the sacrifices and games were such as to soothe even the raging spirit of an envious immortal.

Pyrrhus had in his hands all the Sicilian empire of the great Dionysius. He could now invade that part of the island that had always been Cathaginian. He took Panormus by storm and the sister fortress of Herkte; in a few days, only one Sicilian town remained to the great African city, namely Lilybæum. That could wait for the moment; for Messina and indeed all northern Sicily were groaning under the oppression of the Mamertines. They carried their plundering raids up to the walls of Syracuse

and levied blackmail openly from the smaller cities. Pyrrhus reduced, one after the other, the strongholds of the Campanian mercenaries. He killed the Mamertine tax gatherers, freed the cities that they had captured and drove their troops back to the shelter of Messina.

Pyrrhus' fame was at its height. He assumed with the considered approval of the Sicilian Greeks the title of commander and king of Sicily. His son Alexander was appointed as his heir and successor. Indeed, according to Justin, Pyrrhus was as much king of Sicily as he was king of Epirus.[1] The Mamertines were thoroughly cowed and his flanks and rear were safe. Messina he could take at his leisure, so he now turned to reduce Lilybæum.

Lilybæum stood on a peninsula, that jutted far out to sea and was joined to the mainland by a very narrow isthmus. The Carthaginians were determined to hold it at all costs. So long as they had command of the sea, they could pour into their last city an inexhaustible supply of troops, food, war engines and ammunition. At the same time such was their fear of the Greek captain that they sought to win him over by deserting their Roman allies and by offering him a great war indemnity. Let Pyrrhus but leave to the Carthaginians Lilybæum and he might keep all the rest of Sicily. They would give him gold in abundance and all the ships that he needed for his return to Italy. Pyrrhus would gladly have made peace on these terms; for the Lucanians and Tarentines had learnt by bitter experience that in his absence they were not the invincible warriors that they had fancied themselves in the moment of success. They were now sending him urgent messages for help. The Sicilian Greeks, however, urged him in another direction. If Pyrrhus was to be king of Sicily, it must be of all Sicily; and so long as Carthage held Lilybæum, he could not claim full sovereignty. At any moment the Carthaginians might land a great force and overrun the western part of the island. The Sicilian Greeks would willingly furnish Pyrrhus with men and money but he for his part must be true to their interests and not sacrifice them for his own. Against such reasoning Pyrrhus was helpless. More than half his army was composed of Sicilian soldiers, three fifths of his ships were Syracusan. Syracusan, too, were his artillery and his siege train. Constrained if not convinced, Pyrrhus put off his return to Italy and set out to reduce Lilybæum. To the Carthaginian envoys he gave the same haughty reply that he had received from Rome. Let the Carthaginians evacuate Sicily and he would gladly become their friend and ally.

[1]Justin XXIII. Cap. 3. 2. Rex Siciliae Sicut Epiri appellatur. See also Polyx. VII. 4, 5.

During the negotiations, the Carthaginians had worked night and day at the fortifications of the isthmus. On the narrow neck of land they built huge towers that barred and enfiladed attacks and dug deep moats to arrest the advance of storming parties. On the towers they mounted catapults and war engines of every description and of the most formidable character.[1] Indeed so numerous were their engines that their walls were not wide enough to hold them all. When Pyrrhus led his troops to the assault, the Sicilian Greeks, who had talked so loudly of taking Lilybæum, fell back under the clouds of bolts and arrows that descended on them from the walls. Even the Epirots could not face the storm; and after many had died and many others had been wounded Pyrrhus had to give up the assault. He sent for a fresh siege train from Syracuse; but when it came, it could effect nothing against the great superiority of the Carthaginian war machines. Pyrrhus then tried to mine the city; but the space was so narrow that the Carthaginians could always successfully countermine. The ground, too, was rocky and the boring of mines took endless time and labour. After two wasted months and a great loss of men and reputation, Pyrrhus decided to abandon the siege. The Sicilian Greeks' admiration for Pyrrhus gave place to bitter discontent. The king then offered to reduce Lilybæum by besieging Carthage. Agathocles had almost succeeded and, indeed, had only failed because he lacked ships. The Sicilian Greeks had insisted on Pyrrhus rejecting the Carthaginian peace offers, let them now follow him to Carthage. He had ships in sufficient numbers, but men were needed. He, therefore, called on the Greek cities and especially Syracuse, to man their ships as speedily as possible.

The Syracusans, however, had no wish to engage in a distant and perilous enterprise. While not daring to oppose Pyrrhus openly, they wilfully delayed their preparations. The king retaliated by sending into the various cities press gangs and garrisoning them with Epirot officers and troops. The Sicilian discontent flamed into open mutiny. The various tyrants who had resigned their offices on Pyrrhus' arrival, plotted to seize them again. This was particularly the case in Syracuse, where Sosistratos and Thoinon conspired to murder the king and divide as before the great city between them. Pyrrhus heard of the conspiracy and seizing Thoinon executed him. Sosistratos escaped and raised the whole country side against his former benefactor. With the malignant energy of a renegade, Sosistratos called to his help the very Carthaginians against whom he had invited the aid of Pyrrhus. He also sent envoys to Messina and while Pyrrhus was still planning the conquest of

[1]Diodorus XXII.

Carthage, he found arrayed against him Sicilian Greeks, Carthaginians and Mamertines. Fresh reinforcements had just reached Lilybæum and a great Carthaginian army took the field; but once again they were scattered by the Epirots and the elephants. Then the Sikels rose and a guerilla warfare followed. Against bands of brigands, the ordered charge of the phalanx or the imposing mass of the elephants were useless and soon all that was left to Pyrrhus was Syracuse and the land within bowshot of the walls.

In the meanwhile, ever more instant appeals came to the king from Tarentum and he began to think that it was time for him to return. It was now 275 B.C., and he had been away for three years; he had promised the Tarentines to return to their help, if they were hard pressed and the messages that he had received informed him that they were. On the other hand of what use was his longer stay in Syracuse? He had come to save it from the Carthaginians and that he had done; and the reward that he had earned was the bitter hatred of the Syracusans. The rest of Sicily was lost; but he could hold Syracuse with a body of troops. One at least of the Sicilian captains, Hiero by name, Pyrrhus could trust and could leave behind to hold Syracuse in his name. To ensure Hiero's fidelity, he married or betrothed his daughter, Nereis to Hiero's son Gelon.[1]

[1]Polyb. VII. 4. Hieronymus claimed to be the son of Nereis, the daughter of Pyrrhus and the grandson of Hiero. See also Schubert's Pyrrhus p. 211.

CHAPTER V.

The Second Italian Campaign.

In the spring of 275 B.C. the Epirot king set sail from Syracuse with one hundred and twenty war ships and a large number of transports, on board of which was a formidable army. Unhappily for Pyrrhus, the Carthaginians and Mamertines rowed out of the straits and heavily engaged his squadrons as they sailed north. Pyrrhus had no experience of sea warfare and before he could extricate himself, he had lost seventy of his warships, a great number of his transports, the bulk of his army and all his treasure. He managed to reach the shores of Italy and made an attempt to reduce Rhegium and destroy the mercenaries who lorded it over the unhappy Greek city. But Rhegium was in close alliance with Messina and a force of ten thousand Mamertines went to the help of their Campanian kinsmen. The king's attempt failed and Pyrrhus retreated towards Tarentum. As he passed through difficult ground, he was ambushed by the Mamertines, who killed two of his elephants and threatened to destroy his entire rearguard. Pyrrhus who was at the head of his army galloped to the rescue; but in restoring some order among his men, he received a swordcut on the head. He fell back to staunch the blood streaming down his face.

His withdrawal encouraged the Mamertines; and one of them, a gigantic Campanian in brilliant armour, rode into some open ground and challenged Pyrrhus, if he were still alive, to fight him. Such a challenge no prudent commander should accept; but it sometimes happens that supreme folly wins rewards more splendid than the highest prudence. Of such folly Pyrrhus was guilty. In spite of his wounded head in spite of the ruin to his army that his death would have caused, he instantly accepted the barbarian's challenge. His guards tried to stay him; but he pushed them aside and riding full speed at his challenger, dealt him such a blow as southern Italy, that has seen many good blows exchanged, never saw before or since. His swordblade was of the finest temper and wielded by Pyrrhus' arm it cut through his enemy's head and body and the severed

barbarian's trunk fell into two pieces. The savage cries of the Mamertines were stilled with reverence and admiration. No such blow, they whispered, could have been dealt by a human hand and with a god they must not contend. Breaking off the action, the Mamertines fell back to let the Greek rearguard pass and then returned to their own city. Pyrrhus' march was not further molested; and with twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse, Pyrrhus reached Tarentum. The reckless courage of the daredevil king had saved what remained of his army.

On examining the actual situation, Pyrrhus found that the alarming messages that had reached him, had overstated the case. Tarentum had not even been threatened. The Samnites had, it is true, been repeatedly defeated; but they were unsubdued and in 277 B.C. had inflicted a severe reverse on a Roman army. Against the Lucanians, the Romans had gained some considerable successes, but from the Greek cities they had won but little. In 278 B.C. Heraclea had returned to the Roman allegiance, but only on the most favourable terms. The Romans had besieged Croton but Pyrrhus' officer, Milo had sallied from Tarentum and driven them away. The Romans had then pretended to march against Locri; the Epirot garrison had foolishly left Croton to relieve the threatened city. The Romans had thereupon doubled back and had entered Croton unopposed.[1] The gravest mishap that had befallen the Greek allies was the later defection of Locri. The populace had suddenly risen and had massacred the Epirot garrison and invited the Romans in their place. This misfortune was, however, easily remedied. Pyrrhus by a forced march from Tarentum surprised the Roman garrison and recovered Locri, which he punished severely. He executed some of the ringleaders, fined the town and imposed on it another Epirot garrison. Then driven thereto by the loss of his military chest in the seafight and persuaded by some unbelieving friends,[2] he seized the treasure of Persephone's temple and tried to sail with it to Tarentum. The outraged goddess raised a storm against him and many of his ships were wrecked. The waves washed up much of the lost treasure on the shore near Locri and Pyrrhus, alarmed by the manifest wrath of Persephone, restored to her temple what had been saved. He was thus still short of money. He had taxed the Tarentines heavily during his Sicilian campaign and the Carthaginian privateers had preyed on their commerce. He could not expect fresh subsidies from Tarentum. The other allies were struggling for their existence and had no cash to spare. Epirus could still furnish men, but not food, money, nor equipment. It was,

[1]Mommsen Book II Chap. VII.
[2]Dion. Hal. XIX. 9.

therefore, necessary to end the war with Rome as speedily as possible.

In 275 B.C. there were two Roman armies in the field. One under Manius Curius Dentatus was engaged in laying waste Samnium. Another under Lentulus had been sent to overawe Lucania. Neither consul dared go to meet Pyrrhus as Lævinus had done. The Romans probably expected Pyrrhus' offensive to be launched against Lentulus in Lucania. Pyrrhus acting on their supposed belief sent a small force to keep Lentulus in check and prevent him from joining Manius Curius.

With his main force Pyrrhus marched north west. He crossed the Aufidus and marched unopposed through Apulia and past the scene of his former victory at Asculum. Still without meeting any enemy, he entered Samnium. There he learnt that Manius Curius had entrenched himself on a strong hill near Beneventum and had sent to Lentulus urgent messages for help. Roman historians later explained his conduct by the adverse nature of the auspices. A more reasonable explanation could probably be found in the unwillingness of his soldiers to face the elephants, the terrors of which had been exaggerated by recollection and by reports of their successes in Sicily.

Since Manius Curius would not leave his stronghold and fight in the plains, Pyrrhus, who for political reasons could not delay, resolved to drive the Roman general out of his fastness. Manius Curius did not apparently know the king's exact whereabouts, so Pyrrhus resolved to make a surprise attack in the early morning. To carry out his plan, he sent overnight a strong force to take the Romans in flank and rear, while he made a simultaneous frontal assault. Unhappily, the scheme miscarried. The flanking party lost their way in the dense woods. Their torches burnt out and the intended flank attack dwindled into the onslaught of a few stragglers. Still even the appearance of a handful of weary Epirots produced a panic in the Roman ranks and had Manius Curius been a less experienced commander, Pyrrhus' plan might still have succeeded. As it was, the consul rallied his men and sent a detachment to annihilate the flanking party, as it dribbled down towards the camp. With his main army, he successfully met the frontal attack. Pyrrhus withdrew towards the level grounds, whither he was followed by the victorious enemy. There he reformed his Epirots and, supported by his elephants, he counterattacked with considerable success and drove the Romans back to their camp. By this time, however, the troops detached by Manius Curius against the flanking party had completed their work and elated by success came to the consul's help. After a

sharp action, in which Pyrrhus lost many killed and wounded, and thirteen hundred prisoners, he withdrew his army. Two of his elephants the Romans killed and eight they drove into difficult ground, where their Indian mahouts surrendered them. They figured later in Manius Curius' triumph.

The king had, no doubt, suffered a serious defeat, but he had not been routed. His return march to Tarentum was unmolested and he recalled there the army that he had sent against Lentulus. As the Greek troops retired, Lentulus attacked them and caused them some loss. Still Pyrrhus had a considerable army and need not have despaired; but two matters weighed on his mind. One was his superstitious fear of Persephone's vengeance and the other was his lack of money. The latter was serious, because without it he could not pay the Sicilian mercenaries, who now formed the bulk of his army. Yet the former matter seems to have weighed on the king the more heavily. Even before the battle of Beneventum, he had had a strange dream. He had seen all his teeth fall out and blood gush from his mouth.[1] He was so affected by this nightmare that he would have postponed the action for a day; but his staff had rightly pointed out that by doing so he would lose the advantages of a surprise and he would endanger the safety of the flanking party that he had sent on ahead. The loss of the battle confirmed his fears and he long believed that the cause of his failure was the unquenchable anger of the outraged goddess.

The king, nevertheless, rose superior to his misfortunes. He sent for help both to Antiochus and to Antigonus Gonatas. The former was still struggling with his revolted subjects, the Bithynians, and had neither money nor men to spare. Antigonus Gonatas, on the other hand, could have given Pyrrhus considerable help; for since the death of Ptolemy Keraunos, Fortune had smiled on Antigonus beyond all expectation. The great Gallic army that had overwhelmed Keraunos had divided into three bodies. One under Brennus had invaded Greece and, on trying to sack Delphi had been repulsed, so legend related, by Apollo himself. In their retreat, the Gauls were annihilated by the Phocians and Aetolians. Another body crossed into Asia Minor and became the ancestors of the Galatians to whom many years later St. Paul addressed his letter. The third body was in 277 B.C. skilfully trapped and destroyed by Antigonus Gonatas near Lysimachia, at the base of the Gallipoli Peninsula. This victory brought Antigonus a great reputation; and a mission from Pella invited him as the son of Demetrius and the grandson of Antipater to be king of Macedonia. He accepted the invitation

[1] Dionys. Hal. XIX. 13.

and it was of Antigonus as king of Macedonia, that Pyrrhus begged assistance.

In after years, Antigonus certainly showed himself to be a wise and statemanlike ruler, but on this occasion one must admit that his dislike of Pyrrhus seems to have affected his judgment. Apart from the duty of helping a brother ruler to defend Hellas against the barbarian, it was clear that so long as Pyrrhus stayed in Italy, he would leave Greece unmolested. Had Antigonus sent Pyrrhus a supply of money and a contingent equal to that sent by Ptolemy Keraunos, Pyrrhus might never have left Tarentum. He could again have beaten the Roman armies in the field and his allies would once more have risen and joined him. Tarentum was impregnable, so long as Pyrrhus' ships held the sea and if after some years he had been forced to return to Epirus, Antigonus would by then have so consolidated his rule in Macedonia, that it would have become impossible to upset it. Antigonus, however, refused all help, and since both he and Antiochus withheld aid, there was only one thing for the king to do, and that was to cross over to Epirus, enforce his claims to the heritage of Alexander and afterwards return to complete his task in Italy. He kept to himself the contents of Antiochus' and Antigonus' replies and announced that he would soon receive abundant treasure and reinforcements.[1] The ruse succeeded admirably. The Romans, who had tardily thought of following up their victory at Beneventum, lost heart and decided not to advance. The Tarentines gave up any idea of a revolt in favour of Rome. Leaving in Tarentum a strong garrison under his son Helenos and his general Milo, Pyrrhus sailed one winter night in the year 274 B.C. across the narrow sea and with eight thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry landed in Epirus.

[1]Paus. I. XIII. I.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN.

Pyrrhus' subjects were delighted at his return. What of it that the king had failed rather than succeeded in his undertaking! After all he had saved Tarentum from Rome and Syracuse from Carthage. Did not the fame of his victories fill the whole civilised world? Had his phalangists not overcome the dreaded legions? Had his elephants not hunted like hares the heavy armed Punic warriors from every battle field? Had ever king before Pyrrhus cut in two a barbarian in full panoply? The feats of their leader were no doubt magnified a hundred fold by his devoted soldiers, if for no other reason than to excuse his lack of real success. But Epirus had been drained of supplies and money; his troops were unpaid and his military chest was empty. There were, however, wandering bands of Gauls still in Greece. Antigonus Gonatas had turned many of them into soldiers. Pyrrhus followed his example and engaged a body of Gallic mercenaries. He could not pay them, so he offered to them the plunder of Macedonia.[1]

In the spring of 275 B.C. he entered Macedonia through the Aoos pass and won over the Macedonian garrisons, numbering two thousand men, before Antigonus could take the field against him. At last Antigonus hurried to the spot with a hastily raised force of Macedonians and Gauls. Antigonus was no match in the field for his kinsman. He was out-generalled and forced to retreat; as he did so, Pyrrhus heavily engaged his rear-guard who were Gallic mercenaries. Gauls had no objection to fighting Gauls and Pyrrhus' men cut Antigonus' rearguard in pieces. The entire elephant corps of Macedonia was surrendered by the Indian mahouts. Inspired by his success, Pyrrhus rode up to the great phalanx of Macedonia and calling on the generals and captains by name, urged them to come over to him. A wave of emotion surged through officers and men alike. After all Pyrrhus had once been their king. He had delivered them from the insolent Demetrius. He was himself a hero. He was the cousin of the godlike Alexander. He was the son-in-law of the

[1]Prof. Tarn suggests that he received a sum of money from Arsinoe in Egypt. Antigonos Gonatas p. 445.

gallant Keraunos. Why should they fight against Pyrrhus for Antigonus, whose claims were of the slightest? A moment later the entire Macedonian levy had joined the Epirots and Pyrrhus was once more king of Macedonia and master of her considerable resources. To avoid hurting the feelings of his new subjects, he pretended that he had merely won a victory over Antigonus' hired Gauls. To support this pretence, he hung up their shields in the temple of Athene and underneath he had inscribed an elegiac quatrain, that may perhaps be translated as follows :—

These shields from valiant Gauls by Pyrrhus wrung,
He in Athene's temple now has hung,
Yet marvel not; for as of old we see
Stout spearmen still are the Aiacidæ.[1]

In some of the cities, however, there was still a party that adhered to Antigonus and these had to be taken after hard fighting. This was notably the case in Aegæ. To punish the city for its resistance, Pyrrhus imposed on it a numerous Gallic garrison; but directly the king's back was turned the Gauls began to plunder the tombs of Macedonian kings buried in the city. The gold ornaments they melted down and the bones they threw into the street. The citizens complained to the king. He treated their complaints unceremoniously. He could not afford to quarrel with his Gauls and only a few years before, the Macedonian troops had in Epirus treated in the same way the tombs of Pyrrhus' ancestors.

Antigonus fled to Thessalonica wherein he established himself by means of his fleet and held the cities along the eastern coast. Pyrrhus reduced Macedonia and Thessaly. His own fleet was in the Epirot harbours and to have brought it round the Morea to support his army in an attack on Thessalonica would have taken too much time. He merely observed that Antigonus was a shameless man to wear a king's cloak, when he no longer had a kingdom. Leaving his son Ptolemy as governor of Macedonia, he returned to Epirus. In Macedonia he might be unwilling to hurt the feelings of his new subjects, but no such caution was needed in Epirus. There he could well pose as the Epirot conqueror of Macedonia. This he did and hung up the shields of the conquered phalangists in Dodona and dedicated them to Dodonian Zeus with the following inscription :—

These once sacked wide Asia, teeming with gold and with treasure.
And to the hapless Greeks ruin and slavery brought
Now in the temple of Zeus await they the Deity's pleasure.
Thus were to Macedon's pride, lessons in modesty taught.[1]

[1]Plut. Pyrrhus. XXVI, 5.
[1]Paus. I. XIII. 2.

While Pyrrhus was thus glorying over his conquest and thinking how he might use it to the best purpose, Antigonus was busy raising a new army. He still had money and enlisted fresh bands of Gauls. He called in many of his garrisons and in Pyrrhus' absence again took the field; but in Ptolemy, Pyrrhus' son, Antigonus met an opponent hardly less formidable than the king himself. Antigonus was routed, his army dispersed and he himself barely escaped with only seven companions.[1]

Antigonus had now definitely lost Macedonia, but he still held cities in the Peloponnesus. Pyrrhus decided to drive him out of them. When Antigonus was finally disposed of, it would be time to return to Italy. In this view he was strongly supported by Cleonymus, a claimant to the throne of Sparta. This unworthy pretender was the son of Cleomenes II and the grandson of Cleombrotus, who fell at Leuctra. The eldest son of Cleomenes II, Acrotatus, predeceased his father, but left a son Areus.[2] In modern times there would have been no difficulty about the succession. Areus was a minor on his grandfather's death, but as the representative of the elder branch, he would certainly have received the crown. In Sparta the rule of primogeniture was not so clear. There was in the royal house an old custom that younger sons born in the purple had superior claims to elder sons, born while their father was still in a private station. According to Herodotus, indeed, Darius' decision in favour of Xerxes was based on this old Spartan practice. Now Cleonymus was born when his father was a king; Areus' father never became one; so according to old Spartan custom, Cleonymus had a better claim than his nephew.[3] The rule, however, would seem to have fallen into desuetude, for the Ephors, after a solemn debate decided in Areus' favour. Cleonymus bitterly resented the decision; but the Ephors tried to soothe his vanity by conferring on him important commands. He was sent at the head of a contingent to help the Tarentines; but in Italy, as I have already observed, he did nothing worthy of Sparta. From Italy he descended on Syracuse, ostensibly to free the town from Agathocles but really to found a tyranny for himself. Failing in this attempt, he fled to Corcyra and thence returned to Sparta. By this time, Areus was a grown man and in every way worthy of the kingly office. Cleonymus bowed to the inevitable and would have acquiesced in his nephew's rule, but for a further calamity that overtook him. His young and beautiful wife Chilonis, herself of royal blood, despised her husband for his continual failures; and with the freedom of a Spartan woman,

[1]Justin XXV. 3. Rursus a Ptolemaeo Pyrrhi filio, funditus victus, cum septem comitibus fugiens.
[2]Paus. I. XIII. 4—6.
[3]Schubert's Pyrrhus p. 229.

she took openly as her lover Acrotatus, the handsome young son of Areus and, therefore, her husband's great nephew. The sneers of his equals and the mockery of all the wits in Greece drove Cleonymus from his home. Mad with rage and jealousy, he fled to the camp of Pyrrhus and after the manner of Alcibiades used all his talents and eloquence to ruin his country. Let Pyrrhus, urged the traitor his wits sharpened by hatred, by all means drive Antigonus from the Peloponnesus. But when Pyrrhus had returned to Italy, Antigonus would creep back and all Pyrrhus' efforts would have been wasted. On the other hand with a friendly Sparta to watch over the king's interests, Antigonus would never dare return, or if he did he would instantly be expelled. The way to secure a friendly Sparta was to put Cleonymus on the throne. The task would not be difficult; for Areus was in Crete fighting with the flower of her army on behalf of Egypt. The conduct of Cleonymus could not but have inspired Pyrrhus with contempt; but to conquer Antigonus' possessions in the Peloponnesus and secure them by putting Cleonymus on the throne of Lacedæmon, seemed to be in the best interests of Epirus.

CHAPTER VII.

The Peloponnesian Campaign.

In the early summer of 272 B.C., Pyrrhus accompanied by Cleonymus and followed by twenty five thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry and twenty four elephants set out to the conquest of the Morea. With him went also his sons, Ptolemy and Helenos. He left Alexander behind as regent of Epirus.

The king could not enter the Morea by land, for Antigonus Gonatas still held Corinth; but with the consent of the friendly Aetolians, he shipped his troops from their coast to Achaia. There he was welcomed much as he had been in Sicily. Antigonus was regarded as a tyrant in the Peloponnesus. Some of the cities looked upon Pyrrhus as their deliverer from the oppression of a foreigner. Other cities welcomed him as a protector against Sparta. Among the former was Megalopolis; among the latter were Elis and Achaia. Messene, too, sent envoys and Pyrrhus was able with some justice to proclaim that the object of his invasion was to free the Peloponnesian cities from Antigonus. He spent the summer of B.C. 272 in establishing himself in the north western portion of the Morea. In the meantime, Antigonus was doing his best to lure Pyrrhus back to Macedonia by attacking the cities garrisoned by the Epirots. Pyrrhus has been blamed for not establishing himself firmly in Macedonia before invading the Morea; but I doubt whether the blame is justified. He wished to put Cleonymus on the throne of Sparta and Areus, Cleonymus' rival was away in Crete. Such a chance would not again occur. Pyrrhus also knew that if he stayed in the Peloponnesus, Antigonus sooner or later must conform with his strategy and meet him there. This indeed actually happened. On the other hand had Pyrrhus returned to Macedonia to repel Antigonus' diversion, he would have been conforming with his enemy's strategy.

In the autumn of 272 B.C., Pyrrhus resolved to march on Sparta. His conduct during the previous summer had been closely watched by the Spartan government. At last, convinced that he meant to put Cleonymus on the throne by force of arms, they sent envoys to meet him at Megalopolis; at the same time

they sent word to Areus imploring him to return and probably to Antigonus Gonatas, begging him for help. The envoys on meeting Pyrrhus, demanded a definite statement of his intentions. Pyrrhus told them in jest that he was going to Sparta to leave his sons there, so that, brought up in the Spartan discipline, they might surpass all the young princes of the time. This answer was not meant to deceive and could not have deceived anyone for Pyrrhus' sons were past the school going age. The envoys returned to Sparta and reported the king's reply. With their usual deliberation the Spartans did nothing, until they learnt that Pyrrhus had entered unopposed the valley of the Eurotas and was wasting their territory. They then sent a fresh mission to protest against Pyrrhus' making war on them without a formal declaration. This was a mere sophistry, for Pyrrhus' previous answer was clearly meant as such. The king laughed and referring to the boasted secrecy of the Ephors' Councils, replied in jest : " But we know that you Spartans also do not tell people what you intend doing."[1] The rejoinder of the Spartan envoys was not wanting in dignity. One of them, named Mandrocleides, said in a broad southern accent, that gave weight to his words :

" If you are a god, then we shall come by no harm, for we have not sinned. If you are a man, then you will surely meet your match."

On the return of the envoys, an attempt was made to restore the old defences erected during the wars against Cassander and Demetrius.[1] But there were few men in the town; many were in the country and a large Spartan force was with Areus in Crete. And while the Spartans struggled to rebuild the fallen walls and towers, Pyrrhus and his army, swollen by contingents from the allied cities, were approaching by forced marches. Long before the repairs were completed, Pyrrhus was close to the gates. Cleonymus pressed for an immediate attack. Pyrrhus with more humanity delayed it until the following morning. The city, so he thought, would offer no resistance; whereas in the darkness that had fallen, his troops might get out of hand and a night massacre would be a bad beginning for Cleonymus' reign.

Yet Pyrrhus would have been wiser, if he had followed Cleonymus' advice. The renegade knew the spirit of Sparta better than the foreigner. Spartan statesmanship was indeed, as a rule, faulty. It let Athens face alone Xerxes and then Philip. It sent the army that might have won Chæronea to be massacred with Agis at Megalopolis. But there was never any stain on Spartan courage; and the thought that Cleonymus might be

[1]It was the Spartan's custom to wage war without a formal declaration.
[1]Thirlwall vol. 8 p. 71.

forced on Sparta by foreign spears made the blood boil in the veins not only of the men, but of the women and girls. While Cleonymus' friends and slaves were decorating his house and preparing a feast worthy of the new king and his illustrious ally, the leading Lacedæmonians held counsel together and decided to send the women by night to the care of Areus in Crete through the unguarded gates to the south of the city.

When this decision was made known the women of Sparta mutinied. Archidamia, the grandmother of a yet nobler Agis, stood forth as the rebels' representative. Sword in hand, the great lady entered the council hall. She upbraided the nobles there assembled for thinking that any Spartan woman would care to live after Sparta had perished. If Sparta must fall, let her sons and daughters at least die with her. Let the young men rest for the night and she and the women and girls would help the old men and boys to complete the bulwarks of Sparta. To such a demand there could be but one answer. The council gladly accepted Archidamia's offer; and all through the night, while the fighting men slept, the old men, boys and women worked with the fury of despair to complete the unfinished gaps in the defences. The chief thing was to keep out the elephants; for once inside the narrow streets, nothing would have stopped them. The working parties dug a deep trench opposite the Epirot camp; and probably because the east had begun to grow light before their task was finished, they drew up their waggons at either end of the trench, driving the wheels up to the axle hubs in the soft ground. When day dawned and the enemy's camp began to stir, the women roused the fighting men and giving them their armour bade them guard the trench that the women had helped to dig. " It is sweet," added the women, " to conquer in the sight of your fatherland. It is glorious to fall in a manner worthy of Sparta and to die, if needs be, in the arms of your mothers and wives." Chilonis, who had broken her marriage vow for the sake of Acrotatus, tied a halter round her neck and resolved to hang herself rather than return to the embraces of Cleonymus.[1]

Pyrrhus opened the battle by a frontal attack on the trench; but behind it was a formidable line of Spartan spearmen, whose spirit had been roused to the highest pitch by the words and example of their women. The trench hindered the charge of the Epirot phalanx; for the storming party had to descend the soft ground into the ditch and climb up the other side. When the first rush was beaten back, Pyrrhus sent his eldest son Ptolemy with a force of two thousand picked Gauls and Chaonians to turn the trench by forcing their way through the waggons and so take

[1]Plut. Pyrrh. XXVII.

the Spartans in flank. But the waggon wheels had been so firmly dug into the ground and were so fiercely defended by the Spartans behind them, that Ptolemy made little progress. The Gauls with reckless daring seized the waggons by the wheels and succeeded in pulling several out of the ground; but Acrotatus, who seems in his father's absence to have held the chief command, collected three hundred men and issued from one of the southern gates. Taking advantage of some low lying ground, he and his men crept unseen close to Ptolemy's flanking party and fell upon it with the utmost fury. The Gauls and Chaonians were driven into the trench, where, attacked in front and rear, they lost heavily and at last fled in disorder. Acrotatus led his men back into the town; there he was greeted with rapturous delight by the Spartan women. The elder men went so far as to call on him to go to Chilonis and " beget brave sons for Sparta "; but there was no time for lovemaking. Pyrrhus in spite of repeated failures persevered in his frontal attack. Again and again he led his storming parties to the charge, but the only road into the town lay over the dead body of every Spartan there. When night fell the trench was full of dead Gauls and Epirots, but behind it stood unbroken the unconquerable array of the spearmen of Sparta.

That night Pyrrhus had a strange dream. He dreamt that he was hurling thunderbolts at Sparta, that the town was in flames and that he was delighted at the spectacle. So keen was his joy that he woke up, convinced that he would take Sparta that very day. He called his staff together and told them his dream and his certainty of success. The staff enthusiastically accepted the fortunate omen; but a certain Lysimachus, who may have thought it a mistake to be too sure of victory, put on the dream another and more sinister interpretation. He pointed out that the spot where a thunderbolt had fallen, was always fenced off as sacred ground and he expressed the fear that the dream meant that the streets of Sparta would never be trodden by Pyrrhus. The king, however, was not one to be depressed by such a gloomy view. He scoffed at Lysimachus and treated his interpretation with contempt. " After all," he exclaimed, " dreams are only folly and nonsense. Go and get your arms !" Then remembering a line of the Iliad, he, with ready wit, adapted it to his purpose by the change of a single word.

" Let this be your motto," he added,

" Best of all omens is this to go into battle for Pyrrhus !"[1]

The happy retort of the king dispelled Lysimachus' forebodings. While his staff laughed and applauded, Pyrrhus put on his armour and at daybreak led his army again to the assault.

[1]The original line occurs in Iliad XII. 243. See Plut. Pyrrhus XXIX.

The second day's fighting was almost a repetition of the first. The Lacedæmonians repelled one storming party after another; and while the men fought with more than Spartan courage, the women brought them food and drink and bore away the wounded. Pyrrhus bade his Macedonians fill in the trench and they threw into it earth, the bodies of dead men and horses and rubbish of every description. The Lacedæmonians did their utmost to hinder them; but while the enemy's intention was so engaged, Pyrrhus squeezed with a party of men between the waggons and the wall. The garrison raised a cry of despair; the women shrieked and through the gap made by Pyrrhus came pouring the whole mass of his cavalry. Just then someone, probably a Cretan mercenary in Spartan pay, thrust a javelin into the belly of Pyrrhus' charger.[1] The wounded horse in its death agony threw its rider, who fell on steep and slippery ground. The king's companions thought only of rescuing their leader and carried him out of danger. At the same time, the Spartans counterattacked and drove the Epirot cavalry out of the town.

Pyrrhus must have begun to wonder what object he was serving by the prolonged assault. If he continued it, he would no doubt in the end force his way into the city, but with the loss of half his army; yet if Cleonymus were installed as king over a city of the dead, he could give no help to Pyrrhus. News, too, had come that Antigonus had realised that his diversion in Macedonia had not influenced Pyrrhus' movements and that if he wanted to save any of his possessions, south of Corinth, indeed even Corinth herself, he must go and meet Pyrrhus in the Morea. To face Antigonus, Pyrrhus would need all his troops and here he was wasting them to no purpose. He broke off the action and sent a herald into Sparta to see if he could not win some concessions from the heroic garrison, all of whom had been wounded and many killed. Before, however, any terms had been settled, a relief force entered the city. Antigonus had not only marched southwards, but with great foresight had sent ahead a body of troops under his Phocian general Ameinias. A few hours later, Areus the Spartan king forced his way into the town. On receiving the message that Pyrrhus was marching on Sparta, he had taken with him from Crete two thousand picked troops and returned in all haste. Sparta was saved. The heroic women could rest and the weary and wounded garrison could hand over the lines that they had so heroically defended.

The unexpected arrival of two relieving forces was a heavy blow to Pyrrhus. He made one more assault on the town; but

[1]Plut. Pyrrh. XXIX.

as it failed also, he withdrew his troops some distance and built himself a camp to the north of Sparta on the road to Sellasia and Caryæ. He at first thought of passing the winter there and for that object he began to lay waste the country round, partly to starve out Sparta and partly to replenish his commissariat. Antigonus might at any moment offer him battle and Pyrrhus' beaten troops badly needed rest.

While he was thus restoring the moral of his army, a message came to him from Argos that caused him completely to change his plans. Argos had long been under the influence of Antigonus Gonatas; but a party of whom the leader was one Aristeas were anxious to rid themselves of Antigonus and thought that with Pyrrhus' help they might do so. Aristeas sent word to the king inviting him to Argos. This was the message that caused the instant change in the king's plans. He broke up his camp at once annd marched due northwards. The Spartans were not disposed to let him go unmolested and kept up a series of surprise attacks on his troops and cut off the wounded stragglers. While the main army of Sparta harassed the retreating enemy, the king Areus with a strong detachment occupied a gorge near the river Oineus.[1] When the Epirot army entered the gorge, Areus let the vanguard pass and waited until the rearguard of Gauls and Molossians came up. These he attacked with great determination. Pyrrhus pressed out of the defile with the main body, but sent his son Ptolemy to extricate the rearguard. The gallant youth successfully carried out his mission; but as he himself was nearing the mouth of the gorge, he and his guards were set upon by a body of Spartans under one Evalcus. In the hand to hand fight that followed a Cretan from Aptera, called Oryssus, cut down the young prince. The men with Ptolemy fled, closely pursued by the Spartan infantry. Pyrrhus heard of his son's death; but although half crazed with grief, he did not lose his presence of mind. He had massed a body of Thessalian horse with which to counterattack, directly his own troops were extricated. Seeing the Spartan hoplites scattered in the disorder of pursuit, he let them debouch into the open plain and then charged with his cavalry. He first avenged his son's death by spearing the Spartan leader Evalcus and then with his Thessalian horse cut up every man of Evalcus' command. The loss to the Lacedæmonian aristocracy was fearful, for Evalcus' command was made up of the best blood of Sparta.

[1]Schubert's Pyrrhus p. 248.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Attempt on Argos and the Death of Pyrrhus.

After this disaster, the Spartans did not again attack the retreating Pyrrhus, but Areus followed him at a safe distance, intending to join Antigonus, when he could. The continual rear-guard actions that Pyrrhus had been forced to fight had delayed his march; and instead of a peaceful entry into Argos, as he had hoped, he found that Antigonus had already forestalled him and had occupied on the right bank of the Inachos river certain heights that commanded the city. Pyrrhus did not attack him, but marched along the coast, crossed the Inachos south of Argos and pitched his camp near Nauplia. Next day he tried to provoke Antigonus to leave his strong position, by calling him a robber and challenging him to come down into the plain and fight for Macedonia. Such a message would probably have brought Pyrrhus down on the challenger, but Antigonus was of a less fiery temper. He coolly answered that he relied on strategy rather than tactics and that if Pyrrhus was tired of life, many roads led to death.

While the rival kings were amusing themselves with this exchange of words, the bulk of the Argive citizens regarded them both with dismay. They had no wish that their city should be the cockpit of Greece and they sent heralds to both commanders and begged them to go elsewhere and let Argos remain neutral. Antigonus, whose wellwisher Aristippus was in control of Argos, readily agreed; for he thereby lost nothing. He offered to send his son into Argos as a hostage and asked that a similar guarantee should be required of Pyrrhus. When the heralds went to the Epirot king, they meet with a less cordial reception. He put them off with vague promises, but refused to give any hostages. The heralds went away convinced that Pyrrhus had not given up his designs against Argos. This was the case. He had just received a message from his friend Aristeas that he would that night open to the Epirot troops one of the gates of Argos.

A more superstitious man than Pyrrhus might have been dissuaded from the project, for according to Plutarch there were grave portents in abundance. The sacrificed cattle, whose heads

Pyrrhus had cut off, put out their tongues and licked up their own blood. The priestess of Apollo ran through Argos, crying out that she saw it full of corpses. An eagle that had alighted in Argos suddenly flew away. But the king was in no mood to be deterred by omens. A splendid chance of taking Argos had presented itself. With that famous city in his possession, he could bar Antigonus' entry into the Peloponnesus. In a straight line Argos was not more than twenty five miles from Corinth. Antigonus would thus find himself hemmed in between Pyrrhus' Macedonian troops in the north and the garrison of Argos to the south. Corinth and Thessalonica would soon fall to the master of Argos.

In the dark Pyrrhus set forth with a strong force of Gauls and Epirots. At midnight he reached a gate known as the Diamperes in the southern side of the Argive wall. Aristeas had opened it and through it went the Gallic vanguard and undetected seized the market place. Then a hitch occurred that ruined the whole plan. With the vanguard were two or more elephants. Their covered howdahs, that they carried to protect their mahouts, were too high for the gates and they had to be taken off to allow the animals to enter and then replaced; but while the Indians talked soothing words to their elephants, chattered with each other and fumbled with the howdah straps,[1] the Argives woke up. Finding the enemy established in the market place, they seized their arms and ran to garrison the citadel and other strong places in the town. They also sent word to Antigonus, who sent his son Halcyoneus with a strong detachment and Areus who had by then reached Antigonus' camp with a body of Spartans. In the meantime, Pyrrhus entered the city by an eastern gate near a gymnasium known as the Cylarabis and gave a shout to encourage the Gauls in the market place.

The wretched barbarians were surrounded on all sides by the Argive mob and were in despair. Hearing the king's battle cry, they shouted back; but the king's practised ear noticed that their shout lacked vigour. Realising that his vanguard must be in difficulties, he rode towards them as fast as he could, but he was hampered in his advance by the open drains and water-channels with which Argos abounded. At the same time he and his men were assailed on all sides by the Argive rabble. To add to the confusion, Halcyoneus and Areus had by this time also entered the city. The night was pitch dark; the soldiers of both sides lost their way and were probably butchered indiscriminately by the populace. In despair both armies stood their ground and

[1]Anyone who has seen Indian mahouts at work will appreciate the delay that this must have caused.

waited for daylight. When morning broke, Pyrrhus' eyes rested on a bronze group, which portrayed a bull fighting a wolf. It had been erected by Danaus to celebrate his conquest of Argos; but it recalled to Pyrrhus an oracle, that he had heard many years before. The oracle had foretold that Pyrrhus would die when he saw a wolf and bull fighting.

A still graver cause for depression was the sight of the citadel and the heights of the town filled by an armed mob and by the enemy's soldiers. There was nothing for Pyrrhus to do, but retreat as best he could. But to get his elephants through the gates, he would again have to take off their howdahs. This operation had delayed his advance and would still more delay his retreat. He sent word to his son Helenos to batter down the walls where he could with the remaining elephants and so open fresh exits for the retreating force. The message was wrongly given. Had Pyrrhus' eldest son Ptolemy been in command of the reserves, he would probably have grasped his father's meaning; but that gallant boy was lying with many another hero in the windswept lands of Lacedæmon. Helenos, who was Pyrrhus' youngest son and little more than a lad, blindly carried out the order, as he received it. Instead of breaking down the walls, he led his whole army and his elephants into the gates through which his father's men were struggling to escape. By doing so, he completely shut them in.

To add to the confusion, the largest of Pyrrhus' elephants had fallen athwart one of the gates. Another elephant, whose name Nikon has survived, missed its mahout, who had been mortally wounded and had fallen off the beast's back. It dashed through the retreating force until it found its master's dead body. Lifting it with its trunk, it put the body across its tusks, and wild with grief and rage, it charged in all directions, trampling down everyone whom it met. The unfortunate Gauls and Epirots, attacked in the rear by the Argives, the Spartans and Antigonus' mercenaries and hemmed in from the front by the rest of the army and the elephants under Helenos became hopelessly jammed. The men could neither draw nor sheathe their weapons and many were run through by the swords of their comrades, standing helplessly next them; while from the roofs of the adjoining houses, the Argive women pelted them mercilessly with stones and tiles.[1]

All that man could do, Pyrrhus did. Taking the crown from his helmet, he rode back to the market place to help the rear ranks. Here he was struck in the chest by a spear thrown by

[1]Polyaen VIII. 68. See also Schubert p. 256.

one of the pursuing mob. Pyrrhus turned on the wretched street loafer and would have cut him down. The man's mother happened to be among the women, who were pelting the Epirots from the tops of the houses. Seeing her son in danger, she lifted up a heavy tile with both hands and with all her strength threw it at the king. It struck him on the back of the neck and stunned him.

Pyrrhus lost consciousness and sank from his horse falling on the ground near an old tomb, said to be that of Licymnius, an ancient Argive hero killed by Tleptolemus, a son of Heracles.[2] Before Pyrrhus could recover, one of Antigonus' officers called Zopyrus recognised the unconscious king and dragged him into a doorway. There Zopyrus drew his sword to cut off his prisoner's head. Pyrrhus opened his eyes and gave his assailant so terrible a look, that the assassin almost gave up his design. Nevertheless he recovered himself and hacked off the king's head. The news of Pyrrhus' death spread like wildfire through the two armies. Halcyoneus heard of it and running to the spot, asked to see the head. Recognising it as Pyrrhus', he rode off with it to his father Antigonus and threw it at his feet. The sight of the head filled Antigonus with grief. All his feelings of dislike and rivalry vanished. He remembered the old days when Pyrrhus was the friend and brother in law of his deeply loved father the brilliant Demetrius. Pyrrhus, too, had fought by the side of Demetrius' father Antigonus the One-eyed and shared with grandfather, father and son in the disaster of Ipsus. Antigonus Gonatas covered his face with his cloak and thinking of all the joys and sorrows of those far off years, he burst into tears. He scolded his son as a barbarian for his inhuman conduct and drove him with a blow from his presence.

On Pyrrhus' death, Helenos, whose blind obedience to a wrongly delivered order had caused the disaster completely lost his head. He did nothing to extricate his unfortunate soldiers from the awful situation into which his error had brought them. He changed into rags and went as a suppliant to Halcyoneus. The latter had profited by his father's correction and instead of illtreating Helenos, he spoke to the young prince kindly and led him by the hand into Antigonus' presence. The latter told his son that his present was better than his former conduct, but still reproached him for not having made Helenos take off his rags and put on clothes more fitted to his rank. Antigonus then received the surrender of the army, but behaved with great magnanimity. He equipped Helenos suitably and bade him lead his troops back to Epirus. This Helenos did, apparently without

[2]Paus. 2. XXII. 8.

mishap and his elder brother Alexander succeeded to the throne of Epirus (272 B.C.).

So died Pyrrhus at the age of forty six. It has been the practice of historians to belittle his achievements and to compare him with a brilliant meteor, that lights up for a moment the darkness of the night sky and then disappears without leaving any trace of its passage. They have been influenced by the Greek writers; but these came under the spell of the Antigonid house. It was to Antigonus' interest to consolidate his claims to the Macedonian throne, by belittling Pyrrhus' character. He compared Pyrrhus with a dicer, who makes good throws, but does not know how to take advantage of them. Later chroniclers, justly admiring the great administrative talents of Antigonus have followed his lead. Still I cannot but think that they have done the Epirot king less than justice.

We may well concede that Pyrrhus was not Alexander; but then for such a combination of military and civil talents, the world had to wait two thousand years until Corsica gave birth to Buonaparte. Yet it was no small achievement to rise from penniless exile at seventeen to the kingship of Epirus, Macedonia, Tarentum and Syracuse at forty six. Nor was Pyrrhus' work obliterated by his death. His own country Epirus was, when he found it, split up into factions and shaken by revolutions. He left it a powerful united kingdom. He unquestionably saved Syracuse; for never did she have to yield to Carthage. Tarentum was actually in Pyrrhus' possession when he died; for Milo and his garrison successfully defied the Roman arms. On hearing of the disaster of Argos, the miserable democrats of Tarentum, once again fearing punishment at Roman hands, called in the Carthaginians. The latter eagerly accepted the invitation and one winter morning in 272 B.C., Milo saw the tall masts of Byrsa in the harbour of Tarentum. Milo had no love for Rome, but he was a white man and so was the Roman. Anything was better than to hand over a Greek city to the odious rule of the yellow Phœnicians of Tunis. He sent an urgent message to the Roman consul Lucius Papirius and surrendered to him the town, securing for the citizens a pardon and for himself and his men an unmolested passage to Epirus.

Now fully to appreciate Pyrrhus' achievements, let us suppose that he had followed Cineas' advice and never left Epirus. The Tarentine democrats, to save their wretched lives, would surely have called in the Carthaginians. In the same way Syracuse would certainly have fallen. With Tarentum and Syracuse in her hands, Carthage would have become the suzerain of all the Greek cities

in Italy and Sicily, including Rhegium and Messina. Now Mommsen has shewn that it was by the help of the Greek cities in Italy and the resources of Syracuse that Rome won the command of the sea from Carthage. Thus by his vigorous action on behalf of Tarentum and Syracuse, Pyrrhus saved Europe from African domination. If he could not save her from the slave trade and the circus, he still helped to save her from the orgies of Bal and the sacrifices of Moloch.

Apart, however, from what he actually accomplished, there is a fascination about Pyrrhus, that nearly all writers have felt. The grim pro-Romanism of Mommsen relaxes for a few pages, while he tells the mighty deeds of the "Helden-koenig" of Epirus. Even among the daring successors of Alexander, Pyrrhus was the bravest of the brave. Although a king's son, he could outmarch the stoutest hoplite; and in spite of a life spent in camps and on the battlefield, he was yet a polite and cultivated prince He was a boon companion, a staunch comrade and a chivalrous foe. No hardships daunted him, no misfortunes depressed him. He met every turn of fortune with a cheerful smile and from every calamity save the last, he wrung a fresh achievement.

To Pyrrhus succeeded, as I have said, his son Alexander. When Alexander died in 253 B.C., his son another Pyrrhus followed. The latter died young and was succeeded by his brother Ptolemy and then by his sister Deidameia. She was the last of the Aiacidæ and she was unable to hold for long the sceptre of Achilles. A revolution broke out, a republic was declared and the grand daughter of Pyrrhus fell by the knife of an assassin. With the usual factious hatred of Greek democrats, the republicans dug up the great king's grave and flung his bones and ashes into the street. Last of all a barbarian poet, living many years afterwards in that very Rome that Pyrrhus had fought with equal fortune, commemorated to all eternity the outrage done to his remains.

> Nec tua quam Pyrrhi felicius ossa quiescant
> Sparsa per Ambracias, quæ jacuere, vias.[2]

[1]Pyrrhus wrote a book on the Art of War, that was read in Cicero's time (Cicero ad Fam IX. 25).

[2]Ovid Ibis 299.

HIERO, KING OF SYRACUSE.

CHAPTER I.

His Rise to Power.

Pyrrhus had left in Syracuse a body of troops under a trustworthy Sicilian captain called Hiero and had betrothed his daughter Nereis to the latter's son Gelon; but Hiero, however faithful he might wish to be, was unable to control events. First came the news of Pyrrhus' losses at sea, then of his defeat at Beneventum and lastly of his departure from Italy. It was clear that Pyrrhus would not return, at any rate in the near future, to Syracuse. Nor could he govern it from Epirus. Pyrrhus had in fact ceased to be ruler of Syracuse and all the old feud between aristocrats and democrats broke out again. Pyrrhus had affected, as Agathocles had done, to favour the democratic party and the army under Hiero's command was strongly democratic; but the city fell into the hands of the oligarchical leaders and they tried to assume the control of the army.

This was a challenge both to Pyrrhus' and his viceroy's title. Hiero saw that, in view of Pyrrhus' disasters, he could no longer conduct the administration as the Epirot's lieutenant. His army was camped outside the city at Mergane or Mergantium, and fomenting the democratic feelings of his soldiers, he persuaded them to defy the aristocrats within the walls and to elect him and one of his officers, Artemidorus, as their strategoi or commanders. As the chosen of the army, Hiero and his colleague could laugh at the orders of the factious leaders inside the city. The new strategoi drew up their men close to Syracuse and were soon admitted through the gates by the democrats inside. For a brief space Hiero allowed Artemidorus to act as his co-regent; but once the Syracusans had become used to a military government, Hiero found it convenient to reduce his colleague and rule alone.

Since in Greek history no ruler gave such continuous satisfaction as Hiero, his grateful subjects, anxious to emphasise the wide difference betwen his temperate wisdom and the dissolute cruelty of Dionysius II and Agathocles, found an explanation in the special favour shewn by Heaven to their sovereign. Hiero

was the son of one Hierocles,[1] a well to do citizen, who claimed descent from the tyrant Gelon. His mother was Hierocles' maid-servant. Anxious to be rid of the fruits of his indiscretion, Hierocles exposed the child, after the Hellenic custom, that it might die of cold and hunger. The gods sent bees to feed the infant with their honey and instead of dying, the infant throve. Seeing in the miracle evidence of the divine will, Hierocles took back the child to his house and reared it as his own. One day when Hiero was in a classroom with other boys of his own age, a wolf burst into the school room and without doing Hiero any injury, snatched away his exercise book. Whether this was a divine admonition that Hiero should adopt a military rather than a civil career, is not clear; but when Hiero did become a soldier, further signs of the gods' approval were not wanting. In his first battle an owl perched upon his spear and an eagle rested on his shield. When Pyrrhus landed in Italy, Hiero joined the Epirot army as a soldier of fortune; but his rapid promotion was due to other causes than divine favour. To Pyrrhus Hiero was just " a man from Hiera," an island in the Lipari group and his mother's home;[1] and the royal esteem could only have been won by coolness and bravery in action. Pyrrhus lavished on Hiero presents and favours and when the king sailed from Syracuse back to Italy, he conferred on Hiero then only thirty-one the highest post in his gift and made him his viceroy.

The new autocrat had in his favour youth, a fine presence and the beauty of vigorous manhood. The stain of bastardy he sought to remove by a brilliant marriage. He had induced Pyrrhus to give his daughter Nereis to his son Gelon and he now sought to get a bride for himself from one of the first houses in Syracuse. The head of one of the richest families there, was Leptines, a descendant of Philistos, the friend and historian of the great Dionysius the first. Indeed Leptines was himself connected with Dionysius, for Philistos had taken as his wife the tyrant's niece. Of this rich burgher Hiero asked the hand of his daughter Philistis. It was difficult to reject the prayer of such a suitor and Philistis became the bride of the new ruler; and her wisdom and good sense as well as her aristocratic connexion proved of the utmost value to Hiero throughout his lengthy reign.

Once established as autocrat of Syracuse, Hiero had to consider what his foreign policy should be. Pyrrhus had for a time broken the power of the Carthaginians and the Mamertines; but the naval victory of the former and Pyrrhus' failure before Rhegium had restored the confidence of both his enemies. The Cartha-

[1]Justin XXIII. IV.
[1]Holm's Gesch. Sic. Vol. II p. 286.

ginians had spread over the west of Sicily and the Mamertines had rebuilt many of their old castles and were once again levying blackmail from the Sicilian Greeks. Nor had Hiero the resources that Dionysius I and Agathocles had found in Italy. They had spread their dominion over Magna Græcia and had used the wealth of Rhegium, Locri and Croton and the great forests of Lucania and Bruttium to maintain their Sicilian armies and their fleets. But Rome was now mistress of all Italy save Rhegium; and Rhegium was a close ally of the Mamertines. Hiero was thus faced with a possible Carthaginian attack, supported by Rhegium and the Mamertines; for Carthage had allied herself to Messina in order to combat Pyrrhus. In these circumstances Hiero could only wait on events and these soon took a favourable turn. Once the Romans had become masters of Tarentum, they turned their attention to Rhegium. The Campanian mercenaries in that city had been guilty of two acts, that the Roman Republic never forgave. They had revolted from Rome and they had defeated her armies. In 271 B.C. the Roman Consul Genucius left Rome with definite orders to reduce Rhegium at all costs. With him went a great force of all arms.

This was Hiero's opportunity and he seized it. If Rhegium could be destroyed, the Mamertines, cut off from Italy, would be shorn of half their power. Moreover, if the Romans could be induced to accept Hiero's aid in taking Rhegium, they might perhaps return his good offices, by helping him to reduce Messina. Hiero offered his help and the Romans wisely accepted it. Rhegium was far from Rome. The transport of sufficient supplies to a great Roman army was arduous by road and during stormy weather impossible by sea. On the other hand the great city of Syracuse was close to Rhegium. She had vast supplies ready to hand and her workmen were famous for their skill in the construction of siege trains and other engines of war. She had abundant soldiers trained in the school of Pyrrhus. The Campanian deserters defended themselves with the fury of despair. Every yard of the entrenchments had to be taken and retaken a score of times. Had Hiero not sent siege artillery, ships and supplies, it is probable that the Romans would again have had to raise the siege. For Hiero not only actively helped the besiegers, but his ships prevented supplies from going to Rhegium from Messina and his covering army threatened an attack on the Mamertines, in case they tried to send troops across the straits. At last in 270 B.C. the robber city attacked by land and sea, by Roman and Hellene fell. The revolted mercenaries died fighting, save a wretched remnant, who, surrendering at discretion, were taken captive to Rome and there scourged and beheaded. So far as it was possible, the former burghers of Rhegium were sought out and restored to their ancient homes.

On the fall of Rhegium, the time had come, so Hiero thought, to rid Sicily of the Mamertines; but in his own ranks were mutinous mercenaries drawn from many nations and from all classes of society. They were discontented with Hiero's orderly government and clamoured that he should celebrate his election as Captain of Syracuse by executing the richest citizens and handing over the plunder of their palaces to the soldiers, who had elected him. Hiero preferred to base his rule on the friendship of the Syracusan burghers than on the fleeting favour of insubordinate mercenaries. They in turn conspired to depose Hiero and elect a more complaisant commander. Hiero met the danger with a device already practised successfully by Dionysius. He led from Syracuse an army composed partly of mercenaries and partly of town militia. After much marching and countermarching, he attacked the Mamertines near the town of Cantoripa. He sent out his mercenaries as his vanguard and held his burghers in reserve. When the vanguard were heavily engaged he marched back to Syracuse, leaving the mercenaries to be massacred.

Hiero had thus rid himself of his mutinous regiments, but he had also lost the backbone of his attacking force. The Mamertines, their confidence increased by their recent victory, spread all over north eastern Sicily. Hiero bided his time and with unceasing patience drilled his burghers from a militia into a regular force. His charm and courtesy won their affection, his soldierly talents their esteem and admiration. At last in 269 B.C. he led a devoted and disciplined force composed of Syracusan citizens to avenge the defeat of Cantoripa.[1] The opportunity was favourable. The pick of the Mamertine troops happened to be in the interior of the island and Hiero, no doubt, hoped to surprise Messina in their absence. His plans were frustrated by the vigilance of the Mamertines. The garrison of Messina were able to repel Hiero until the main army returned by forced marches. Hiero retreated as if towards Syracuse; then changing his march, he suddenly threw himself against Mylæ, a city held by the Mamertines to the southwest of Messina. This he took by storm and drafted its garrison of fifteen hundred men into his own army. The speed of his movements seems to have paralysed the Mamertines, for they made no effort to attack Hiero in the rear and let him storm unmolested Ameselon the most southerly of their strongholds. It lay between Cantoripa and Agyrion and was intended to overawe both towns. Hiero razed the fortress to the ground and divided the lands round it between the two cities that it had oppressed. He drafted the garrison into his own army and then made himself master of Alesa an important town on the western frontier of the Mamertine territory. Some of its Greek inhabitants opened the gates to the Greek captain. The fall of Alesa

[1]Diod. XXII. 13. 7. Polyb. 1. 9.

was followed by that of Abakainon and Tyndaris, two towns between Alesa and Mylæ and in a few weeks the Mamertines found themselves reduced to Messina and the lands round it. Even here they were not safe, for Hiero's force swollen by the garrisons of the conquered cities to ten thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, was now marching straight for Messina. The Mamertines could put into the field but eight thousand infantry and a small body of horse. Kion, who was in command of the Mamertine forces consulted his soothsayers as to the outcome of the battle. They replied that he would pass the night in the enemy's camp. Kion believed the answer to mean that he would capture the enemy's camp and equipment. He ordered his army to cross the Longanus and attack the Syracusan position. Hiero, had, however, in his ranks two hundred Messina refugees, who had escaped from the town when treacherously seized by the Campanian mercenaries. Hiero sent them with four hundred picked men to seize a hill called Thorax with orders to fall on the enemy's rear, when an opportunity occurred. He himself made a frontal attack on the Mamertines as they crossed the river. The latter fought with their accustomed courage and might have repulsed the Greek army, but for the sudden attack of the refugees. The Mamertines, taken entirely by surprise, were seized with a wild panic. Some indeed stood their ground; but worn out by some hours of fighting, they could not withstand the onslaught of a fresh force, animated by furious hatred. They were all cut down. The six hundred then placed themselves across the Mamertine line of retreat and a massacre ensued. The Greeks shewed no mercy to the robbers, who had treacherously seized a Greek city and very few fugitives escaped to Messina. Kion the leader was taken wounded but alive into Hiero's presence. The latter ordered his doctors to attend to Kion's wounds and had a bed prepared for him in one of his own tents, thus fulfilling the soothsayer's prophecy that Kion would spend the night in the enemy's camp. With careful treatment Kion might have recovered. But as he lay in Hiero's tent, some of the general's servants brought in a number of horses that they had collected on the battlefield. Among the horses was the charger of Kion's son. Judging from this that his son had perished, Kion, in an agony of grief, tore off his bandages and died of hemorrhage.

The Mamertines, who had lost their general, their possessions and their army, were reduced to despair. Their only hope of escaping the vengeance of the fugitive burghers was to throw themselves on the mercy of Hiero; and they resolved to surrender their town on the best terms that they could get. Before the envoys left Messina, a strange event happened, that had the most momentous consequences. A Carthaginian fleet under one

Hannibal[1] lay off Lipara. Hearing of Hiero's victory, it occurred to Hannibal's ingenious mind that he might snatch the spoils from the victor. He sent a squadron laden with troops to Messina; on board was an envoy empowered to promise the Mamertines the full support of Carthage, if they did not surrender. While his ships were on the sea, Hannibal himself went to meet Hiero, offered his congratulations and assured Hiero that there was no need to advance, as the Mamertine envoys were already on the way with an offer of surrender. Indeed Hannibal insisted on celebrating the victory with fitting revelry and when he at last let the Syracusan army proceed, his ships had reached Messina. The Mamertines cancelled their previous resolution, recalled their envoys and resolved with Carthaginian aid to defend their city. Hiero had no wish to enter on a war with Carthage. He withdrew his army and returned to Syracuse to receive the congratulations of the burghers. They were freely bestowed and fully merited. Hiero had created a citizen army and with it had won a signal victory over their most troublesome enemy. It was true that he had not taken Messina, but he had broken the Mamertine power. Never again would they be able to levy blackmail from Sicilian towns or overawe them with robber castles. The citizens shewed their gratitude, by raising Hiero from the office of captain to one higher still and for the next fifty years the former viceroy of Pyrrhus ruled the great city as king of the Syracusans.

[1]This Hannibal had nothing to do with the great Hannibal of the Barca family. Hannibal was a common name and is the equivalent to our John. Hanna = grace. Bal = lord. Hannibal thus = the grace of the Lord.

On the other hand: Hanna Jah = the grace of the Lord. Hanna Jah or Jah Hanna = Johannes and Johannes = John.

CHAPTER II.

The Coming of the Romans.

The Mamertines were at first grateful for their escape from the Greek king, who at the bidding of the Messina exiles, might have inflicted on the Campanian robbers a punishment similar to that received by the Rhegium mutineers; but their gratitude soon waned on daily contact with the African Semites. A hundred years before, the Carthaginians had during their struggle with Dionysius I destroyed Messina rather than garrison her. Now that they had established a powerful naval base at Lipara, they would no longer have any difficulty in holding Messina. Hannibal, therefore, proposed to keep the town for Carthage and calmly posted a garrison in the citadel under the command of Hanno, one of his subordinates, regardless of the feelings of his allies.

The Mamertines were furious at being tricked by the unscrupulous Carthaginian and in despair thought of Rome. After all as Campanians, they were akin in speech, thought and manners to the Romans. On the other hand, the latter had punished with terrible severity their allies and fellow criminals, the Campanians of Rhegium. Still it was possible to distinguish between the two cases. If the Mamertines had treated their Greek hosts with treacherous cruelty, it was probable that the full tale of their misdeeds had not reached Roman ears. The Mamertine envoys could deny the worst charges and pass lightly over the others. For the Mamertines, too, it could be urged that they had never deserted Rome and that they had never been at war with her. Again their crime was a quarter of a century old. The Mamertine ranks were filled with innocent youths, born of Greek mothers. Surely there must be some prescription for political offences; if not, could Rome herself plead innocence? Could the authors of the Sabine rape in fairness cast blame on the treacherous soldiery of Messina?

This reasoning was not without force and the insolence of the Carthaginian soldiery, who lorded it over the town, rapidly increased the strength of the pro-Roman party. In 265 B.C. the Mamertines sent secretly envoys to Rome and begged their help as a kindred people. The Roman Senate treated the reasoning of

the Mamertine envoys as sophristy and found it difficult to distinguish between the guilt of Rhegium and Messina. The Mamertines, even if they had never declared war on Rome, had helped Rhegium to the best of their ability and had only abstained from open war through fear of Hiero. On the other hand the political situation was of the gravest. If Messina remained in Carthaginian hands, Syracuse would in no short time become the subordinate ally of Carthage. Since the capture of Tyre and Sidon by Alexander, Carthage had expanded in the most formidable manner. The Punic city was far more populous than Rome and her dominion extended over sixty thousand square miles.[1] Carthage owned Sardinia, Corsica, Malta and most of Sicily. In Africa she owned Tunis, Algiers and large parts of Libya or Tripoli and of Morocco. She had trading stations in Spain and naval stations in most of the Sicilian islands. She was absolute mistress of the western Mediterranean and the Tyrrhenian Seas. If she became sole mistress of Sicily also, Italy would be entirely ringed in. The Greek cities of Magna Græcia, from which Rome drew most of her wealth would slowly dwindle to nothing; and the hardy population of Italy would be for ever doomed to be hewers of wood and drawers of water. Still in spite of these grave considerations, the Roman Senate rejected the Mamertine embassy.

The patrician captains, however, who in the reduction of southern Italy, had found war a lucrative business, contrived an appeal from the Senate to the people and held out glowing hopes of the rich plunder of Greek and Carthaginian towns. The bait proved irresistible and, little dreaming of Thrasymene or Cannæ, the Roman people resolved to send help to the Mamertines (264 B.C.). The consul Appius Claudius[2] conveyed to the Senate the decision of the people and accepting it, the Senate directed a large force to proceed to Sicily. One of the tribunes C. Claudius went with the vanguard to Rhegium; but on arrival there he received a message from Messina that since a peace had through the good offices of the Carthaginians been arranged between the Mamertines and Hiero, Roman help was no longer needed. The tribune guessed rightly that the message had been extorted by Hanno from the Mamertine leaders and resolved to get into touch with the latter. In a small boat he crossed the straits and entered the harbour of Messina, where he announced that he had come merely to clear up some unexplained points. Hanno the commandant, who seems to have been quite unfit for his post, allowed Claudius to confer with the Mamertine leaders. The tribune learned thereby the strength of the Roman party in the town. He also received an

[1] Beloch Vol. III p. 1 p. 331—70,000 square kilometers in Africa and 43,000 square kilometers in the islands.
[2] Holm's Gesch. Sic. Vol. III p. 8.

assurance that if he could land some troops in Messina, the town would rise in his favour. Claudius returned to Rhegium and shipped on some local transports a considerable force. Unfavourable weather and the watchfulness of the Carthaginians baulked the tribune. Some of his ships were blown out of their course; the few transports that reached Messina were politely invited to return. A second attempt by Claudius proved more successful. Choosing a night when the wind was in his favour he again put out with his transports, got them across and landed his men unopposed in Mesina. The population greeted him with open arms and Hanno, taken completely by surprise, withdrew his men into the citadel. Claudius addressed the Mamertine assembly and announced the decision of the Roman people. The treacherous Campanians invited Hanno to discuss the question, offering him a safe conduct if he entered the assembly unarmed and unattended. Hanno, who had himself been guilty of treachery in holding the town for Carthage against the wishes of the burghers, might well have suspected similar treatment at their hands. Nevertheless he accepted the offer and blindly walked into the trap. After a decent interval passed in speeches and replies, one of Claudius' officers rushed at Hanno, seized him and marched him off to prison. There the Mamertines and the Roman guard held out to him threats of death by torture and told him that if he wished to save himself from pain and execution, his only hope lay in ordering his men down from the citadel and marching with them out of Messina.[1] The cowardly African was willing to agree to any terms to save his own skin. He undertook to march his men out of Messina and was released that he might do so. He carried out his undertaking, withdrew his soldiers and left Messina in Roman hands. Hanno reported his misfortunes at headquarters and was promptly crucified.

Hannibal brought his field force to Sunes or Eunes, a town to the north of Messina. He ordered the Carthaginian fleet to Cape Peloris, the extreme north eastern point of Sicily and laid siege to Messina. He invited Hiero, his companion in misfortune, to join in the siege. Hiero so hated the Mamertines that he forgave Hannibal his previous treachery and allied himself to Carthage. He camped with a Syracusan army to the south of Messina. The Mamertines were once again in serious danger, but help was at hand. The consul Appius Claudius had come with the main Roman army to Rhegium; there he collected every ship, boat or raft that he could find or get built in Tarentum, Locri and Naples. To hide his preparations he opened negotiations with both Hiero and Hannibal. They naturally declined to raise the siege, as he requested them to do, and Hiero made many pointed observa-

[1] Polyb. 1. 11. Dio Cassius fr. 43 and Zonaras VIII. 9, 2.

tions on the crookedness of Roman policy. For these, however, Claudius cared little. One night in the spring of 263 B.C., he succeeded in escaping the vigilance of the Carthaginian patrols and in landing in Messina with the entire consular army.

Once inside Messina, Appius Claudius resolved to break through the enemy's entrenchments. He first attacked Hiero and his Syracusans, but was repulsed with considerable loss; and a similar attack on the Carthaginian lines met with a similar disaster.[1] The consul's year of office was drawing to a close and he made no other attempt to pierce the enemy's lines. Towards the end of August 263 B.C., he was relieved by the new consul Manius Valerius. The latter engaged the enemy with greater success. He led his troops out of Messina. Hiero, confident of a second victory, did not await the Roman attack in his entrenchments. He led out his troops to meet the consular army, probably hoping to destroy the vanguard before the main body could debouch from the gates of Messina. It was a dangerous movement, for the Romans greatly outnumbered his men[2] and he could count on no support from the distant Carthaginian lines. A long struggle ensued; it first went in Hiero's favour, but ended disastrously for him when the whole Roman army had deployed. Hiero retreated to his lines. In the bitterness of his failure, he remembered Hannibal's previous treachery and attributed his defeat to some fresh act of Punic perfidy. The following night he struck his camp and withdrew to Syracuse.

Manius Valerius had now only one enemy to deal with. He drove the Carthaginians out of their entrenchments and forced them to fall back on Cape Peloris, where they encamped, their left wing guarded by their fleet. Their centre and right wing were protected by unfordable marshes. Seeing that the Carthaginians were determined to act on the defensive, Manius Valerius treated them with not unmerited contempt and took one by one the neighbouring Punic and Sicilian fortresses. Manius Valerius was shortly afterwards joined by the second consul Manius Otacilius Crassus and the two generals, who commanded an army of four legions and allied contingents, rapidly reduced Cantoria and Adrianon. They then established themselves at a spot known as the Brazen Gates[3] and received the voluntary submission of Alesa, Tauromenion, Catana and some sixty other towns. These easy successes led the consuls to besiege Syracuse hoping that the great city would follow the example of the lesser Greek towns and surrender.

[1] Beloch Vol. 3 p. 1. p. 671.
[2] The Romans had about 20,000 men to Hiero's 10,000. Niese Vol. 2 p. 183, footnote.
[3] Diodor XXIII.

Their hopes would certainly not have been fulfilled, had not other circumstances worked in their favour. The Carthaginian alliance had never been popular with the king's subjects.[1] For centuries the Syracusans and the African Phœnicians had been at war and the former knew well the abominations of the Punic government. To this age-long hatred had been added the double-dealing of Hannibal in the matter of Messina and his failure to support Hiero in the recent battle. Yielding alike to his own wishes and to the clamours of his people, Hiero sent envoys to the consuls and sued for peace. The consuls who preferred plunder to war, were glad to let Hiero ransom himself rather than conduct a long and weary siege. The king was forced to restore his Roman prisoners of war without a ransom, and to pay an indemnity of either one or two hundred talents in four yearly instalments.[1] On the other hand, Hiero was confirmed in the possession of Leontini, Acrae, Megara, Heloron and Neton and possibly also of Catana. His dominion was extended by the grant of Tauromenion and he received the protection of Rome. The treaty was to last for fifteen years, but was afterwards renewed indefinitely. Hannibal hearing of the projected siege of Syracuse sent his fleet at once to help his ally, hoping no doubt that Syracuse would, as Messina had done, admit a Carthaginian garrison into her citadel. But Hiero had already had more than enough of the Carthaginian alliance. He sent word to the Punic commander that he was now an ally of the Romans and forbade Hannibal's fleet to enter the harbour of Syracuse. The Carthaginian ships sailed away and Hiero's long and faithful connexion with Rome began. One of the immediate consequences of the treaty was Hiero's reconciliation with the Mamertines. They were now the allies of his allies and could no longer be treated as foes. At the prompting of the consuls the bitter enemies became friends; and in no long time all cause for enmity vanished. The Mamertines became rapidly Hellenized and Messina became to all intents and purposes a Greek city.

[1] Polyb. 1. 16. See also Niese Vol. II p. 184, footnote.

CHAPTER III.

The War with Carthage.

The Romans after their treaty with Hiero again turned their attention to the interior of the island, but met with unexpected ill fortune before the open village of Adranon and the little town of Macella. In both cases they were repulsed and had to raise the siege. These mishaps were balanced by the voluntary surrender of Segesta and Halicyae, now known as Salemi, two important towns in the west of the island. Segesta excused her treachery by claiming that she like Rome was a daughter of Troy. Three smaller townships, of which the sites are unknown, followed the lead of Segesta. Tyndaris would willingly have done the same; but the Carthaginians heard of the plot, seized the leading citizens and sent them to Carthage as hostages.

The Roman successes roused Carthage to greater efforts. Carthage had lost the eastern part of the island without much regret, but she was determined to hold the western towns. The fighting was hardest round Agrigentum. The new consular year of 262 B.C. had begun and the consuls Lucius Postumius and Quintus Mamilius marched with a powerful army against Agrigentum and established themselves near a temple to Aesculapius, about a mile to the east of the walls. They were soon short of supplies, for the Carthaginians held the sea and the Romans had to live on the country. They dispersed in foraging parties to gather in the harvest, that was then ripe for the reaping. Their carelessness nearly led to a great disaster. Hannibal sent out a mobile force, that cut up the foragers as they were scattered among the fields. A panic ensued among the Romans and there was a mad rush towards the camp. For a time it seemed as if the Carthaginian detachment would destroy the Roman army; they drove them into the camp and actually began to pull up the palisades. Once, however, within the camp, Roman discipline reasserted itself. The Romans counterattacked and drove back the Carthaginians with heavy loss into Agrigentum. Both sides thereafter became more careful. The Romans called on their allies, especially Syracuse, for supplies, which Hiero furnished in great quantities. Hannibal alarmed at the heavy losses sustained by his detachment as it retired, made no more considerable sorties.

Encouraged by Hannibal's inaction, the Romans formed a second camp to the west of Agrigentum, at Heraclea, now known as Montallegro and drew circumvallation lines between the two camps, thus cutting the Carthaginians from the sea. Having achieved this, the consuls created a great corn depôt at Herbessus to the west of Heraclea, to which the allies could either cart or ship their supplies.

Hannibal, cut off from the sea, sent urgent messages for help to Carthage. She enlisted mercenaries from all quarters, Liguria, Gaul and Spain and shipped the hastily raised army together with fifty elephants to Sicily. This was the first time that the Carthaginians had used elephants. They had been so terrified by those of Pyrrhus, that they resolved to use some themselves. There were vast herds of elephants in the Atlas mountains, smaller, it is true, than Indian elephants,[1] but quite large enough to trample down a Roman legion. They had never been tamed and the general impression seems to have been then as now, that the African elephant was untameable. But Ptolemy II had solved the problem. There was one race and one only known to the ancient world with sufficient patience for the purpose. If Indian mahouts could be obtained, even the African elephant would work cheerfully for mankind. Ptolemy II founded Ptolemais near Suakim and hired mahouts from India.[2] In no long time the Indians had not only caught herds of Nubian elephants, but had won their love and affection. Carthage and Egypt were friendly nations. Ptolemy would, if asked, obtain Indian mahouts for his neighbours and they would tame the Atlas elephants as they had tamed the elephants of Nubia. Ptolemy was obliging. Indian mahouts went to Carthage and in no long time the Punic war office had at its disposal as many elephants as its generals wished.

Hanno the commander of the Carthaginian relieving force made a dash at Heraclea, which he took and followed up his success by capturing the great Roman grain depôt of Herbessus. The Romans were soon as distressed as the beleaguered Hannibal and but for the resources of Syracuse and the ingenuity and continued efforts of Hiero, they would have had to raise the siege of Agrigentum. To add to the Roman misfortunes an epidemic broke out in their camp and their cavalry suffered a sharp reverse from Hanno's Numidian horse.

After his successful cavalry action Hanno moved his camp to a little over a mile from that of the Romans and two months

[1]See Beloch Grechische Geschichte vol. 3 pt. 1 p. 360.
[2]Tarn's Hellenistic Civilisation p. 55. Polybius always calls the mahouts Hoi Indoi; so does Plutarch.

passed in skirmishes of little importance. At last the distress inside Agrigentum became so acute that Hannibal insisted on Hanno making a serious effort to relieve the city. Hanno agreed and confident in his cavalry, his elephants and the weakened state of the Roman army, he offered battle to the consuls. They eagerly accepted the challenge and a battle was joined in the open space between the hostile camps. Had Hanno known how to use his elephants, the battle would certainly have gone in his favour. In the level ground the crowded Roman legions would have been trampled down as they were by Pyrrhus' elephants at Heraclea and Asculum; but it is one thing to catch elephants and quite another thing to use them effectively in battle. Indian mahouts are not soldiers and apart from their own particular craft are extremely stupid. They did just what they were told to do and remained in the rear. Hanno attacked the Roman army with his newly raised mercenary levies. After a long struggle they were driven back. In their flight they brought confusion into the reserves and the whole Carthaginian army broke and fled. The elephants turned tail also and added to the general confusion; and the pursuing Romans inflicted very heavy losses on the fugitives. The elephants and all Hanno's baggage became the spoil of the victors. It was a great victory for the Romans, but it was somewhat marred by the escape the same night of Hannibal and the Carthaginian garrison. That wily commander seeing that he had no more to hope from Hanno, led his soldiers through the Roman lines, while the legionaries were celebrating their success with befitting revelry. The Romans punished the unfortunate Agrigentines for Hannibal's escape. They plundered the city and sold twenty-five thousand of the inhabitants as slaves.

The fall of the wealthy city in December 262 B.C., justified Hiero's choice of sides; yet without the king's help the city would probably never have fallen at all. Indeed the real difficulties of the Romans were just beginning. The Carthaginians were absolute lords of the sea. Their privateers sailed unchallenged through the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian seas; any Italian ship that ventured to put out, even for coastwise trade, was at once seized and sunk with all her crew. The Punic fleets blockaded the harbours of Magna Græcia and in spite of the loss of Agrigentum, they still had a great Sicilian base at Lilybæum. Worse still they made descents at various points along the Italian coast and one of the consuls had to return to guard against them. The Romans no doubt were helped by the Syracusan fleet; but Hiero's navy was fully occupied in keeping open the straits and maintaining the Roman lines of communication. In any case Syracuse was neither by land nor by sea the equal of Carthage. There was only one thing for Rome to do and that was to build a fleet of her own.

That was not difficult. In spite of the historians, Rome had always had a small navy both for commerce and war. The subject Greek towns had admirable building yards and better still large numbers of experienced seamen; and the forests of Italy furnished an inexhaustible supply of excellent timber. In 260 B.C., a Roman fleet of a hundred and twenty sail, of which a hundred were quinqueremes, was in commission. Yet even such a fleet would have had little chance against the Carthaginians. It would have been at once rammed and sunk by the superior skill and experience of the African sailors. For seacraft, however, the Romans found a substitute in a device probably suggested to them by the Syracusan mechanics. Syracuse had shewn her inventive powers in the war against Athens and had defeated the skill of the Athenian seamen by strengthening the prows of her ships; the Athenians had met this move by using grappling irons. These the Syracusans had countered by covering their decks with slippery leather. The new Roman device was but a development of the Athenian one. It was a flying bridge that could be dropped on and fastened to the enemy's deck. This device prevented the enemy ship from using her ram and enabled the Roman marines to board her.

In 260 B.C., the consuls were Gnæus Cornelius Scipio and Gaius Duilius. To the former fell the honour of first leading a Roman fleet into action against Carthage. He made a surprise attack on the Carthaginian naval base at Lipara, but he was himself surprised and captured with all his squadron. Duilius, however, avenged his colleague's defeat by winning a great victory near Mylae to the northwest of Messina over a fleet commanded by the same Hannibal, who had outwitted Hiero and defended Agrigentum. The victory was peculiarly gratifying, for among the ships taken was a seven decker, on which Pyrrhus had once hoisted the flag of Epirus. Hannibal escaped in an open boat.

Nevertheless the war dragged on. The Romans had found a way to defeat the Carthaginian fleet in a general action; but they had still no means of stopping the ravages of the Punic privateers. The Carthaginian crews could still outsail and outrow the Romans. The Carthaginians, moreover, established a new base at Drepanon, the modern Trapani, that more than made up for the loss of Agrigentum. The Carthaginian general Hamilcar, who relieved Hannibal after his defeat by Duilius was a skilful soldier and retook the Sicilian cities as fast as the Romans took them. Camarina an important town in the south of the island changed hands several times and was only finally captured by the Romans with the help of Hiero's siege train. The Romans attempted to make a diversion in Corsica and Sardinia. They took the Carthaginian port Alesia in Corsica, but in Sardinia

they had no success. At last in 256 B.C., the Roman Senate adopted a plan that must, I think, have been suggested to them by their Syracusan allies. In 310 B.C., Agathocles tyrant of Syracuse had landed in Africa and had all but taken Carthage. If Agathocles could do this, the Romans with incomparably greater resources than Agathocles could easily bring Carthage to her knees. The Roman Senate entrusted to the two consuls Manlius Vulso and Marcus Atilius Regulus three hundred and thirty ships and a hundred and forty thousand men. The expedition began well with a naval victory at Eknomos, but ended disastrously at Tunis by the defeat and capture of Regulus by the Spartan mercenary Xanthippus. Once again Sicily became the scene of the fighting. The Romans at first depressed by their African disasters and by repeated losses at sea, recovered their moral by the victory of Panormus, wherein the consul Metellus proved that it was possible to overcome the Carthaginian elephants, no matter how well handled, provided they could be lured into broken ground.

In 252 B.C., Hiero and the Romans made a successful attack on the Carthaginian naval station at Lipara. Still Lilybæum defied the Roman besiegers. Hamilcar Barca dug himself in at Eryx and shewed that, if properly led, Carthaginian soldiers could hold their own against the legions. In 242 B.C., came the end of the great war, when Gaius Lutatius destroyed the last Carthaginian fleet off Lilybæum. The Carthaginians evacuated Sicily and for the first time for many hundred years, Syracuse was freed from the Carthaginian peril. Another and a graver peril took its place. The problem that now faced Hiero was how to maintain the independence of Syracuse in view of the greatness to which Rome had attained.

CHAPTER IV.

The Peace—241 B.C.—218 B.C.

The Romans with characteristic ingratitude rewarded neither the Mamertines nor Hiero. The Mamertines might perhaps deem themselves sufficiently compensated by the help given them at the beginning of the war; but Hiero, who had furnished the Romans with money, men and supplies, who had befriended their shipwrecked sailors, had lent them his war engines and had indeed turned the scale in favour of Rome, had every right to expect a substantial addition to Syracusan territory. It was true that Hiero's lands had not suffered much, still Hamilcar Barca had carried his raids as far as Catana.[1] Nevertheless the king received no reward.

Hiero would not have been human, had he not resented this treatment; nevertheless he concealed his annoyance and met the Roman danger with consummate wisdom and statecraft. He resolved to do all in his power to keep on good terms with the Roman people and help them on all occasions with gifts of money and corn, so that they might at least have no excuse for making war on him. At the same time he tried to insure himself against deliberate Roman aggression by making friends with Egypt, Pergamum, Rhodes and Athens. Lastly he raised a large force of mercenaries and fortified Syracuse by every means that the genius of his kinsman Archimedes could devise.

Of this remarkable man, the glory of Hiero's reign and of Syracuse, too little is unfortunately known. He is, however, the only mathematician, to use Professor Tarn's admirable phrase,[2] who ever became a legend. At Alexandria he was a pupil of the famous Euclid, whose treatise was still in my youth taught in English public schools. On his return to Syracuse, Archimedes devoted himself to the study of pure mathematics and made therein

[1] Diodorus XXIV. 6.
[2] Tarn's Helenistic Civilisation p. 245.

some remarkable discoveries. Among them was the quadrature of the parabola. He calculated also the ratio between the circumference of a circle and its diameter and the relation of the volume of a sphere to a circumscribing right cylinder.[1] This last he deemed to be his greatest achievement and on his tomb was, at his wish, engraved a cylinder enclosing a sphere, together with the proof of the mathematical problem thereby created. His theory of the centre of gravity, led the French mathematician Lagrange to describe Archimedes as the founder of mechanics. Yet had Archimedes confined himself merely to the study of mathematics, he would never have become a legend. Like many others learned in that abstruse science, he affected to despise mechanics.[2] It was only the persuasion of Hiero that led him to examine what he had till then deemed a childish accessory to geometry. When he did apply his mind to mechanics, he became the greatest mechanician ever known. A hundred stories are told of him. One day he was asked by Hiero to test the quality of a gold ornament without injuring the metal. As he lay in his bath, thinking how he could gratify his kinsman's wishes, it occurred to him to weigh the ornament against the water it displaced and thus arrived at the correct conclusion that the weight of water displaced by an object is equal to the weight of that object. With a cry of "Eureka! Eureka!", he leapt out of his bath and ran naked through the streets, never resting until he had tested his theory by weighing Hiero's ornament.[3]

Another day Archimedes wrote to Hiero to say that with a given force it was possible to move any given weight and that if he could but go to another world he could move this one. Hiero in reply begged him to launch a great three-masted merchant man, that the strength of innumerable workmen and slaves had till then failed to move. Archimedes consented to try and in a short time he had contrived so admirable a system of pulleys and levers,

[1] Plut. Marc. XVII. The tomb was in 75 B.C. discovered by Cicero after it had been forgotten by the Syracusans (Cie Tusc Disput. V 64 ff.)

[2] Plut. Marc. XIV.

[3] Strangely enough a similar problem was solved in a similar way by Shahaji, the father of Shivaji, the liberator of the Maratha nation. "One day, so the story runs, Shahaji wished to weigh an elephant belonging to his friend, Murar Jagdev, the Minister of Bijapur. The latter had made a vow to distribute in charity the weight in silver of his riding elephant. In vain the learned men of the Adil Shahi Court racked their brains to devise a pair of scales strong enough to bear the animal. Shahaji's ingenious mind solved the problem. He put the elephant in a flat bottomed boat on the Indryani river. Marking the waterline on the boat he had the beast removed and the boat filled with stones, until it again sank to the former waterline. Lastly removing the stones, he weighed them and thus correctly; if laboriously, ascertained the weight of Murar Jagdev's elephant." Kincaid and Parasnis' History of the Maratha People, vol. II p. 56.

that at a signal from Hiero, he was able with the force of his single arm to launch the ship, moving her as rapidly and easily as if she were floating in water.

Archimedes' genius was now directed towards engines of destruction and with unlimited labour at his disposal, he soon erected such marvellous long and short range catapults, cranes and grappling irons, that he rendered Syracuse impregnable to assault.

The fortification of Syracuse was only a defensive measure intended to guard against a surprise attack. Hiero meant never to engage in war save as the ally of Rome and the aim of his policy was to render himself indispensable to her. With that object he helped to the utmost of his power Carthage to recover from the effects of the first Punic War. Unhappily for Carthage the immediate result of the peace was a mutiny of her mercenaries, that was only suppressed after a merciless war of four years' duration. At first the Romans were hampered by an outbreak at Falerii and the fear that other cities might follow her example. But their own danger averted, the Romans began to think that Carthage's troubles were Rome's opportunity. The Carthaginian mutineers sent envoys to the Roman Senate and although the Senate could not for very shame openly side with the mutineers and prohibited Italian sailors and merchants from succouring the rebels, the Senate took little care to see that their orders were obeyed. When Hamilcar seized five hundred Roman blockade runners, the Senate asked for their release in menacing terms. Indeed it is probable that but for Hiero the Romans would have seized the chance of crushing Carthage by allying themselves to the mutineers. The king, however, was untiring in his good offices and sent to Carthage fleet after fleet laden with money, supplies and weapons.[1]

In the end Carthage overcame the mutineers through the genius of Hamilcar Barca, but the effort exhausted her. The Romans could no longer restrain their appetites. It became the fashion at Rome to complain that the peace had been granted on too favourable terms. In 238 B.C., a chance occurred of correcting the treaty. The Carthaginian mercenaries in Sardinia had invited Roman help. The Romans thereupon occupied not only Sardinia but Corsica. In justification they alleged that their cession had been included in the peace treaty, because they were islands that " lay between Sicily and Italy." After the suppression of the African mutiny, the Carthaginians sent envoys to request the restitution of Sardinia. The Romans met the request by

[1]Polyb. 1. 83.

declaring war on Carthage. The wretched Phœnicians worn out by war and quite unprepared for a new campaign, threw themselves on Roman charity. Through Hiero's intervention they were graciously permitted to ransom themselves by the payment of twelve hundred talents (£292,000) and by the formal cession of both islands.

It is probable that the Romans although they were pleased to pardon the Carthaginians for offences that they had not committed, resented Hiero's intervention and above all the aid by which he had enabled Carthage to overcome the mutiny of her mercenaries. In 237 B.C., shortly after the second treaty Hiero was " invited " to Rome to see the games held to celebrate the victory over Carthage. Such an invitation could not be declined, yet to accept it was dangerous also. He who ventured into the lions' den might well not leave it. Hiero, however, trusted to his charm of manner and still more to a present of 200,000 measures of corn that he brought with him as a gift to the Roman people. Corn was always welcome in that metropolis and its arrival changed the feelings of the Romans in Hiero's favour. The king was graciously welcomed, saw the games and wisely left before the shortlived gratitude of Rome had faded.

Not long after this incident, Hiero was able to shew that his alliance was still of value to the Romans. In 229 B.C., the depredations of the Illyrian pirates had forced the Romans to remonstrate with Queen Teuta, their ruler. On his way home the Roman envoy was murdered and the queen refused to surrender his murderer. War at once was declared by Rome. Hiero hastened to offer his services as a Roman ally and assiduously provisioned the Roman fleet in the Adriatic.[1]

Hiero made himself even more useful to the Romans during the Gallic war of 225—222 B.C. In 225 B.C. a great Gallic army composed both of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gauls marched south to the conquest of Rome. The Senate were so alarmed that they could find no better remedy than to bury alive a Gallic man and woman in the Forum, so as to fulfil an alleged prophecy that the Gauls would possess Rome. After this absurd act the Senate thought of raising armies to defend the capital. After some considerable Gallic successes the barbarian invasion was repelled and and Gauls crushed. As the Roman armies marched along the coast of Etruria, Hiero's ships accompanied them and supplied them with corn. His help was so valuable that at the end of the war the Romans conferred on their ally a quantity of Gallic arms and armour and some of the plundered treasure. The king hung the Roman gifts in the Syracusan Olympeion.

[1]Holm's Geschichte Sicilien's vol. III p. 34.

Watchful as the king was to befriend the Romans, he was no less ready to befriend his own countrymen. He would enlist no mercenaries save Greeks and when any opportunity occurred he helped with openhanded generosity the Hellenic states. When in 225 B.C. a great earthquake overwhelmed Rhodes, throwing down her great Colossus and most of her dwelling houses, Hiero at once sent the Rhodians a hundred talents of silver. Part of this money was to be spent on sacrifices, so that divine worship might continue unhindered;[1] part was to be spent on oil in the gymnasium, so that the Rhodian athletes might still train for the games. Hiero also relieved of all export dues Rhodian vessels, that shipped corn from Syracuse to Rhodes. To help the Rhodians in restoring their defences, Hiero sent them fifty catapults each three cubits long. With exquisite courtesy and as if to shew that the Rhodians were conferring a favour by accepting his gifts, he erected in the mart at Rhodes a group of statuary. It represented the people of Rhodes being crowned by the Syracusans. By similar generosity Hiero won and retained the friendship of Ptolemy II. In 240 B.C., during a great famine, the king sent his ship of state the Syracosia, filled with corn, salted fish, wool and other commodities to Alexandria. At the same time with courtly tact he changed the ship's name from Syracosia to Alexandris.

While the king wooed the friendship of the neighbouring states, he sought to make Syracuse the most famous and beautiful city in the world, more wonderful even than Athens or Alexandria. He filled Syracuse and her dependent towns with statuary and temples, gardens and gymnasiums. In the market place at Syracuse he erected the noble fane to Zeus Olympios, wherein he hung the spoils and weapons of Gaul. His palace on the island of Ortygia was adorned, as probably no palace has been adorned before or since. Within the walls of Syracuse he built a vast granary, which after his death enabled her to laugh at the Roman blockade. He encouraged the burghers to pay painters to beautify their houses; and he had his own palace covered by skilled artists with scenes from the Iliad and the Odyssey. Nor did he love poetry less than art. Theocritus was a Syracusan born and bred; and in his sixteenth idyll he has preserved for all time the greatness of Hiero. When the Athenian poet Archimelos wrote an elegaic poem of eighteen lines on Hiero's ship of state the Syracosia, the generous king repaid the courtesy with a gift of a thousand bushels of corn.

The ship of state was indeed worthy of a poem; for a full account of it has been preserved for us by Athenæus and admir-

[1]Polyb. v. 88.

ably summarized by Holm.[1] The wood for the hull came from the forests on Aetna and was sufficient for the construction of sixty ordinary triremes. The hemp and pitch came from the Rhone valley. The hull below the water line was protected by a coating of lead. The designer was Archias of Corinth, but his plans had to be submitted to and approved by Archimedes; and Hiero himself was never long absent from the shipyard. Three hundred carpenters worked daily at the ship and they had under them a vast quantity of unskilled labour. In six months' time the great ship, that had according to Graser's reckoning a tonnage of four thousand two hundred tons, was ready to leave the yard. Archimedes launched her; but the Syracosia although launched, took another six months to complete in the wet dock. The ship was not built for speed. She had only twenty rowers, but she had sails as well. There were three decks. Companion ladders led from one to the other. The third or lowest deck was for ballast or cargo. On the second deck were the state cabins. There were sixty cabins in all; thirty on each side of the gangway and each cabin had four berths. There was also the captain's cabin with fifteen berths; in it slept the captain, the ship's officers and the officers in attendance on the king. There were also three smaller cabins, each containing three berths. Aft of the ship were the kitchen and the sculleries. The state cabins had wonderful mosaic floors, that depicted scenes from the Iliad. They were reserved for the king and the royal guests. The common soldiers and sailors had cabins with rows of bunks, but their position is not known. They were probably somewhere in the hold.

[1]Holm's Geschichte Siciliens III p. 39. Athen. V 206 E. I have ventured to translate the poem as follows:—

"Who made this giant ship? What prince was he,
Who fashioned her and launched her on the sea?
How joined he keel and ribs and deck and hold?
What wondrous craftsman could her rivets mould?
Who made her big as Aetna's summits be,
Or some lone isle in the Aegean sea?
Her equal sides did giant minds design,
That she might navigate some heavenly brine?
High, high above, her mastheads touch the stars
And cloudland hides her rigging and her spars;
Her anchor cables are like those that stayed
The bridge that Xerxes at Abydos made.
But stay! some letters on the deck reveal
Whose hand rolled seaward that stupendous keel.
The hand was Hiero's, the Sicilian king,
That he might costly gifts to Hellas bring.
Therefore Poseidon, when the white waves roar
Guard this good ship and guide her safe to shore."

The poem is given by Athenæus v. 209 c.

The upper deck had all the luxury of a Syracusan villa. On it were a gymnasium, a tank that served alike as a swimming bath and an aquarium, a winter garden, summer houses, hidden by huge pots of ivy and vine, and a beautiful shrine to Aphrodite. In the latter were three berths; the floor was of agate and of other costly Sicilian stones. All the partition walls and floors on the upper deck were made of cypress wood; the doors were of ivory and cedar. On all sides statues and pictures charmed the eyes. A library with five couches invited the king's guests to pass some of their leisure in study. Its walls and doors were of boxwood and just outside stood a wonderful clock, similar to the great clock in the Achradina, the inner town of Syracuse. The guests, however, did not have the whole upper deck. On each side of it were ten horseboxes, bins for fodder and cupboards for provisions and utensils. Upon beams that projected from the ship's sides were built store rooms for wood and for stoves and grainmills. The projecting beams were supported at regular intervals by pillars carved in the likeness of Atlas.

Hiero had no intention of letting his ship of state fall a prey to the first Illyrian or Cicilian pirate that met it. Its defences were constructed with all the science of the day and all the genius of Archimedes. The Syracosia carried eight towers, two in the bows, two astern and four amidships. From the towers projected beams, upon which the defenders could enfilade with stones and arrows hostile boarding parties. Four heavily armed hoplites and two archers manned each tower. Right across the ship ran a roofed and armoured gallery, provided with abundant loopholes. On the gallery stood a mighty catapult designed by Archimedes himself, that threw to a distance of more than six hundred feet,[1] stones that weighed three talents or over a hundred and seventy pounds[2] and fired also projectiles fifteen feet long. The ship's sides were protected by heavy wooden armour, that could be raised or lowered by iron chains. On each of her three masts were crow's nests, from which arrows and bolts could be fired or slung at the enemy. All round the ship projected iron spikes to prevent the lowering of flying bridges after the Roman manner. Besides the men in the towers, there were sixty heavy armed marines to guard each side of the ship and an equal number to man the crow's nests. The great vessel had four wooden and eight iron anchors. The foremast and mizzen mast were of no unusual size; but the great main mast had been specially obtained from the wooded mountains of Bruttium. A local swineherd had pointed out the noble tree and it had been cut down and shipped by Philias a celebrated architect of Tauremenion. An ingenious device of Archimedes

[1] i.e., a stadium. The stadium was 606 English feet.
[2] The Attic talent weighed about fifty seven pounds.

enabled a single sailor to pump out the water that accumulated at the bottom of the hold. The Syracosia had to serve her, a big rowing cutter that could carry passengers and cargo up to a weight of three thousand talents and two or three smaller craft that could carry only fifteen hundred talents.

One may well ask how with so small a kingdom, Hiero contrived to foster the arts with such magnificence and befriend so generously his allies and his enemies. The answer is to be found in the extraordinary impulse that he gave to agriculture. The soil of his little state was the richest in Sicily and he encouraged its exploitation. His kingdom was thickly populated and under his able guidance it soon produced vast quantities of corn, oil and wine and became covered with herds of sheep, goats and cattle. The king, too, had admirable talents for organisation. He fixed the rent of the state lands at one tenth of the farmer's produce and his settlement endured after the Roman conquest.[1] A permanent settlement, however, was of little value unless strictly observed; and Hiero devoted his powerful mind towards the double task of seeing that the tithe was fully paid by the farmer and that the taxgatherer levied no dues on his own account.

While encouraging agriculture, Hiero also encouraged export trade so that the produce of his lands might find a market. He, moreover, was wise enough to see that one of the secrets of successful trade is a stable coinage. To use a modern phrase, he " pegged " the coinage of Syracuse to that of Alexandria. Four Syracusan litras became the equivalent of one Ptolemaic drachma and the Syracusan piece of sixteen litras the equivalent of the Ptolemaic tetradrachma. Indeed Egyptian coins were deemed good in Syracuse and Syracusan currency good in Alexandria; much as French francs before the Great War were accepted in Belgium and Belgian francs in France.

Another source of Hiero's wealth was his modest personal expenditure. While his cities abounded in public gardens and statuary, while his navies transported across the Mediterranean corn and money to distressed neighbours, while his ship of state was the wonder of the world, while the walls of Syracuse were covered with defences such as had never been seen before in antiquity, the great and wise king kept no court whatever. Dressed as a simple citizen, he walked unguarded through the streets, contemptuous of the assassin's knife that might be hidden under the cloak of any passer by. Had Dionysius and Agathocles acted thus, they would not have long survived; but Hiero had created no private vendettas by judicial murders or confiscations,

[1]Cic in Verr III. 20.

while public animosity was disarmed by the exquisite courtesy of the king. Even the citizens of Syracuse most filled with fanatical love for democratic government, excepted Hiero from the list of those rulers whose assassination was a public duty. As the years passed by and all grew to love the wise old man, even his political opponents joined in doing him honour. Statues of Hiero and laudatory inscriptions, set up or engraved at the expense of private citizens, could be seen in every city and township throughout his dominions; for judging him by his works alone, all had found that Hiero, tyrant although he might be called, had yet been the best and truest friend of liberty.

CHAPTER V.

The Second Punic War—218 B.C

The Carthaginians were at first cowed by the loss of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica and the Roman threat of war, but they gradually regained their courage. The merchants of Carthage recovered their markets and again sent out their merchantmen and cargo boats through the Pillars of Hercules into the Eastern Atlantic. By way of insurance against Roman landhunger and jealousy, they developed a system of bribery. Their local agents at Rome were instructed to pay yearly sums to leading Roman consulars; and thus was initiated the aristocratic corruption, that only ended with the empire. The Barca family, however, found a nobler remedy for the ills of their country; and Hamilcar Barca, his son in law Hasdrubal and his son Hannibal extended the Carthaginian government rapidly over southern and eastern Spain. By 218 B.C., Carthage was once more formidable and when in that year a Roman envoy complained of Hannibal's siege and storm of Saguntum, a city allied to Rome, the Carthaginian assembly refused to listen to his complaint and readily accepted his offer of war.

When the Second Punic War began, Hiero was a very old man, well over eighty. It was with consternation that he heard of the outbreak of the fresh conflict, in which Syracuse, his beloved city, might well succumb. His son Gelon, in other ways the most obedient of sons, inclined towards a Carthaginian alliance, possibly persuaded thereto by his wife, the Epirot princess Nereis;[1] but the wise old king knew that he had gone too far in the first Punic War to obtain Carthaginian forgiveness in the second. It was his unwavering support that had enabled the Romans to win Sicily and even if he now helped the Carthaginians against his ungrateful allies, no services that he could render to Carthage would efface his former injuries. He threw himself wholeheartedly on the side of the Romans and in this policy he received the strong support of the majority of the Syracusans.

[1]Livy XXIII, 30.

Hiero sent the Romans the fullest assurances that he would continue their ally and in the first year of the war he was able to render them a signal service.[1] Twenty Carthaginian penteconters suddenly appeared off the island of Lipara, eight off Vulcano island, three cruised into the straits of Messina. The object of this manoeuvre was to deceive the Roman consul Titus Sempronius Longus, who was expected in Sicily, and to get him to concentrate his forces in the northeastern corner of the island. A Carthaginian fleet of thirty-five ships would then make a sudden descent on Lilybæum and the impregnable city would once more be in Punic hands. By a fortunate chance, Hiero had gone to Messina to discuss some matters with the consul. Hearing at Messina that three Carthaginian ships were in the straits, he sent an order to Syracuse to despatch twelve ships and if possible catch the raiders. His orders were promptly obeyed and the three Carthaginian ships were taken. From the captured crews Hiero learnt the Carthaginian design and hastened to inform Marcus Aemilius, then prætor of Sicily. The prætor took the necessary steps with commendable activity. He ordered his warships of which he had a hundred and seventy, to be fully provisioned and to meet at Syracuse within ten days. He had scouts posted on all suitable points along the western coast. The prætor's orders had hardly been carried out, when the Carthaginian fleet tried to steal into Lilybæum harbour. It was a moonlit night and the men on watch detected the dark hulls of the hostile ships. They gave the alarm and roused the Roman fleet and garrison. The Carthaginians gave up the attempt to surprise the city; but so greatly had their moral benefited by their successes in Spain, that although greatly outnumbered, they made no attempt to sail away. They rowed into the open sea and there awaited the Roman attack. Nor was their confidence greatly misplaced. It is true that eight Punic ships were cut off by the Romans; but the rest of the Carthaginian fleet moved off uninjured, after seriously damaging one Roman warship.

Before the news of the Carthaginian failure at Lilybæum had reached Hiero, the consul Sempronius Longus crossed from Italy to Messina. The king went to meet the consul with the full naval strength of Syracuse and greeted him in the most cordial manner. He personally renewed his assurances and promised the consul that he would help the Roman people no less vigorously in his old age than in his early manhood. He undertook to clothe and feed at his own expense the Roman sailors and legionaries. At the same time he begged the consul to protect Lilybæum and the other coast cities; for many of the townsmen were ready to welcome the return of the Carthaginians. The consul was convinced by the old king's earnestness and adding his ships to the

[1]Livy XXI. 49—51.

Syracusan fleet, he set sail at once for Lilybæum. On the way they got the news of the retirement of the Carthaginians and saw the eight ships captured by the Romans.

Sempronius was now free to move elsewhere and leaving Hiero and the Syracusan fleet to guard Lilybæum, he set sail for Malta, which the commander Hamilcar, the son of Gisgo, surrendered with the garrison of two thousand men. The consul returned to Lilybæum and sold his captives as slaves[1] and then sailed to the Vulcano and Lipara islands to destroy the rest of the Punic squadron. The Carthaginians, however, had left the shelter of the islands and were wasting the coast of Italy. Sempronius sought their fleet in vain and returned to Lilybæum. There he received an urgent letter from the Senate. Hannibal had successfully crossed the Alps and was in Italy. The consul should return with the army of Sicily and join his colleague. Sempronius obeyed the order, leaving behind him the prætor Marcus Aemilius with only a small division and fifty ships.[2] Hiero was in fact if not in name, entrusted with the defence of the great island.

Fear of the gallant old king for the time kept the Carthaginians out of Sicily, but in the north of Italy tremendous events were happening. The Romans, defeated on the Trebbia and at Ticino, let Hiero know that they would be glad of military help in Italy. The king sent them five hundred Cretan mercenaries and a thousand light infantry. They fought at Lake Thrasymene but were all killed or taken. Undismayed by the disaster, Hiero in the spring of 216 B.C. sent a Syracusan fleet to Ostia.[3] The envoys on board were welcomed in the Roman Senate and an imposing spectacle ensued. The Syracusans assured the Senate that their king knew that the greatness of the Roman people was never more clearly shewn than in the hour of danger, nevertheless he had ventured to send them such presents as were customary between true and faithful allies. The first gift that the envoys offered was a golden statue of Victory, that weighed three hundred and twenty pounds. The king had sent it as an omen of future success and he begged that the Romans would hold it as theirs for ever. In addition Hiero offered them three hundred measures of wheat and two hundred measures of barley. Lastly, although the king knew that the Romans admitted none but Roman citizens or Latin allies into the regular cavalry and infantry, still he had seen foreigners serving as light troops in the Roman camps. He had, therefore, sent the Romans a contingent of a thousand archers and slingers, who should prove useful against the Balearic

[1]Livy XXI. 51—Inde post paucos dies reditum Lilybæum captivique et a consule et a prætore, præter insignes nobilitate viros, sub corona venierunt.
[2]Holm Geschichte Sicilien's vol. 3. p. 44.
[3]Livy XXII. p. 37.

islanders and the Moors. The Syracusans concluded by suggesting on their king's instructions, that the Romans should make naval demonstrations against the African coast so as to stop the stream of supplies that flowed steadily towards Hannibal. The Roman Senate were for once touched by the generosity of their old ally. They thanked the envoys graciously and unanimously passed a resolution, appreciating the virtues of Hiero and the unswerving fidelity with which he at all times and with no niggard hand had helped them. Although it was against their custom to accept gifts of gold, yet they would now depart from it and accept the golden statue. It should be set up in the Capitol within the walls of Jupiter's temple and there firm and immovable, it would for ever stand, a sure omen of coming victory. The slingers and archers as well as the shiploads of corn were sent to the consuls in the field. Lastly twenty-five ships were despatched to Titus Otacilius the proprætor in Sicily and he was directed, if he thought it advisable, to make a descent on Africa.

Not long after this signal proof of Hiero's friendship came the awful news of Cannæ. On a summer day in 216 B.C.,[1] a Roman army seventy-six thousand strong, leaving in camp a reserve of ten thousand men, crossed at early dawn the river Aufidus to attack the Carthaginian army at Cannæ. By evening of the same day seventy thousand Romans lay dead on the battle field; the reserve had surrendered and only a few thousand hunted fugitives had escaped to the neighbouring town of Canusium. Nor had the Carthaginian army suffered proportionately. Out of his army of forty thousand men Hannibal had only lost six thousand, of whom two thirds were Gallic levies. The Senate might well thank the consul Marcus Varro for not despairing of the Republic. Save in Rome itself, there were few others who did not. The shock to the Roman dominion was similar to that felt after Pyrrhus' victory at Asculum, which strangely enough was won not far from the field of Cannæ. The Bruttians, the Campanians, the Samnites all expressed to Hannibal their willingness to join him. The unrest spread from Italy to Sicily and even to Greece. A Carthaginian fleet ravaged the lands of Hiero and blockaded his harbours. Philip V of Macedonia promised to land an army on the western shore of the Adriatic. It seemed as if the genius of a single man would reduce southern Europe to be an appanage of Africa.

Hiero was ninety years of age. His son Gelon, on the news of Cannæ, openly declared for the Carthaginians. Father and son had always loved each other and the old king felt deeply his

[1]According to the Roman calendar, Cannæ was fought in August; according to Mommsen's calculation the month was really June.

son's defection. Nevertheless neither the weight of years nor domestic discord could cloud Hiero's lucid vision or mislead his unerring judgment. He saw as clearly as when he first threw in his lot with Rome, to which side his interests joined him. It is true that he had better information than southern Italy. His ranging warships and his farflung merchant marine brought him news from Spain. Although Hannibal might win Cannæ, the victory availed him little if he could not draw on Iberia for men and money. In 218 B.C. Gnæus Scipio had defeated the Carthaginians in Spain under Hanno and in 217 B.C. had destroyed their fleet. In 216 B.C. almost on the same day as Cannæ, Gnæus Scipio and his brother Publius had destroyed a second Carthaginian army under Hasdrubal. Rome, too, was mistress of the sea and as long as her navy was unbeaten, Philip of Macedon could hardly hope to land an army in southern Italy. The Greek cities, too, of Magna Graecia inspired by their old hatred for the Carthaginiains, still clung to Rome; only Croton and Locri, more under compulsion than of their own free will, joined Hannibal. Hiero reaffirmed to the Roman proprætor Titus Otacilius his loyalty to Rome, but begged for help against Carthaginian raids. The proprætor sent a despatch to the Senate, asking for more ships and men. He dared not, he wrote, draw men from Lilybæum. His main fleet was watching a Carthaginian squadron off the Sicilian islands.

The Senate put the prætor Publius Furius in command of a fresh fleet and sent him to help Syracuse. Instead of doing so, he made a descent on the African coast, where he was defeated and badly wounded. After this failure, he sailed to Sicily, where he lay for a long time on the point of death. Titus Otacilius again wrote to the Senate begging for men and supplies. The Senate at their wits' end wrote back that they had neither men nor supplies to send and that the proprætor must " carry on " as best he could.[1] Titus Otacilius could only turn to Hiero. The gallant old king, harassed and menaced although he was, rose nobly to the occasion. He sent the proprætor a sum of money and supplies for six months. Gelon's death late in the year freed Hiero from the fear of filial treachery; but the death of his beloved, if disobedient, son was a great shock to the old man. Nevertheless he lived through the year and as a supreme act of friendship he sent the Roman Senate two hundred thousand measures of wheat, a hundred thousand measures of barley and a large sum in gold. This time the Senate in its need made no difficulties about accepting the money. The king's gifts and the moral support of Syracuse put fresh life into the Roman conduct of the war; but Hiero's days were numbered. Early in 215 B.C., a rumour spread to Rome

[1]Livy XXIII. 21.

that her faithful ally was dead. A Roman squadron of fifty ships under the Prætor Appius Claudius Pulcher sailed at once for Syracuse to renew the alliance. The king, however, was still alive and the fleet moved on to Lilybæum. It would have been well for Syracuse if the rumour of Hiero's death had been true; for with a Roman contingent inside the walls the city would have adhered to Hiero's policy. As it was, Hiero did not die until after the Roman squadron had left and with the spirit of her wise old prince fled the good fortune of Syracuse.

CHAPTER VI.

The Last Days of Syracuse.

A sketch of Hiero might reasonably be expected to end with his death, but the appalling disorders that followed it, form the best tribute to the dead king's greatness. Hiero's last days had been embittered by fears for his beloved city. Gelon was dead. His son Hieronymus was but a lad of fifteen, who owing to his father's influence inclined towards a Carthaginian alliance. Hiero at one time thought of abdicating his powers and restoring them to a Syracusan republic; but his daughters Damareta and Heracleia, pressed him to consider the family interests. He gave up the idea and bequeathed the kingdom to Hieronymus, but under the tutelage of fifteen guardians. Among these were Adranodorus and Zoippus, the husbands of Damareta and Heracleia. Hiero's last direction to the guardians was that they should never abandon the Roman alliance.

The Syracusans had no special love for Hieronymus, but they were willing to abide by Hiero's will. They had grown to worship Hiero in his old age and they gave him a funeral such as no citizen of Syracuse ever had before or since. They then waited to see how Hieronymus would acquit himself in his new office. He soon shewed the Syracusans that he lacked all the great qualities of his grandfather. Adranodorus and Zoippus, too, instead of giving the prince good counsel, helped him to get rid of thirteen of his guardians and then tried to rule Syracuse through him. Hieronymus at the same time adopted the insignia of royalty. He appeared in public dressed in purple and wearing a crown and drove through the streets behind a team of four white horses, just as Dionysius had done. He refused to summon the Syracusan assembly or to receive visitors and surrounded himself with armed guards. In this way he soon roused all the old dislike of a tyranny, which Hiero's simplicity and tact had lulled. A conspiracy was formed against Hieronymus and on its discovery Adranadorus and Zoippus managed to implicate Thrason the leader of the Roman

party in Syracuse. Thrason was executed and Hieronymus was thereafter induced by his uncles to send two envoys Polycleitus and Philodemus to Hannibal. The latter received the envoys warmly and sent two brothers Hippocrates and Epicydes, the half-breed descendants[1] of a Syracusan refugee back with the envoys. They were admirable agents; for they spoke Greek well, they were brave and capable men and they were devoted to Carthaginian interests.

The Roman prætor Appius Claudius on hearing of this sudden turn of events, sent a mission from Lilybæum to implore the young king to be true to the old alliance; but Hieronymus met the Roman entreaties with an affected sympathy at their recent defeats. He then asked the envoys why the Romans had recently sent a fleet of fifty ships to Syracuse. The envoys explained that the Romans had believed Hiero to be dead and had merely sent the fleet to help Hieronymus to secure the crown. When the admiral had learnt that Hiero was still alive, he had at once changed his course and sailed back to Lilybæum. Hieronymus retorted with an impudent jest: "Just as you Romans changed your course and steered for Lilybæum, so I, too, shall now change my course and steer towards the hopes that Carthage holds out to me."

The Roman embassy left Syracuse in anger; and Hieronymus at Hannibal's advice sent three envoys to Carthage and proposed an offensive and defensive alliance. The contracting powers should combine to drive the Romans out of Sicily and then divide it. The river Himera, as in Dionysius' time, should be the common frontier. Carthage agreed. Hippocrates, however, was anxious to make it impossible for the Romans to offer the young king better terms and urged him to demand the whole island as the grandson of Pyrrhus. Carthage once more agreed; for if the Romans were driven out of Sicily they could well afford to laugh at Hieronymus and his treaties. The Romans sent yet another mission to Syracuse, but it met with as scant courtesy as the former one. Hieronymus offered contemptuously to renew the old treaty, if the Romans repaid him Hiero's gifts of gold and corn and assigned him all Sicily east of the Himera river. The Romans not unnaturally refused and war broke out between the former allies.

Hieronymus resolved to strike the first blow and invaded Roman territory. A vanguard of two thousand men was led by Hippocrates and Epicydes. Hieronymus commanded the main army of fourteen thousand men. Adranodorus was left to hold Syracuse. But the expedition achieved nothing; for Hieronymus

[1]Their grandfather had fled to Carthage from Syracuse, as he was thought to have assassinated Agatharchus a son of Agathocles. Polyb VII. 2.2.

was treacherously murdered with the connivance of one of his guardsmen[1] as he rode through Leontini. The murderers, who were members of the Syracusan republican party, galloped back at full speed to Syracuse. Their arrival was followed by a general rising. Adranodorus resigned his command in spite of the entreaties of his wife Damareta. Syracuse became an aristocratic republic and elected fifteen generals, of whom one was Adranodorus. The new government reverted to Hiero's policy and Syracuse became once more the ally of Rome. Hippocrates and Epicydes were ordered to leave. They asked for an escort to Hannibal's camp in Italy and it was granted; but they managed to postpone their departure and artfully won over to their side the army and the Roman deserters, of whom there were many in Syracuse. They were usually Italian Greeks, who had run away from the Roman galleys and they were always cruelly executed, when recaptured. Hippocrates and Epicydes, to give colour to their proceedings, persuaded Adranodorus and a certain Themistos, the husband of Hieronymus' sister, Harmonia to try to reestablish a kingdom in Syracuse. Adranodorus unfortunately talked of the plot to a tragedian called Ariston, who disclosed it to the other generals. The infuriated generals had Adranodorus and Themistos struck down, as they entered the Senate House. A tumult ensued; Ariston convinced the Senate of the truth of his tale. The generals then summoned a popular assembly and caused it to vote the extermination of Hiero's house. Damareta and Harmonia were at once executed. The unfortunate Heracleia, the wife of Zoippus, who was absent in Alexandria, was seized with her daughters. The wretched mother offered in vain her life for theirs; she was cut down in their presence. The two daughters ran into the street, where they were chased, caught and butchered.

The popular assembly, who had so lightly voted the destruction of the royal house, were filled with horror at the lynching of the two girls. They voted Hippocrates and Epicydes to be generals in the place of Adranodorus and Themistos. The wily halfbreeds accepted office and for some time made no open effort to force Syracuse into a conflict with Rome. On the contrary they affected to approve an armistice with Appius Claudius. In 214 B.C. Marius Claudius Marcellus came to Sicily as consul and events took a more serious turn. It was the fashion among classical writers to praise Marcellus for his clemency; but he really was as cruel and brutal as any Roman aristocrat of his time. Hippocrates and Epicydes took his measure and acted accordingly. They induced the neighbouring town of Leontini to revolt and then exaggerated the horrors of the Roman storm. They next forged letters from the Syracusan generals to Marcellus, urging him to

[1]Deinomanes was the guardsman's name.

treat the mercenaries in Syracuse as he had treated the deserters in Leontini. The mercenaries were deceived by the forgeries and either killed or chased out of the town all the generals except the two brothers. The latter, supported by slaves, mercenaries and deserters, now made themselves masters of Syracuse and held it in the Carthaginian interest.

Marcellus thought that the capture of Syracuse, would be an easy matter. After five days spent in preparation, Appius Claudius attacked the town from the land side with a large Roman army, while Marcellus assailed it with his fleet at a point where the wall ran down to the sea. Marcellus had filled sixty quinqueremes with slingers, archers and javelin men, whose duty it was to shoot down the defenders of the walls. Another eight quinqueremes were filled with men under orders to carry the sea wall by means of ladders, that were to be hoisted by a system of pullies and ropes to the height of the wall. The ladders were protected by armour and the whole contrivance was called a sambuca or harp from its resemblance to that musical instrument. Appius Claudius' attack was the traditional Roman one. The infantry were supported by catapult fire and advanced with great confidence under cover of their shields.

But both Appius Claudius' and Marcellus' attacks were completely defeated by the genius of Archimedes. He had designed the defences of Syracuse and knew perfectly how to use them. On the land side the burgher militia, who manned the walls fled appalled at the mere sight of the attacking force; but in the breast of Archimedes fear found no place. He was an old man, but seventy winters had not chilled his courage. While the burghers fled, he stood his ground and his mechanics were fired by his example. The head of every Roman formation was destroyed by long range fire from mangonels and catapults. Those legionaries who got through the " barrage " paid a heavy toll of dead and wounded to the archers firing through the loopholed walls. Other soldiers were killed by stones and beams, while those who succeeded in reaching the walls were caught up by cranes, dropped from a great height and smashed to pieces.

Marcellus' attack was no more fortunate, Archimedes' engines swept the decks of the quinqueremes so clean, that they could not advance. Marcellus after suffering heavy losses gave up the attack by day and renewed the assault that night. Archimedes let the Roman ships come close to the wall and through his loopholes shot down the crews at close range. When the boarding parties tried to hoist the sambucas, he dropped immense stones on them from cranes concealed behind the defences. Other cranes picked up single legionaries and dashed them against the cliffs.

One or two huge machines actually seized the quinqueremes, lifted them in the air and swung them about until all the crew had fallen to their deaths on the rocks below. The repulse of the Roman assault was complete. Later actions were no less disastrous. At last such a panic fear spread among the Romans that on seeing the end of a rope or of a beam above the walls, they would flee shrieking that Archimedes was training some new engine on them.[1] With troops so demoralised the Roman generals could do nothing. They decided to abandon all idea of storming Syracuse. They would mask it with a covering force, while they made themselves masters of the outlying Syracusan possessions.

Agreeably to this plan, Appius Claudius with two thirds of the Roman army remained near Syracuse, while Marcellus marched with the other third into the interior of the island. The cities of Helorus and Herbessus surrendered on the first summons. The little town of Megara made a gallant resistance, but was stormed and destroyed. Acrae and Tauromenion repulsed the Roman assault. Nor could Marcellus press a siege vigorously against them; for a Carthaginian army under Himilco twenty-eight thousand strong had landed in Sicily and had retaken Agrigentum. Marcellus had to fall back on Syracuse, but he succeeded in repulsing a vigorous effort made by Himilco and Hippocrates, who had joined him with part of the garrison, to relieve the city.

The siege had begun in 214 B.C. and lasted through that year and the next. The garrison suffered little distress owing to the vast store of provisions laid in by Hiero. In the winter of 213—212 B.C. a plot to admit the Romans was foiled by the vigilance of Epicydes; but the three days' feast of Artemis gave Marcellus a chance that he did not neglect. While the drunken Syracusan sentries slept at their posts, a Roman force carried the outer wall and with it the Epipolae or suburbs. Marcellus overjoyed at the success, is said to have wept copious tears at the prospect of plundering the main town in the near future.[1] In the meantime he stripped the Epipolae bare of everything portable.

In spite of Marcellus' tears the fall of Syracuse was still delayed. Archimedes was inside the Achradina or main town and organised its defences. At the same time the Carthaginians made a supreme effort to relieve the doomed city. Hippocrates and Himilco with twenty-five thousand men attacked the Roman camp, while a hundred Carthaginian ships entered the great harbour. They gained considerable successes; a Roman camp to the north of the town under the command of Crispinus was carried by Hippocrates; and Epicydes making a sortie from the Achradina,

[1]Plut. Marc. XVII. 3.

[1]Plut. Marc. XIX. Plutarch writes that the tears were of sorrow. I doubt it.

inflicted heavy loss on the Roman garrison in the suburbs. The Romans were not, it is true, driven from their main positions; but they were themselves besieged and their fate would probably have been that of Nicias and his army, had not fortune, as usual, favoured the " Wolves of Italy."

In the Autumn of 212 B.C., plague broke out in all the camps. The Syracusans and the Romans did not suffer so much, but the Carthaginian army and their Sicilian contingents ceased to exist as a fighting force. The Sicilian survivors fled panic-stricken, but almost the entire Carthaginian army perished with Hippocrates and Himilco. Bomilcar the Carthaginian admiral sailed to Carthage for reinforcements; but having obtained them, he feared to venture again near the pest stricken city. He sailed to Tarentum, which was in the hands of Hannibal and handed over the reinforcements and supplies to him. Epicydes thinking Syracuse lost, left his command and escaped to Agrigentum. But Archimedes stood at his post and held the Romans at bay with new engines of destruction. The Sicilian contingent on the Roman side tried to save Syracuse by arranging terms of surrender; but this meant the rods and the axes for the Roman and Italian deserters. With the help of the mercenaries, the deserters stopped the negotiations by killing the Roman envoys. Afterwards it occurred to the mercenaries that their case was different from that of the deserters. One of the mercenary leaders Mericus, by name, admitted a Roman force through the gate in his charge and they soon made themselves masters of the Achradina. The deserters luckily for themselves escaped in the confusion; but the unhappy citizens, who for the most part would willingly have kept friends with Rome, suffered terribly. They pleaded the long friendship and many good services of Hiero, the Syracusian blood shed and the Syracusan gold lavished in the cause of Rome; but their pleading was in vain. Gratitude was not a Roman virtue.

As a great favour the Syracusans were given their lives and their empty houses. All their portable wealth was taken, much of the rest destroyed. The priceless statues with which Greek genius had beautified their city were carried to Rome; Hiero's treasure was confiscated by the Roman people. Nor was murder absent. The slightest attempt at resistance was punished with instant death and among those who perished was Archimedes. Two probable stories have been told by Plutarch of his end. In the one Archimedes was ordered by a legionary to go with him to Marcellus. Archimedes busy with a problem and unaware of the fall of the city, refused to go until he had finished his calculation. The soldier lost his temper and killed him. The other story is that Archimedes was carrying his box of mathe-

matical instruments to Marcellus, when he met a party of soldiers. They thinking that the old man was carrying off treasure, killed him. Whatever the circumstances of Archimedes death, it was the best thing that could have befallen him. Marcellus would otherwise have led him in triumph through Rome and there like Gavius Pontius, Jugurtha and Vercingetorix, he would have been sacrificed to Jupiter, Best and Greatest. No Roman Senate would have spared Archimedes, for he had repeatedly defeated Roman armies.

So died, unconquered as he had lived, one of the wisest and noblest of men. His tomb that Cicero discovered in Sicily no longer exists and the inventions with which he astonished his contemporaries have ceased long ago to excite wonder. Yet still there is one country where his work lives after him. As the tourist travels from Alexandria to Cairo he crosses canal after canal, on the banks of which creak innumerable water wheels. Unceasingly they drive the yellow siltladen waters of the Nile over the wide fields of the Delta. According to a local tradition the waterwheels are based on a model made by Archimedes for Ptolemy. Their principle is certainly that of the Archimedean screw. If the legend be true, then for two thousand years throughout the land of Egypt a million wheels have crooned night and day the greatness of Archimedes.

APPENDIX A.

In my account of Archimedes' defence of Syracuse, I have not mentioned the story of his setting fire to the Roman ships with burning glasses. There is nothing impossible in the feat, for in 514 A.D. Proculus is said to have burnt in this very way the fleet of Vitalian, who was then besieging Constantinople. In 1747 A.D. Buffon with the aid of an engineer called Passemont set up a hundred and sixty eight mirrors. By their means he set fire to wood at a distance of a hundred and fifty feet and melted lead at a distance of a hundred and forty feet. This was in April in northern France. With the help of a Sicilian sun in August Archimedes could certainly have set fire to ships close to the walls of Syracuse.

The tale, however, is not to be found in Polybius, Livy or Plutarch, the three great authorities on Archimedes. The earliest writers, who mention it are Galen (de Temp. III. 2) and Lucian (Hipp 2.2) The mirrors are described in great detail by Tzetzes (Chil II. 103 f). Galen and Lucian wrote in the reign of Marcus Aurelius and Tzetzes wrote in 1150 A.D.

ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT.

CHAPTER I.

(His Accession 223 B.C.)

Antiochus III of the Seleucid house succeeded in 223 B.C. to a troubled inheritance. In the lifetime even of Antigonus the One-eyed, Mithridates I, said to have been descended from one of the seven nobles who assassinated the false Smerdis, had set up the kingdom of Pontus, famous in Roman history under the rule of Mithridates VI. In 297 B.C. Zipœtes a Thracian chief had proclaimed himself independent dynast of Bithynia. In 282 B.C. Philetarios had declared himself king of Pergamos. In Cappadocia a Persian noble Ariarathes had founded yet another dynasty. In Aderbijan Atropates had carved out a little kingdom, known as Atropatene Media near the shores of the Caspian Sea. Armenia and Paphlagonia and also numerous Greek cities, notably Byzantium and Selge, a Spartan settlement in Pisidia, had managed to make and keep themselves independent of Antiochus I.

The subsequent wars between the descendants of Antiochus I had added to the strength of these dissident chiefs and allowed a large settlement of Gauls in Asia Minor. In the reign of Antiochus II, Diodotus, the satrap of Bactria had successfully rebelled and shortly afterwards a band of nomads, fleeing southwards from Central Asia had founded the kingdom of the Parthians, immortalised long afterwards by their defeat of Crassus. On the death of Antiochus II broke out the Laodicean war, in which Ptolemy III first sought to save and afterwards to avenge his sister Berenice, married to Antiochus II and murdered by her co-wife Laodice. Ptolemy III had held for a time all the Seleucid kingdom except Asia Minor. He had been driven out of his conquests by Seleucus II Kallinikos; but he had retained a great part of Syria and many coast towns, including the important Seleucia in Pieria on the Orontes, the port of Antioch. Lastly the civil war between Seleucus Kallinikos and his brother Antiochus Hierax had added to the disorder of the kingdom.

In the summer of 223 B.C., Seleucus III the son of Kallinikos, fell by the hand of an assassin, while fighting against Attalus king of Pergamos. His brother Antiochus then only eighteen years of age was proclaimed king in his stead; but he was away in Babylonia and could do nothing until Epigenes, the Seleucid general joined him with Seleucus III's army. In the meantime, two brothers Molon, the satrap of Media and his brother, Alexander, satrap of Persia renounced their allegiance. The fidelity of Achæus the king's cousin and governor of Asia Minor could not be counted upon. It thus seemed that the kingdom to which Antiochus had succeeded had hardly any existence.

To add to the young king's difficulties, his counsellors were at variance. The civil head of his administration was a Carian called Hermeias,[1] whom Seleucus III had left as regent, when he himself marched against Attalus. Hermeias had great ability; but he was jealous of rivals and he was treacherous and cruel. He was at bitter enmity with Epigenes the skilful general, who had brought back the army after the dead king's murder.

Hermeias called a council to consider the situation. The first matter to examine was the revolt of Molon. Epigenes rightly urged the king to lead himself an army against the rebel, for the Seleucid name would win over his troops. Hermeias, who had no wish that either the king or Epigenes should acquire fame as a general, pressed his master to send a subordinate against Molon and march, accompanied by Epigenes, into Palestine. Hermeias won the day by producing a forged letter, purporting to have been sent by the Egyptian king to Achæus. It promised to him ships and money, after he had revolted. The letter made the king so angry that he approved at once the Palestine campaign. While on the march, he met near Seleucia on the right bank of the Euphrates, Laodice[1] the daughter of Mithridates II of Pontus. He married her in great state and took her with him to Antioch, where he proclaimed her queen.

It proved, however, easier to discuss a plan of campaign against Molon than to destroy him. Xenon and Theodotus, whom Hermeias appointed to that task, fell back without fighting, so formidable was Molon's military strength. Hermeias then sent Xenœtas an Achæan to supersede them. The new commander came up with Molon near Seleucia on the Tigris, which Molon was besieging. Encouraged by deserters, Xenœtas skilfully crossed the Tigris. Molon retreated, but only far enough to be out of sight. Xenœtas, thinking the campaign over, celebrated his victory by a banquet to his troops. In the early dawn Molon

[1] Polyb. V. 41.2.
[1] Polybius V. 43.

fell upon the royal force, still drunk from the previous evening's revels. A fearful massacre followed, in which Xenœtas and most of his army perished. Molon became master of Seleucia, Babylon, Susa and all Lower Mesopotamia. He took the title of king and began to strike coins in his own name (222 B.C.). In the meantime, Antiochus' own campaign had ended badly. After assembling his forces at Apamea on the Orontes, he marched up the valley of the Marsyas river, a tributary of the Orontes, hoping to surprise the Egyptian commander Theodotus, an Aetolian mercenary captain. The latter, however, was too experienced to be caught unawares. Theodotus occupied in strength the two fortresses of Gerrha and Brochi, that commanded the narrowest part of the valley; and when Antiochus tried to carry the Egyptian position, he was repulsed with loss.[1]

The next Council meeting was a stormy one. Epigenes was able to point out that Hermeias' counsel had been proved worthless by events. Hermeias lost his temper and broke into personal abuse of Epigenes; but the latter carried his point. In doing so, he signed his own death warrant. The king and his Council decided that the former should lead the whole strength of what remained of his kingdom against Molon. The royal troops fell back on Apamea and there they mutinied. Hermeias offered to pacify the mutineers by paying their arrears out of his own private purse, on condition that Epigenes was relieved of his command. The king reluctantly accepted the condition; the troops returned to their obedience. Epigenes retired into private life; but a letter from Molon, forged by Hermeias, was shortly afterwards found in Epigenes' house and he was executed for treason.

Late in 221 B.C., the royal army began its march eastwards. In the spring of 220 B.C., Antiochus and his troops crossed the Tigris and relieved Dura which one of Molon's subordinates was besieging. Afterwards he came up with the rebel's main forces in Apolloniatis. When the rumour spread that the royal troops were commanded by the king in person, a wave of loyalty swept through Molon's adherents. The Greek troops remembered that the king was the heir of the great Seleucus Nicator, descended, so legends said, from the god Apollo;[1] the commander who would have united in his single hand the conquests of the immortal Alexander, had he not been stabbed by the cruel hand of Ptolemy Keraunos. The Persians recollected that through Seleucus' wife Apama, the daughter of Spitamenes, there ran in the young king's veins the bluest blood of Iran. Molon's army was soon

[1]Polyb. Book V. 46.

[1]Justin XV.4 siquidem mater ejus Laudice . . . . . visa est sibi per quietem ex concubitu Apollonis concepisse.

demoralised. The rebel aware of the change in his soldiers' feelings sought to surprise the royal troops at night; but he withdrew on seeing a band of his cavalry desert him. Next day his worst fears were realised. Molon's left wing, attacked by Antiochus in person, went over in a body; then his right wing broke and fled. Molon at once committed suicide. His brother Nicolaus rode to Persia to warn the third brother, the satrap Alexander. A family holocaust followed. Nicolaus killed his mother and Molon's children and then himself. Alexander followed his brother's example and committed suicide also. Thus the young king by a single battle suppressed a formidable rebellion, rid himself of three rebel chiefs and recovered the two great satrapies of Media and Persia. The young king's work, however, was but well begun. Artabazanes the reigning prince of Aderbijan or Atropatene Media, the principality founded by Atropates, had been involved in Molon's treason. Hermeias the minister had become intolerable; and since Laodice had born Antiochus a son, he was actually plotting the king's murder, so as to become regent during the little prince's minority. Lastly, the king's cousin Achæus had definitely resolved to declare himself independent.

Antiochus first moved against Artabazanes; but the Persian dynast was a very old man and had probably joined Molon against his will. He had no stomach for a fight. On the approach of Antiochus he begged for pardon on any terms. Antiochus granted it and his conditions were probably the payment of a subsidy and a recognition of Seleucid suzerainty.[1]

The riddance of Hermeias was a more delicate business. The man had enjoyed the full confidence of Seleucus III and he had undoubtedly rendered great services. The whole administration was in his hands and Antiochus III was surroundd by his minister's spies and creatures. The Council, who would gladly have helped the king were overawed by the fate of Epigenes. Fortunately Antiochus' doctor Apollophanes loved the king sufficiently to risk his life in his service. One day, when alone with Antiochus, he pointed out that Hermeias intended to poison his master and that the danger was by no means remote.[2] The king owned that he hated and mistrusted Hermeias and begged Apollophanes to help him. Apollophanes hit on an excellent plan. The king feigned to have fits of dizziness and under the doctor's orders he refused to receive his civil and military advisers. At the same time, Apollophanes prescribed him the society of some intimate friends, of whose fidelity the king assured himself. When the

death (220 B.C.).

[1] Bouché Leclercq's Histoire Séleucides (p. 136).

[2] Polyb. v. 56.

plot was ripe, Apollophanes ordered the king to take a walk with his friends in the early morning and Hermeias was invited to join the party. When they reached a deserted spot, Antiochus suddenly excused himself and walked away into some undergrowth. The conspirators at once fell on Hermeias and stabbed him to death (220 B.C.)

The king was now master in his own house and was free to decide whether he should deal with Achæus at once or renew his attempt on Palestine. Achæus, it was true, had assumed the royal diadem and had taken steps to conquer the whole empire; but a mutiny had broken out among his troops, who were unwilling to fight against their lawful king and Achæus had been forced to retreat. Apollophanes, who had taken Hermeias' place as confidential adviser counselled another attack on Hollow Syria or Palestine. Achæus after his recent failure was unlikely to move for some time. Every report from Egypt brought fresh accounts of the incapacity of Ptolemy IV, who had succeeded to the Lagid throne in the winter of 222/221 B.C. Theodotus, the Aetolian, who had defeated the king in the Marsyas defiles was infuriated at his treatment by the Egyptian headquarter staff and might be won over to the Seleucid cause. Lastly it was all important to recover Seleucia in Pieria. It was at once the great emporium of Syria, the strongest fortress south of the Taurus and the burial place of Seleucus, the founder of the royal line. So long as Seleucia remained in Egyptian hands, Antioch and all the towns on the upper reaches of the Orontes languished. The hardships of the foreign occupation were depicted in lively colours by Apollophanes, who was himself a native of Seleucia.

The king, who could refuse Apollophanes nothing, declared himself convinced by his reasoning and announced that he would first attack Seleucia and then invade Palestine. The reduction of Achæus could be more easily achieved, if, when the king called on the rebels to return to their allegiance, the royal prestige had been heightened by victories against Egypt.

CHAPTER II.

The Seleucia and Raphia Campaigns and the Reduction of Achæus (219—213 B.C.).

In the spring of 219 B.C., Antiochus set out from Apamea to reduce Seleucia. He sent his fleet under Diognetus to blockade the town from the sea. He sent a force under Theodotus, nicknamed Hemiolus, because he was said to be half as big again as other men, to guard the approaches from Palestine; and he encamped with his army in the racecourse about five furlongs from the defences of Seleucia.

Antiochus' task was a formidable one. The town lay on the southern slope of a mountain called Coryphæum, but was separated from it by a deep ravine and thus not commanded by it. To the west was the Mediterranean, and the town sloped down to the sea in a series of terraces and was protected at most points by steep and rocky headlands.[1] Where the ground was level, the town was defended by walls of great strength. Seleucia was thus almost impregnable. Antiochus, however, hoped to help his soldiers by bribing the Egyptian garrison. The commandant Leontius was incorruptible,[2] but the king was able to buy some of Leontius' subordinates. If the king, said the renegades, could carry the suburbs, they would undertake to hand over to him the city.

To distract the commandant's attention, false attacks were made under Zeuxis on the Antioch gate and under Hermogenes near the temple to the Dioscuri. The main attack on the suburb was entrusted to Ardys and Diognetus. It succeeded; and directly the Seleucid troops were inside the walls, the bribed officers ran to Leontius, crying out that the day was lost and begging him to make peace on any conditions. Leontius was shocked at what he thought was the low moral of his subordinates;

[1] Polybius V. 59.
[2] Polybius v.60.

and thinking it hopeless to defend the city with such poltroons he sent envoys to Antiochus asking for terms. The king naturally made them as easy as possible. He spared the city, its inhabitants and their property. He brought back the exiles and restored to them their citizenship and their possessions.

Antiochus had no sooner taken Seleucia, than he received a most welcome appeal from Theodotus the Aetolian. The latter's success had aroused the envy of Sosibius. The victorious general had been courtmartialled and only just acquitted. The mercenary was burning with rage at this return for his great services. He begged to be allowed to enter the Seleucid's army promising to hand over to his new master Ptolemais, the capital of Palestine, and Tyre. News of Theodotus' intended treason reached the Egyptian court. Ptolemy IV sent another Aetolian mercenary Nicolaus to supersede Theodotus and save Palestine. Nicolaus shut up Theodotus in Ptolemais and would have stamped out the defection, had Antiochus not hastened to the spot. Nicolaus raised the siege and occupied a pass near Berytus. The king stormed the position and joining Theodotus and his brother traitors took over Ptolemais, Tyre and forty war ships. At first, Antiochus thought of nothing less than the conquest of Egypt; but hearing that Ptolemy IV was holding Pelusium in force, Antiochus decided first to reduce the Palestinian cities.

This decision gave Ptolemy IV a breathing space. The Egyptian king appealed to Rhodes, Byzantium, Cyzicus and Aetolia, begging them to intervene on his behalf. The little states flattered by the king's appeal sent envoys to Antiochus. Ptolemy IV, who was only trifling with his rival, prolonged the negotiations until he could call in his mercenaries from foreign stations. He also sent out recruiting officers and engaged a number of notable condottieri, namely Echecrates of Thessaly, Phoxidas of Melita, Eurylochus of Magnesia, Socrates of Boeotia, Andromachus of Aspendus, Cnopias of Allaria and Polycrates of Argos. They had all except Andromachus and Polycrates seen service under the Besieger; and they reorganised from top to bottom the Egyptian army and drilled the men according to the latest tactics.

The negotiations dragged on, as they were meant to, into the winter; and Antiochus, completely hoodwinked, was induced by the Alexandrian government to agree to a truce of four months. He left garrisons in the Palestinian fortresses that he had captured and retired to Seleucia. During the truce the same farce continued; whenever Antiochus seemed about to accept the Egyptian offers, Ptolemy's envoys asked that Achæus should be included in the peace. This made acceptance impossible. At last

Antiochus realised that he was being fooled and marched back into Palestine (218 B.C.). Nicolaus had occupied the Lebanon passes, but Theodotus seized a hill that commanded Nicolaus' position and drove him into Sidon. Masking Sidon, Antiochus marched southwards; and by the end of the fair season, he had completely reduced Palestine as far as the frontiers of Egypt.

All through that summer and winter the Egyptian king made no sign, but his mercenary captains day in, day out drilled their men. The recruiting officers brought their recruits from overseas. Military stores of all kinds were either manufactured locally or imported and twenty thousand Egyptian fellaheen were trained in the use of the sarissa. In the spring of 217 B.C., Ptolemy IV's military advisers reported that everything was ready for an advance; and under the command of Ptolemy IV and his queen Arsinoe, the Egyptian troops marched across the desert. The opposing armies met at Raphia. Ptolemy's infantry numbered seventy thousand and his cavalry five thousand and they were supported by seventy-three African elephants. Antiochus' field force was not much smaller. He had sixty-two thousand foot, six thousand horse and a hundred and two Indian elephants. The armies manœuvred for some days close to each other and Theodotus made a daring but unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Ptolemy in his sleeping tent. The battle opened with a struggle between the elephants on both sides. This was the first time in history that the two species had been opposed; and the African elephants, either less courageous or not so well trained as their Indian cousins, turned tail and threw into confusion Ptolemy's left wing. Antiochus, who commanded the Seleucid right, took advantage of the incident and drove Ptolemy's left wing off the field.

Unfortunately the Egyptian right wing obtained a similar success over Antiochus' left and the battle came to depend on the phalanxes of the two armies. The effect of the prolonged training of the mercenaries was now seen. The Seleucil phalanx was driven back in disorder into Raphia. Antiochus, carried away by his pursuit of Ptolemy's left wing, returned to the battlefield too late to influence the result. Seeing that the day was lost, he rode that night to Gaza and after obtaining a truce to bury his dead, he withdrew his troops to Antioch.

Antiochus had lost over ten thousand killed and four thousand prisoners. Ptolemy's casualties barely exceeded two thousand. The Seleucid king saw that it was useless to prolong the war. He begged for and obtained a treaty on extraordinarily easy terms. He was, it is true, forced to give up Palestine; but he was allowed

to retain the great town of Seleucia, which had been such a thorn in the side of Syria. Nor was he compelled to recognise Achæus. Ptolemy seems to have been sick of war and anxious to return to the pleasures and vices of Alexandria. Antiochus was thus free to give his attention to Asia Minor.

Achæus had established himself firmly west of the Taurus, while Antiochus had vainly sought laurels in Palestine; nevertheless, Achæus had in a measure been kept in check by Attalus, king of Pergamos and to a lesser degree by Prusias, king of Bithynia and the independent city state of Selge. So long as these remained hostile, Achæus could not carry out his original scheme of substituting himself for Antiochus throughout the Seleucid empire. And now the day of reckoning was at hand. In the summer of 216 B.C., Antiochus moved across the Taurus. He had bought the temporary goodwill of Attalus and secured a loan from him by acknowledging his jurisdiction over Mysia, Troas, Aeolis and probably all such Ionian towns as his troops occupied.[1] Prusias of Bithynia kept the Gauls from joining Achæus. Face to face with Antiochus, Achæus seems to have made no stand. At least no historical account of it has survived. When Achæus is next referred to by Polybius, he is being besieged in Sardis.[2] The town was extremely strong even in Croesus' time and it had been repeatedly fortified since its capture by Cyrus. It had already stood a year's siege without any weakening of the defence, when Lagoras, one of Antiochus' generals, observed that vultures and carrion kites used to perch on a particular section of the wall. It overlooked a precipitous ravine, into which dead bodies of men and horses were thrown and it was the strongest part of the fortifications. The presence of the birds, however, convinced Lagoras that there the wall was unguarded, probably because of its very strength. He examined the spot under cover of darkness and believing that ladders could be set against the wall, asked the king to let him scale it. The latter approved the plan, and, on a dark night, a party of soldiers under Lagoras, put ladders against the battlements. Simultaneously, Lagoras mounted one ladder and Diogenes, another of the king's generals, mounted the other. It was dawn when the escalade was attempted, but Antiochus diverted the attention of the garrison by attacking the opposite gate of the town known as the Persian gate. Aribazus, who commanded the garrison went to repel Antiochus; in his absence, Lagoras and his party were able to scale the wall open the gate nearest to them and let in about two thousand picked men, who lay in hiding close by. When Aribazus rushed back to meet the new danger, Antiochus carried the Persian gate. Achæus and his

[1]Niese II p. 392.
[2]Polybius VII. 15.

adherents had no other course but to take refuge in the citadel. This was closely beset by Antiochus and its eventual reduction by famine was certain.

The Egyptian court had hitherto stirred not a finger to help Achæus; but it now became seriously alarmed about his fate. Sosibius knew at Alexandria a certain Cretan called Bolis[1] and consulted him how to free Achæus from the trap in which he had been caught. Bolis was a man of courage and experience and he happened to be related to Cambylus, the commander of Antiochus' division of Cretan mercenaries. He promised Sosibius that with Cambylus' help he would rescue Achæus. Sosibius was delighted and advanced ten talents to Bolis for current expenses and promised him a large reward, when he brought Achæus to Alexandria. Bolis crossed to Asia Minor and met Cambylus. The latter as a Cretan was ready to consider any scheme by which he might make money; but after he and Bolis had talked the matter over, the two kinsmen agreed that it would pay them better to pocket Sosibius' ten talents, catch Achæus and hand him over to Antiochus. Cambylus went to Antiochus, who promised a bigger reward than Sosibius. This decided the Cretans. Bolis sent to Achæus with the connivance of Antiochus, a brother officer Arianus, who induced the prince to entrust himself to Bolis. The latter was allowed by Antiochus to make his way secretly into the citadel. Achæus, whose situation was desperate, clutched at the chance offered to him; but as a precautionary measure, he told Bolis that he would not go that night himself, but would send five friends ahead and would join them later. He then disguised himself in a servant's clothes and mixing with the other four, he hoped in the dark to elude Bolis' observation. But as Polybius says, he was trying to out Cretan a Cretan.[1] Bolis was as astute as he was unscrupulous. He guessed that one or other of the five was Achæus and when he saw the others helping the pretended servant down the steep parts of the road, he soon guessed correctly, which was the rebel prince.

At a point on the road Bolis had already posted an ambuscade. When they reached it, he whistled and instantly seized Achæus round the arms, so that he could not draw his sword. He and his companions were soon securely tied and led into the presence of Antiochus. The king was struck dumb with astonishment, when he saw his enemy standing bound in front of him. Then he burst into tears for he knew that by the " laws of the Medes and Persians " he could not but execute Achæus; and

[1]Polybius VIII. 15.
[1]Polyb. VIII. 19.

Achæus was his first cousin.[1] At dawn Antiochus' intimate courtiers came to pay their respects and could not believe their eyes, when they saw the captive prince in the king's tent.

Shortly afterwards, the Council met and discussed Achæus' punishment. One could wish that humanity had prevailed, but Alexander's sentence on Bessus formed too close a precedent. Achæus' hands and feet were cut off and he was then beheaded. His head was sewn in an ass' skin and his body crucified. The army acclaimed the capture and the crucifixion with shouts so loud that Achæus' widow Laodice, who was in the secret of the intended escape, guessed that her husband had been taken. The citadel did not hold out much longer; Aribazus and Laodice quarrelled and separately surrendered the impregnable stronghold (213 B.C.).

[1]Achæus was the son of Andromachus and Andromachus was the brother of Laodice, Antiochus' mother.

CHAPTER III

Antiochus' Campaigns in High Asia, India, The Persian Gulf, Pergamos and Palestine (213 B.C.—198 B.C.).

After the execution of Achæus, Antiochus met with no further opposition in Asia Minor. Pergamos, Bithynia and the free Greek towns acknowledged his overlordship and left him at liberty to continue elsewhere his work of reorganisation. The king appointed Zeuxis viceroy of Asia Minor[1] and in the spring of 212 B.C., he moved against Armenia. There Xerxes a descendant of the founder of the kingdom had recently succeeded to the throne. On hearing of the advance of Antiochus, he fled to the fortress of Armosata or Arsamosata,[2] which lay in an open plain between the Tigris and the Euphrates, somewhere near the modern Diarbekir. Antiochus laid siege to Arsamosata, but Xerxes contrived to escape and proposed a conference. Antiochus' advisers suggested that the king should agree to the conference and seizing Xerxes, put on the throne his own sister's son Mithridates; but Antiochus was above such treachery. He received Xerxes cordially, reduced his arrears of tribute to a reasonable sum, bestowed on him as on a vassal the fief of Armenia and gave him his daughter Antiochis in marriage. The Seleucid's generosity won the hearts both of Xerxes and the Armenians. Xerxes opened his treasure chests and gave his conqueror as part payment three hundred talents, a thousand horses and a thousand mules. Armenia gave Antiochus no further trouble.

Parthia and Bactria remained unsubdued, but the task of welding together the reconquered provinces occupied Antiochus during the next few years. During that time he associated his son, also named Antiochus, to the throne, so that if he should himself fall in the Bactrian or Parthian expedition, the succession

[1]Histoire des Séleucides Voll. p. 157. (By Mr. Bouché Leclercq).
[2]Polybius VIII. 23, gives the spelling Armosata. M. Bouché Leclercq spells the name Arsamosata.

of his son should be assured. The expenses of the wars against Achæus and Armenia had depleted the royal treasury and ready money had to be found with which to hire mercenaries, ready to march to the shores of the Caspian. The king obtained the money in Ecbatana, the ancient capital of Media. The fabulous treasure of its palace had already been plundered by Alexander the Great and Antigonus the Oneeyed; but in a temple sacred to Ardvi Sura Anahita,[1] the angel of running water, Antiochus found sufficient plunder to enable him to coin four thousand talents. With these he was able to refit his army.

Antiochus' first objective was Parthia. It had already come to include Hyrcania on the southeast coast of the Caspian Sea and the ruler Arsaces III felt confident that he could defy the Seleucid. His front was protected by a desert; but in the desert were subterranean streams, that fed abundant wells. Antiochus knew of the wells and determined to continue his march in spite of the wilderness. Arsaces, too late, sent light cavalry to destroy the wells; but Antiochus sent a thousand horse and drove the Parthians away. The Seleucid army thus crossed the desert without difficulty. The king expected a stand near Hecatompylus, the capital of Parthia; but the Parthians adopted the tactics famous in Roman history and retreated into Hyrcania. Arsaces' plan was to draw the Hellenic army into the Labus Pass, where he hoped to destroy it; but Alexander had laid down the true principles of mountain warfare. The Parthians had erected barricades in the defiles and hoped to attack the Greek troops, as they strove to remove them or mounted slowly the steep ascent. Antiochus, however, sent archers and slingers to seize the hills above the Parthian positions and while they cleared the heights, he remade with his pioneers the road through the passes. Over the new road marched the heavy armed phalanx and the baggage train. The Parthians gradually fell back, but made a final stand at the last defile and fought the heavy armed spearmen hand to hand; but here again they were manoeuvred out of their positions by a night march of Antiochus' light armed troops, who at dawn appeared in the Parthian rear. A panic spread through Arsaces' men and they broke and fled. The Parthian king was finally driven to bay at Sirynx, the capital of Hyrcania. The town was strongly fortified and encircled by three moats; but the Greek engineers filled up the moats, undermined and knocked down the wall. The Parthians in despair killed the Greeks in the town and

[1]Polybius X.27 calls the temple, the temple of Aine. M. Bouché Leclercq identifies Aine with Anahit. This must be the Zoroastrian Azad or angel Ardvi Sura Anahita, commonly called Avan Azad. Any evening in Bombay one may see Parsees standing on the sea shore and saying prayers to this angel. (See my book " Our Parsee Friends," p. 16.)

fled into the open country. Antiochus sent after them a party of mercenaries, who overtook the fugitives and drove them back into Sirnyx. There they were forced to surrender at discretion. Arsaces submitted and was received as an ally,[1] no doubt on payment of tribute and acceptance of Seleucid sovereignty.

In the following year (208 B.C.) Antiochus marched against Bactria. Diodotus was dead and his throne had been usurped by one of his subordinates, Euthydemus of Magnesia. The latter held the fords of the Arius river (Heri-Roud) with ten thousand cavalry; but Antiochus in his advance learnt that while the enemy's horse kept watch by day, they retired at night to a town between two and three miles distant. The king, therefore, made his last march at night and got his cavalry and light troops across the river before the Bactrian horse had returned to their posts. When the enemy's cavalry found the Seleucid troops astride the stream, they instantly charged, hoping no doubt to catch Antiochus' men in disorder; but the king's personal valour saved the day. He repeatedly counterattacked at the head of his heavy cavalry, until the phalanx under Panaetolus was able to deploy on the eastern bank. The Bactrian horse then fell back on Euthydemus' main forces; but Antiochus pursuing his advantage, broke Euthydemus' army and compelled him to fall back on Zariaspa or Balkh. The king greatly enhanced his reputation for courage in this battle. He had a horse killed under him and he received a wound in the mouth, that knocked out several of his teeth. After the battle Antiochus invested Zariaspa and then followed one of the great sieges of antiquity.[2] It lasted for two years until at last both sides were anxious to come to terms. By his envoy Teleas, Euthydemus sued for peace. After all, he pleaded, he had never rebelled. All he had done was to punish the decendants of the rebel Diodotus. He pointed out that Central Asian nomads were pouring into the country and that unless the Greeks ceased to fight among themselves, the dominion of Hellas would become the prey of the barbarians. Antiochus was glad of an excuse to stop what was really a civil war; and when Euthydemus sent his son Demetrius to ratify the treaty, Antiochus not only confirmed Euthydemus as vassal king of Bactria, but gave to Demetrius one of his daughters. On the other hand Euthydemus handed over his war elephants and provided Antiochus' army with abundant supplies. Antiochus had now reduced to obedience all except one of the possessions of Seleucus Nicator. Beyond the Hindu Kush lay the magic country of India. Chandragupta had acknowledged or pretended to acknowledge the overlordship of

[1]Justin XLI Cap. 5 ad postremum in societatem ejus adsumtus est.
[2]Polybius XXIX. 12.8.
[3]Polybius XI. 39.

Seleucus, but Bindusara and Asoka, Chandragupta's son and grandson had paid little heed to Seleucus' successors. In the spring, therefore, of 206 B.C. the grand army of Antiochus crossed the Paramisus and entered the Cabul valley.

On Asoka's death his empire had begun to crumble away. According to Buddhist tradition, Asoka was succeeded by his brother Jaloka. The latter was a fervent Buddhist and disliked war. He was a Philhellene and claimed to be the friend of the kings of Syria, Egypt and Macedonia. Under his instructions, a certain Subhagasena, whose name the Greeks corrupted into Sophagasenos, came to meet Antiochus and lavished presents on one, who was after all connected with the Maurya house.[1]

Provisions for the royal army, elephants and money were the gifts or the tribute presented by Subhagasena. Part of the treasure was paid down, the rest was to be paid at a later date. To collect it, Antiochus left behind him Androsthenes of Cyzicus. The king went back through Arachosia, across the Helmund river, through Seistan and spent the winter of 206-205 B.C. on the shores of the Persian Gulf. The summer of 205 B.C. Antiochus passed in Babylon and there his thoughts turned to the unexplored corners of that sunlit gulf, up which Nearchus had sailed to rejoin Alexander. Somewhere on its Arabian shore lay the great town of Gerrhae, the emporium through which passed the trade of Persia, India and the Far East on the way to Petra, Mecca and the Hejaz.[2]

The merchant princes of Gerrhae had no wish to oppose the Seleucid king's victorious army and they sent him a pathetic letter. In it they begged him not to take from them the gifts that the gods had bestowed on them, namely perpetual peace and liberty.[3] Antiochus, when the letter had been interpreted to him, agreed to leave the Gerrhæans their freedom; and they in turn passed a decree, by which they honoured Antiochus and voted him a gift of five hundred talents of silver, a thousand talents of frankincense and two hundred talents of cinnamon oil. From Gerrhæ he sailed to Tylos or Bahrein, where he no doubt received a share of the yield of the pearl fisheries. Thereafter he returned to Seleucia on the Tigris (204 B.C.).

In spite of his successes one recollection must often have burnt in Antiochus' memory and spoilt all enjoyment of them, namely his defeat at Raphia. In the year 203 B.C., the news reached Syria that the conqueror in that battle, Ptolemy IV,

[1]Seleucus gave his daughter in marriage to Chandragupta.
[2]Diodorus III. 42. See also Strabo XVI. 766 and Bevan II p. 24.
[3]Polybius XIII. 9.

was dead and that with him had died his queen Arsinoe. The facts had been suppressed by the Alexandrian government,[1] but directly they came out, Antiochus saw that his chance had come. He made an agreement with Philip V of Macedon to despoil Egypt; but this was merely a device to ensure Philip's noninterference. The Egyptian court tried as before to gain time and sent envoys to Antiochus, begging him to respect the treaty signed by him and the dead king. At the same time the court sent agents to recruit mercenaries and despatched ambassadors to obtain armed assistance from Rome and the Greek states.

It was impossible, however, to play the same trick twice with success. Antiochus was not deceived and the Alexandrian government fell into a state of hopeless confusion. A rumour spread that Agathocles, the chief minister of Ptolemy IV had on his master's death murdered the queen Arsinoe. The mob excited by a military pretender called Tlepolemus, rose and murdered Agathocles and his entire household.[2] Thereafter Tlepolemus made himself regent, but his incapacity was soon so apparent that the mob removed him also from power and put Aristomenes at the head of the civil government and gave an Italian condottiere, named Scopas, full power to reorganise the army.

While the Alexandrian Greeks were quarrelling among themselves, Antiochus was completing his preparations. In the spring of 201 B.C., he again invaded Palestine; he met with no organised resistance save at Gaza, where, as so often had happened before, the inhabitants endured a long siege rather than surrender. Antiochus was now master of the greatest kingdom that the ancient world had seen since the death of Alexander; but within its borders were still many independent states. Of these Pergamos was particularly obnoxious to Antiochus. The founder of this kingdom was an eunuch called Philetærus, the son of a Paphlagonian flute girl, but born in the Greek town of Tios. He was supposed to have lost his virility by being crushed in his nurse's arms through the pressure of a crowd round her. He had first been in the service of Docimus, one of the Macedonian generals.[3] Afterwards the eunuch had passed into the service of Lysimachus and just before the battle of Courupedion, he had declared himself independent king of Pergamos near the old site of Troy. He joined Seleucus Nicator at the right moment and after Seleucus' murder recovered the body, cremated it and sent the ashes to Antiochus I. Philetærus was succeeded

[1] Mors ejus . . . . . diu occultata fuit. Justin XXX. II.
[2] Appian. Syr. X. 63.
[3] Bevan I. p. 130. Pausanias. I.8.I.
Polybius XV. 25.

by his nephew Eumenes, and then by another nephew Attalus I. All three were men of ability and did all that they dared to render difficult, if not impossible, the Seleucid administration. It was true that Attalus had helped Antiochus against Achæus; but that was only because Achæus was the nearer and more formidable enemy. Since Achæus' downfall the king of Pergamos had been on terms of more or less veiled hostility to Antiochus. He owned, too, one of the most fertile sections of the coastline of Asia Minor and his independence hampered the Seleucid government much as the independence of Sussex would hamper the administration of England. Attalus knew that he could never resist singlehanded the power of Antiochus. He, therefore, looked about for an ally and found one in Rome.

In 199 B.C., the Romans were at war with Philip V and the king of Pergamos was actively helping them. Antiochus seized the occasion and invaded Attalus' dominions. Could he have but reduced Pergamos, it might have been his salvation. Unhappily at the critical moment, he received news that a great Egyptian army under Scopas had invaded Palestine. Antiochus had to patch up peace with Attalus and once more cross the Taurus. The Seleucid king came up with Scopas at Panium or Cæsarea Philippi, near the sources of the Jordan.[1] After a bloody battle in which the crown prince Antiochus distinguished himself, the king completely defeated Ptolemy's army, shut up Scopas in Sidon and forced him to surrender (198 B.C.). From this time onwards the Ptolemies made no further attempt to recover Palestine.

At this point the fame of Antiochus reached its highest point. After all, what had Seleucus Nicator done that Antiochus had failed to achieve? All the Near East including Palestine was at his feet; and Palestine had not been among the possessions of his great ancestor. Like Seleucus he had extorted elephants from the Maurya emperor and like Nearchus he had navigated the Persian Gulf. The deeds of Antiochus were the talk of the whole civilised world. His Greek subjects gave him the title of Megas Basileus, which has survived to this day; his Asiatic subjects conferred on him the appellation of Nicator or the Conqueror. Even the Romans, hungry for the plunder of Asia Minor, were at this time overawed by the vast resources and boundless glory of the Great King.

[1]Polyb. XVI. 18. Bouché Leclercq p. 176.

CHAPTER IV.

The Roman Menace (198—195 B.C.).

Antiochus returned from his campaign in Palestine determined to do away with all opposition to his government in Asia. His policy was that of the East India Company during the vice royalties of Lords Wellesley and Dalhousie. He intended to reduce the larger states to impotence and absorb the smaller ones. All foreign possessions, whether Egyptian, Rhodian or Macedonian, he meant to seize at the first favourable opportunity.

The Egyptian possessions offered the greatest temptation. The young king Ptolemy V, Epiphanes could offer no resistance. Antiochus betrothed his daughter Cleopatra (198 B.C.) to the young Pharaoh and gave as her dowry half the revenues of Palestine. The other half and the whole administration he kept in his own hands. In consideration of the bride and the wedding gift, he obtained from the Alexandrian government a surrender of their possessions in Caria and Cilicia. These had mostly been acquired by Ptolemy III in the Laodicean war and it is not surprising that Antiochus should have demanded their restoration.

The winter of 198 B.C. the Great King passed in Antioch, but in the spring of 197 B.C., he led a mighty armament to the reduction of Caria and Cilicia. The land army under the command of his two sons Ardys and Mithridates marched to Sardis. The king and his son Seleucus sailed from the mouth of the Orontes with a fleet of two hundred warships. The crown prince Antiochus remained at Antioch to carry on the civil government. There was practically no resistance. The Egyptian government had abandoned the provinces and the magnitude of Antiochus' preparations rendered opposition useless. Mallos, Soloi, Zephyrium and the other chief towns opened their gates. Coracesium alone stood a siege. While Antiochus was endeavouring to reduce this great stronghold, a Rhodian embassy met him and declared that if the king's warships passed the Chelidonian promontory,

the Rhodians would resist them with armed force. The reason given for this amazing declaration was that during the Athenian hegemony, the Persian king had bound himself not to sail his warships beyond this point. The reason was as impudent as the declaration; and even Livy admires the tight hold that Antiochus kept on his temper.[1] Instead of ordering the envoys contemptuously from his presence, he assured them that he had no designs on Rhodes. He sent an embassy to confirm his assurances. Unfortunately, just as the royal envoy was addressing the Rhodian Senate, a despatch runner brought the news that Philip V had been completely defeated at Cynoscephalæ and had ceased to count as a political factor.

The Rhodians now took another tone and proceeded to engage in warlike operations against Antiochus; but the defeat of Philip V opened up a new horizon both to the Rhodians and the Great King. They soon found it more profitable to divide between them not only the Egyptian possessions in Asia Minor, but also those of Macedonia.[2] The Rhodians acquired Caunos, Myndos, Halicarnassus and Samos. Stratonicia they obtained as a gift from Antiochus. On the other hand the king occupied the whole shore of Asia Minor, except the Pergamene section from Cilicia to the Hellespont. Among his new acquisitions were Ephesus and Abydos. Just at this time an even wider field was opened to the Great King's ambitions by the death of Attalus, king of Pergamos (197 B.C.)

While addressing the assembly of the Bœotian League in the interests of Rome, Attalus had a paralytic stroke. After a reign of forty four years, he was carried home to die at Pergamos at the age of seventy two. He left four sons of whom the eldest Eumenes succeeded to the kingship. Antiochus at once occupied all the Pergamene territory outside the ancient limits of Pergamos.[3] Eumenes could offer no resistance and most of the Pergamene dependencies made no objection to a change of masters. Two cities, however, Lampsacus and Smyrna refused obstinately to acknowledge Antiochus' suzerainty. The Great King offered them self government in consideration of the same tribute paid by them to Pergamos; but encouraged by Eumenes, they held out for complete independence and appealed to Rome.

The Roman government had recently been indulging in an orgy of Philhellenism. They had decided to free Greece and

[1]Livy XXXIII. 20. et quamquam ea legatio erat, quæ accendere regium animum posset, temperavit iræ.

[2]Niese II p. 640.

[3]The ancient limits of the Pergamos state stretched along the coast from Adramyteion to Myrina. Niese II. p. 643.

make all its cities independent. The double advantage of such a course was that they earned the gratitude of the liberated towns; and by reducing all the organised governments to a fine powder, they rendered easier the task of plundering Hellas later on. Now to their disgust they found that like Louis XV " ils n'avaient travaillé que pour le Roi de Prusse." All the cities in Asia Minor that they had freed from Philip's rule had been appropriated with a few exceptions by Antiochus. They sent an embassy to protest; but before the ambassadors could reach Antiochus, he was in Europe.

In the spring of 196 B.C., the king took his fleet to the Gallipoli Peninsula. He had directed his army to march to Abydos, whence they were to cross to Europe and join the fleet at Madytus, a town on the European side of the straits.[1] Madytus closed its gates but afterwards capitulated. Its example was followed by the other towns in the Chersonese. The Great King having conquered the Peninsula, won the hearts of its inhabitants by restoring Lysimachia, the capital built by Lysimachus to defend the Chersonese from the wild Thracian tribes. All this territory had been taken from Seleucus II by Ptolemy III and had since been conquered by Philip V. The latter had withdrawn his garrisons during the Roman War and it had been overrun by the Thracians. Lysimachia had been destroyed and its inhabitants had been enslaved or had taken refuge in the Greek cities of the Hellespont. Antiochus rebuilt the town and recalled or redeemed from slavery as many of the old citizens as he could trace.[2] Thereafter he invaded Thrace to teach the barbarians to respect in future a Greek city.

On the great King's return from his Thracian expedition, he found a number of foreigners in Lysimachia, awaiting his arrival. There was Lucius Cornelius, who had been sent by the Roman Senate to arrange a peace between Antiochus and Ptolemy. Next there were three of the ten commissioners appointed by the Roman Senate to help the victorious consul Titus Quinctius Flamininus to settle the affairs of Greece. Of these Publius Villius had come separately from Bargylia, where he had expelled Philip's garrisons.[3] The other two were Lucius Terentius and Publius Villius. They had been sent direct by their colleagues. Besides the Roman ambassadors there were delegates from Smyrna and Lampsacus.

Antiochus received his foreign guests with Hellenic courtesy.

[1]Livy XXXIII. 38.9. Cum ad Madytum Chersonesi urbem . . . . . .
[2]Bevan II. p. 50.
[3]Livy XXXIII, 38.12.

To it the Romans responded with their customary brusqueness. They complained that every act of the king since he had left Syria had offended the Senate; they demanded that the king should restore to Ptolemy his recent conquests and they declared it intolerable[1] that the Romans should have had the trouble and danger of defeating Philip V and that Antiochus should appropriate all the spoils of the war. Lastly they objected to the presence of the king's army and fleet in Europe. Antiochus would doubtless deny that he meant war even if he invaded Italy; but the Romans would not wait until he had done so.

Antiochus' reply was courteous and effective. As regards Ptolemy, he and the young were ꟻuiꟻ on the best of terms and the two dynasties would shortly be united in marriage. As regards Philip's Asiatic provinces, Antiochus expressed surprise that the Romans should enquire so closely into his conduct in Asia. That was no more their business than it was his to enquire into their conduct in Italy. Lastly his occupation of Thrace was in no way directed against Rome. Thrace had been conquered by his ancestor Seleucus Nicator from Lysimachus. He had merely gone to Thrace to recover his own lost property, taken from his house first by Ptolemy III and afterwards by Philip V.

The Romans, worsted in argument, called in Parmenion and Pythodorus, the delegates from Lampsacus and Smyrna. They read out so insolently[2] a list of their grievances, that the king had to stop them. He could not admit the claim of the Romans to arbitrate between him and those who, as he contended, were his subjects. He told the ambassadors sharply to hold their tongues. If he decided to allow outsiders to interfere, he would ask the Rhodians and not the Romans to be arbitrators. At this the conference broke up with considerable illfeeling on all sides.

Before any suitable formula could be found, the news reached both the Romans and the king that Ptolemy V was dead. He had no children; both parties, therefore, hoped to seize his inheritance. Neither party, however, disclosed to the other his information. Lucius Cornelius gave out that he must go to Egypt in connection with the peace that he had been sent to arrange between Antiochus and Ptolemy. On this Antiochus dismissed all the ambassadors and leaving his second son Seleucus at Lysimachia, sailed to Ephesus. Thence he sent, to quiet Roman suspicions, a mission to Titus Flamininus with assurances that he meant no harm to Rome. From Ephesus he sailed along the Lycian coast to Pataræ, a town on the mainland just

[1] Id vero ferendum non esse Livy XXXIII 39.6.
[2] Polybius XVIII. 52.

opposite the island of Rhodes. There he learnt that the news of Ptolemy's death was false. Indignant at the deception, the king resolved to compensate himself by seizing Cyprus. He had no claim to it; and it was held in the interest of the young king of Egypt by Ptolemaios of Megalopolis.[1] Antiochus' scheme miscarried, as indeed it deserved to. First a mutiny broke out among his sailors and then a storm overtook his fleet off the Cicilian coast near the mouth of the Saros river. Most of his ships were wrecked. His losses in seamen and soldiers were very heavy and many of his most trusted officers perished. The king could no longer hope to seize Cyprus. He took the remains of his battered fleet to Seleucia on the Orontes and spent the winter at Antioch (196—195 B.C.). During his stay at Antioch he celebrated the marriage of the crown prince Antiochus with his sister Laodice. Among the wedding guests was in all probability Hannibal.

That remarkable genius had after the close of the second Punic war rendered signal service to his country, first by substituting for the incapable oligarchy a competent administration and afterwards by reorganising the finances and checking the embezzlement of the custom dues and other state income. In this manner he succeeded in paying off the Roman indemnity without levying fresh taxes. Still although he served his country well, his measures aroused widespread private animosity. The corrupt Carthaginian merchant princes, who had so long misappropriated the public revenues, complained to Rome about Hannibal, alleging his hostility and his intrigues with Antiochus. The Roman Senate in spite of the dignified protests of Scipio Africanus, sent three ambassadors to Carthage to enquire into the charges against Hannibal. The latter, however, did not await the enquiry. He rode first to his castle near Thapsus and thence fled by sea to the island of Cercina. Afterwards, he sailed to Tyre, where the civic authorities gave him a splendid reception. From Tyre he made his way to Antioch, where he saw the prince Antiochus, who was celebrating the games at Daphne. The prince treated him with great kindness and sent him to Ephesus. There he met the Great King on his return from Lysimachia in 196 B.C. The king at once gave Hannibal employment and seems to have taken the distinguished Carthaginian on his staff, when he went back to Antioch.[2]

[1] Polybius XVIII. 55.

[2] The date of Hannibal's arrival in Asia is uncertain. According to Livy, it was in 195 B.C. According to Appian and Nepos, he came in 196 B.C. Niese puts the year as 196 B.C. and I have followed him. Niese II p. 671. Note 2.

CHAPTER V.

Antiochus The Great and Hellas (195-191 B.C.).

The presence of Hannibal on Antiochus' staff enabled the king to question the Carthaginian closely on the best means of waging war against Rome, should it break out. Hannibal advised that the king should send him to Italy with ten thousand foot, a thousand cavalry and a hundred decked warships. With these, he would rouse Carthage to a third war and then invade Italy. The plan pleased Antiochus and was worthy of the great captain; but it miscarried owing to the insane enmity felt towards Hannibal by the corrupt plutocrats of Carthage. He had thwarted their dishonest practices and they would have sooner sold their city to Rome than have allowed him to return. Their acuteness sharpened by hatred, they detected Hannibal's agents in the city and reported their presence to the Roman Senate. The latter stirred up Massinissa, king of Numidia to ravage the Carthaginian lands[1] and thus effectively kept Carthage occupied with home troubles.

Antiochus spent the years 195 and 194 B.C. in and about the Hellespont, recruiting Gallic mercenaries.[2] In the Chersonese Antiochus met Publius Villius, who nominally a Roman envoy, was acting as a Roman spy. He reported Antiochus' activities to Flamininus and the Greek king thought it advisable to send another mission under Menippus to Rome.[3] The latter assured the Senate that Antiochus' intentions were perfectly peaceful and that all he wished was to recover his ancestor's possessions in Thrace. The Roman Senate referred the question to Flamininus and he insisted that Antiochus must withdraw from Europe. Menippus, however, begged the Romans to come to no definite

[1]Livy XXXIV. 62.
[2]App. Syr. II. 6; Bouché Leclercq p. 183.
[3]App. Syr. II. 6.

decision; and the Senate agreed to send in their turn an embassy to Antiochus. The envoys chosen were Publius Sulpicius, Publius Villius and Publius Aelius (B.C. 194).[1]

The envoys did not reach Antiochus' court until the spring of 192 B.C., and in the meantime the Great King tried to bind to himself his enemies and his doubtful friends by marriage alliances. He had already married his daughter Antiochis to Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia (195 B.C.) and he now offered another daughter to Eumenes of Pergamos; but the latter, whose only chance of independence seemed to him to lie in a Roman alliance, declined the offer. In the winter of 193/192 B.C., Antiochus went to Raphia to be present at the marriage of his daughter Cleopatra to Ptolemy V.

As a matter of fact, neither Rome nor Antiochus was in the least anxious for war. The former was frightened by the immense reputation of Antiochus and the possibility of having to wage war on five fronts at once—namely in Spain, North Africa, Macedonia, Cisalpine, Gaul and Asia. On the other hand the Great King had no quarrel with the Romans; he was obsessed by the lure that had already proved fatal to Perdiccas, Antigonus the One eyed and Seleucus Nicator, namely the desire to possess the whole heritage of Alexander. The king was absent fighting in the hills of Pisidia, when the Roman envoys reached Elæa the port of Pergamos.[2] Sulpicius who fell ill stayed there; but Publius Villius hastened to Ephesus.[3] Antiochus on hearing of Villius' arrival invited him to Apamea. Both sides were discussing their differences without any result when the negotiations were stopped by the news of the death of the crown prince Antiochus. That gallant youth had been invested with the royal title seventeen years before and his death was a heavy blow to his father.[4] The king retired to Ephesus to hide his grief. Publius Villius withdrew to Pergamos, where he sounded king Eumenes as to his intentions in case of war. After some weeks spent in mourning, Antiochus invited the Roman envoy to renew the negotiations at Ephesus. He was not again present in person; but he sent Minio, his most trusted adviser to meet Villius and

[1] Livy XXXIV. 59.
[2] Bevan II p. 62 gives a very clear account of these negotiations.
[3] It was when Publius Villius was at Ephesus that according to legend, he created suspicion in Antiochus' mind by continually seeking Hannibal's society. It is a story that I cannot believe. Hannibal was not likely to fall into such a clumsy trap; and his dislike for the Romans was so great that he would certainly have taken measures to keep Publius Villius at arm's length.
[4] The suspicion of foul play mentioned by Livy XXXV. 15. 5. may well be discredited. The youth Antiochus was his father's most loyal friend.

Sulpicius, who had regained his health. The discussion seems to have been confined to the case of Lampsacus and Smyrna; and Minio met the Roman champions of Hellenic liberty by pointing out that they themselves held the Greek cities of Italy and Sicily in bondage. The Romans found some difficulty in meeting this argument, but contended that they had occupied the cities of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks from time immemorial; whereas the cities of Smyrna and Lampsacus, even if at one time under the rule of Seleucus Nicator, had in the interval been independent. The contention was absurd. The Romans had only conquered Tarentum and Syracuse in the Pyrrhic and Punic wars; and Smyrna and Lampsacus had not been independent cities. They had been subject to Pergamos and their king had ceded them by treaty to Antiochus. Neither side would yield and the Roman envoys went back to report to the Senate; but peace might still have been preserved but for the folly of the Aetolians.

The Roman troops had evacuated Greece in 194 B.C. The Aetolians had been bitterly disappointed at not receiving a greater plunder after Cynoscephalæ; and once the Roman soldiers had left, they worked themselves into the belief that it was their arms only that had conquered Philip V. In the spring of 192 B.C., the Roman Senate sent Titus Flamininus back to Greece, that he might keep some at least of the Greek cities on the Roman side. He did his best to prevent the Aetolians from taking an irrevocable step; but their heads had been turned by the arrival from the court of Antiochus of one of their leaders Thoas, a foolish, mendacious boaster. They passed a decree that Antiochus should be invited to Greece to settle all questions between themselves and the Romans. When Flamininus asked for a copy of the decree, he received the reply that it would shortly be sent to him from the Aetolian camp on the banks of the Tiber.[1] This nonsensical reply made hostilities inevitable. It, therefore, became a matter of life and death to the Aetolians to drag Antiochus into the war.

The foolish outburst of the Aetolians found Antiochus almost wholly unprepared. Unhappily for him, Thoas arrived from Aetolia with all speed and told so skilfully such an amazing tissue of lies that the king was led to believe that all he had to do was to land in Greece. His presence alone would cause armed warriors by the hundred thousand to spring from the ground. Hannibal whose clear intelligence would have penetrated the braggart's mendacity, was artfully excluded from the Council chamber. If Hannibal were sent, said Thoas, his appearance in Greece would

[1]Livy XXXV. 33.10. decretum responsum que in Italia brevi castris super ripam Tiberis positis daturum.

have no result. Only the Great King could rouse Greece. The Aetolian further hinted that if Hannibal did go without Antiochus to Greece and were successful, he might return to Asia Minor greater even than the Great King. Just then the news came that the Aetolians had secured the port of Demetrias on the Thessalian coast. Here was a convenient harbour, where Antiochus might land. Carried away by the false promises of Thoas and the fatal lure of Alexander's heritage, the Great King collected such troops as he could find. They numbered ten thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry and six elephants and were conveyed from Ephesus to Demetrias in two hundred transports, escorted by a hundred warships. The king before starting, went to Ilium and sacrificed to Athena. Xerxes and Alexander had done the same, the one before his European and the other before his Asiatic expedition; but even the favour of an Immortal could not bestow victory on a force so small, as that which Antiochus led across the sea to the conquest of Hellas.

The Seleucid's appearance in Greece in the late autumn of 192 B.C., did not, it need hardly be said, have the extraordinary results promised by Thaos. This adventurer had told as many lies to the Hellenes as he had to Antiochus. Their disappointment was keen when the Great King landed with an almost negligible force. The Aetolians, however, invited Antiochus to Malia, where they greeted him with extravagant joy. Yet even they began to doubt the wisdom of a war against Rome when their chief ally could only support them with a handful of men and had so little money, that he had to beg the Aetolians to furnish his horses and men with forage and supplies. One of their leaders Phæneas suggested that they should ask Antiochus merely to arbitrate between them and Rome. The egregious Thoas, however, promised the Aetolian assembly that in the following spring, Antiochus would bring to Greece innumerable armies; and by a fresh outburst of mendacity led the assembly to appoint Antiochus as their strategos or general.

One might have expected that the Roman force at Apollonia, where Marius Bæbius had two legions and some auxiliaries, would at once have invaded Aetolian territory; but the Romans were unable to cross the mountains of Epirus during winter. Antiochus, therefore, had for the time being, a free hand. Nevertheless the Achæans made a vigorous effort to check his progress. They were definitely on the side of Rome. The Aetolian envoy Archidamus had tried to win them to the cause of Antiochus by magnifying in the Achæan council gathered at Aegium, the countless infantry, the masses of cavalry, the vast fleets, the inexhaustible treasures of the Great King and by re-

peating the names of the many nations ranged under his banner. Flamininus, who was also present, turned the tables on Archidamus by his famous tale of a dinner to which he had recently been invited by a friend in Chalcis. Although it was not the season for game, yet game of all kinds was served. It turned out, however, that the so called game was but pork dressed in different ways. In the same manner the nations under Antiochus laughed Flamininus, were merely Syrians disguised under other names. Indeed the Great King's resources might be fairly judged by the army that he had brought into Greece, an army that small as it was he could not afford to feed.

The Achæans, supported by a contingent from Pergamos and a body of five hundred Roman marines, tried to cross into Eubœa so as to hold it against the Seleucid; but Antiochus' officer Menippus attacked the Achæans at Delium on the Bœotian coast and cut them to pieces. Thereupon all Eubœa, including the port of Chalcis, ranged itself on the side of the Great King; so did Elis and Bœotia and Amynander, King of the Athamanians. Thereafter Antiochus occupied all Thessaly with the exception of Larissa, that resolutely held out.

While Antiochus' courtiers were magnifying his petty victories, one lofty mind looked at them with disdain. The king invited Hannibal's opinion and received the reply that the conquest of Thessaly had no value. Rome was the only enemy that mattered. Antiochus should ally himself to Philip V; if Philip would not join the Seleucid cause, he should be rendered powerless by an attack under Seleucus, the king's eldest remaining son, on his Thracian frontier. In the meantime, every effort should be made to get the king's troops in Asia across to Greece. The king's fleet should patrol the Italian coast from some base on the Greek side of the Adriatic. This would cut the Roman communications with Apollonia and enable Antiochus, if the opportunity arose, to throw an army into Italy.

Antiochus could not be convinced of the danger to which he was exposed and seems always to have left Rome, as a barbarian power, out of his calculations. He paid no heed to Hannibal's advice and tried to upset Philip's throne by raising a revolt among his subjects. To this end he put forward an impostor, called Philip of Megalopolis, who pretended descent from Alexander the Great, as a claimant to the throne of Macedonia. In Antiochus' company, Philip of Megalopolis buried with due pomp the remains of the Macedonians, who had fallen at Cynoscephalæ. Philip V, who had till then been undecided, at once threw himself heart and soul into the Roman alliance. He went

in person to meet the prætor Bæbius, whom he met in Dassaretia near Apollonia, and invited him to march through Macedonia to the relief of Larissa.[1] Bæbius gladly accepted the invitation. He sent two thousand men under Appius Claudius through the Gonnoi pass. Their general disposed them so skilfully that Antiochus believed them to be a large Roman army. He raised the siege of Larissa and leaving garrisons in the towns that he had occupied, fell back on Chalcis. There he wasted the rest of the winter in first wooing and then marrying a young woman the daughter of one Cleoptolemus, a private citizen; and forgetful of the arduous campaign ahead, he revelled and idled to the ruin of his army and the neglect of his mobilisation.

While the Great King feasted and slept, the Romans prepared with grim determination to drive him out of Greece. In January or February 191 B.C., the Roman Senate consulted the auspices, who foretold victory and plunder for the Roman army,[2] war was at once solemnly declared on Antiochus and the Aetolians; and Manius Acilius Glabrio with twenty thousand Roman and Italian infantry, two thousand cavalry and fifteen elephants, crossed from Brindisi to Apollonia.[3] Marius Bæbius in conjunction with Philip V had already taken the offensive. The Seleucid could do nothing to stop their advance. His troops were disorganised by licence; his Asiatic army was not ready to leave Asia. His garrisons in Thessaly were taken prisoners and although four thousand Aetolians joined him, their fighting quality was so poor that they did not add to his strength. With about ten thousand foot and five hundred horse he tried to hold Thermopylæ. The Roman frontal attack, as that of Xerxes had done, failed, but Marcus Cato at the head of a Roman detachment turned the pass by surprising the worthless Aetolian outpost on Mount Callidromus. Taken in flank, the Macedonian spearmen at once broke and the king's force fled in a wild panic. In a few hours Antiochus' army had ceased to exist. The king escaped with a handful of men to Chalcis. There he joined his bride and boarding one of his warships, he reached Ephesus in safety. The Romans met with little further opposition. The Aetolians attacked by both Philip and the legions defended themselves but feebly; and before the fair season of 191 B.C. was over, they as well as Antiochus' other allies had made their submission to Rome. No longer could the Great King in his daydreams see himself as the heir of Alexander's empire.

[1]Livy XXXVI. 10. Marius Bæbius interim cum Philippo in Dassaretiis congressus. See also Bevan II p. 79 and Niese II p. 700
[2]Livy XXXVI. 1. 3.
[3]App. Syr. IV. 17.

CHAPTER VI.

Magnesia and the Death of Antiochus. (191—187 B.C.).

Antiochus returned to Asia thoroughly disillusioned about his Greek friends; when his evil genius Thoas again appeared at his court and implored him to help the Aetolians still resisting in Aetolia, he dismissed him with a sum of money. He refused to be drawn into any more adventures in Greece. At the same time he formed the belief that once he had evacuated Hellas, the Romans would have no further quarrel with him; but the " wolves of Italy " had lost their fears of Antiochus and were firmly resolved to invade Asia and extort all the plunder they could from the weakness of the Great King.

Antiochus' courtiers were as blind as their master. Once again it was Hannibal's voice that was raised in warning. He fearlessly spoke out. So far, he said, from the Romans not coming to Asia, he only marvelled that they were not already there.[1] The Romans were as powerful on sea as on land and the Great King would shortly have to fight both by land and sea for his very existence. There was no mistaking the earnestness of the great captain, who had recently received news from a private source of the preparations that the Romans were making for a campaign in Asia. Antiochus set himself to commission a fleet and to cover the sea with light craft, so as to obtain early information of the enemy's movements. In command of his fleet he appointed Polyxenidas, a Rhodian refugee.

The arrival of the enemy was not long delayed. In the late summer of 191 B.C., Caius Livius sailed for the Aegean. His fleet consisted of eighty one decked warships and a quantity of small craft. Among them were six Carthaginian and three Pergamene vessels.[1] The full naval strength of Pergamos and of

[1]Livy XXXVI. 41.2—Hannibal unus, magis mirari se aiebat quod non jam in Asia essent Romani, quam venturos dubitare.

[1]Livy XXXVI. 42. 206.

Rhodes, that had after much hesitation joined the Romans, was to meet Caius Livius in the Aegean. Polyxenidas got the king's permission to attack the Roman fleet before the allied squadrons joined it. Unfortunately Eumenes succeeded in bringing to Caius Livius' help twenty-four decked warships before Polyxenidas could engage the Romans. The result was that Caius Livius commanded no less than a hundred and five decked warships as against the seventy decked warships under Polyxenidas. Nevertheless the gallant Rhodian decided to attack, trusting to his seamanship to make up for his inferiority in numbers. He began the action off Cissus by attacking a Carthaginian ship with two of his warships and breaking her oars. He then boarded and took her. When, however, he tried these tactics on the ship of Caius Livius, he found that he was merely playing the Roman's game. Caius Livius let the two Seleucid vessels break his oars and then dropped gangways on them and captured them both. From this moment the action went steadily against Polyxenidas. The Romans first put to flight his port squadron and then Eumenes broke up his starboard squadron. Polyxenidas signalled to his commanders to make for Ephesus with all speed. They did so and by dint of hard rowing made the harbour, but with the loss of ten ships sunk and thirteen taken. The Romans lost only the Carthaginian vessel boarded at the beginning of the fight.

The battle of Cissus fully proved the wisdom of Hannibal's words; and all that winter Antiochus spent in preparation and mobilisation. The various contingents were directed to meet at Magnesia between thirty and forty miles from the sea, near the battlefield of Courupedion, where the Great King's ancestor Seleucus Nicator had defeated and killed his rival Lysimachus. Magnesia was a convenient centre from which to watch the whole coast; for now the Romans had the command of the sea, it was difficult to say from what point they would attack. At the same time every effort was made to create a fresh navy. Old ships were made seaworthy under the eye of Polyxenidas. The Aegean pirates were encouraged to prey on the Roman foodships,[1] and Hannibal was sent in person to obtain squadrons from the emporiums of Canaan, Tyre and Sidon.

The Romans spent the winter at Canæ[2] on the Pergamene coast and won over or constrained to their cause the Greek islands and several of the coast towns. In the spring of 190 B.C., Caius Livius tried to secure both sides of the Hellespont for the passage of the consular army that Rome was sending under the command

[1]Bevan II p. 94.
[2]Classis Romana ad Canas hibernabat. Livy XXXVII. 8. 6.

of Lucius Scipio and his brother the great Publius Scipio Africanus. Caius Livius sacrificed to the Athena of Ilium as Antiochus had done the previous year; he then marched against Sestos, but was met by two eunuch priests of Cybele, who begged him not to use armed force against the city.[1] Caius Livius readily granted Sestos an honourable capitulation and crossing the straits besieged Abydos.

Antiochus had turned Abydos into a great place of arms and it resolutely withstood the Roman siege. Nevertheless, it was on the point of surrender, when Livius was forced to hasten south by the news of a great disaster, that had overtaken the Rhodian fleet. It was under the command of one Pausistratus, who had excited Polyxenas' hatred by referring to him in a public speech with the utmost contempt and contumely. Polyxenidas revenged himself by offering to betray to Pausistratus the Seleucid fleet in return for permission to return to Rhodes. Pausistratus let himself be deceived and then surprised. He was killed and his vessels with the exception of seven were either sunk or taken. These last escaped by holding out flaming firepots on each side of their prows. The result of this victory was that Antiochus cleared that part of the Aegean of enemy ships and was able to take Phocæa and Cyme.

The energy of the Rhodians prevented Polyxenidas from taking full advantage of his naval victory. They at once equipped twenty fresh ships and effected a junction with the Roman fleet, and so recovered the mastery of the sea. Still the Roman position was not an enviable one. Two noted pirates Nicander and Hybristas[2] threatened their long line of communications; and all the time Tyre and Sidon were getting ready their fleets under the eagle eyes of Hannibal. In the end after an unsuccessful attack on Patara, the allied fleet withdrew to the shelter of Samos.

Antiochus snatched at the opportunity and sent his son Seleucus to take Pergamos and its port Elæa. Seleucus who had little of his elder brother Antiochus' talents for war, failed in both attempts. Antiochus then joined him with the troops that he had mobilised and father and son wasted the whole countryside of Pergamos. Attalus, king Eumenes' younger brother, gallantly defended the capital and so gave time to Eumenes to sail back to Elæa with the Pergamene squadron.[3] Thence Eumenes threw himself with all available men into Pergamos. While the king was resolutely defending his chief town, the Rhodian and Roman fleets sailed into the harbour of Elæa. Antiochus pitched a camp

[1] Polybius XXI. 6.
[2] Livy XXXVII. 13, 12. See also Niese II p. 729.
[3] Livy XXXVII. 18. 8.

close by and sent a herald asking for peace. The Rhodians were willing to treat; but Eumenes, who believed that once the Roman army had returned to Italy, the life of his kingdom would be short, strenuously opposed all peace negotiations until the arrival of the main army under the Scipios.

Antiochus, unable to make peace, withdrew from Elæa and tried to take the wealthy town of Adramyteion in the extreme north of Pergamene territory; but the Roman and Pergamene fleets reached the harbour in time to save the town. Almost simultaneously, another mishap befell the king. A thousand Achæan infantry and a hundred cavalry reached Elæa from Greece. Their leader was Diophanes a brave and able soldier of the school of Philopœmon. Guided by Pergamene scouts, Diophanes passed safely through the Seleucid lines and entered Pergamos. Thence he made such skilful sorties on Seleucus' investing force that the prince had to raise the siege and fall back on the coast. On the other hand a Roman attempt on Phocæa failed and the Roman general vented his illtemper by plundering the beautiful temples on Bacchium island close by.

This fighting between Antiochus against the Romans and their allies was little more than an affair of outposts. In Syria, however, Hannibal had commissioned a fleet and it was of vital importance to the Romans that Hannibal should not effect a junction with Polyxenidas. Suddenly the Romans learnt that Hannibal had weighed anchor. It was resolved that the Roman fleet should watch Polyxenidas, while the Rhodians under the command of their admiral Eudamos, should intercept Hannibal. Eudamos did his duty well. As he patrolled the shores of Asia Minor, he saw the Phœnician squadron off Sida on the coast of Pamphylia. It must have been an awe inspiring sight; seven of Hannibal's warships had seven banks of oars and four six banks of oars and his fleet numbered forty seven sail against Eudamos' thirtysix.[1] But Rhodian hearts were as bold and Rhodian seamen as skilful as in the days when they defied the terrible Besieger. Eudamos without hesitation attacked the Canaanite fleet. The ships of Tyre and Sidon were of clumsier build and were worse handled than those of Rhodes; and Hannibal at sea was not the captain that he was on land. Eudamos won a complete victory and Hannibal, able to save only twenty of his vessels, took refuge in Sida.

The disaster off Sida had a repercussion inland. Prusias,

[1] Rhodiorum duæ et triginta quaduremes et quattuor triremes fuere. Regia classis septem et triginta majoris formæ navium erat; in quibus tres hepteres, quatuor hexeres habebat; præter has decem triremes erant. Livy XXXVII. 23. 4.

king of Bithynia and hitherto, as the enemy of Pergamos, the friend of Antiochus, suddenly made his peace with the Romans. This was a serious defection, for the kingdom of Bithynia included all the southern coast of the sea of Marmora. Still everything was not lost for Antiochus, if the Rhodian, Roman and Pergamene fleets could be attacked and destroyed separately. The Rhodians were watching Hannibal's remaining ships in Sida. The Pergamene ships were guarding Eumenes' coast towns. The Romans were at Samos. If Polyxenidas could tempt out the Romans, he might perhaps overwhelm them before their allies could come to their assistance. To bait the trap, Antiochus laid siege to Notium, the port of Colophon an ally of Rome. The people of Colophon begged help of Aemilius, who was in command of the Roman fleet. Aemilius weighed anchor and sailed for Notium. On the way he brought his ships into Teos harbour and only by the merest chance escaped destruction. Polyxenidas came up at all speed, hoping to destroy the Roman fleet when crowded into a narrow space. At the last moment, Eudamos with some Rhodian ships joined Aemilius and made him take his vessels out of the inner harbour and anchor them in the open roadstead at the other side of the town. Polyxenidas came up up the other side of the town. Polyxenidas came up just too late and was attacked by the allied squadrons in the open sea off Myonesus. They numbered sixty Roman and twenty Rhodian sail against his eightynine; but the skill of the Rhodian sailors and the boarding tactics of the Romans won a great victory. Forty-two of Polyxenidas' ships were sunk or taken. Antiochus thus lost finally the command of the sea.

The Great King now realised that he must fight the Romans in Asia and he recalled his garrisons from Abydos and Lysimachia. He has been criticised for evacuating Lysimachia. It is true that his garrison did so without destroying the stores therein; but he can hardly be blamed for the negligence of his subordinates. On the other hand his garrisons in the Hellespont were formed of picked troops and to leave them there was to lose them. "Place assiégée est place prise," unless it can be relieved. Antiochus could not have marched to their relief, for on either flank of his line of march would have been the hostile states of Pergamos and Bithynia.

Eumenes met the Romans in the Hellespont and provided them with all the transport necessary for crossing the straits; but at Abydos the Roman army was delayed for thirty days by the religious festival of the Salii.[1] Here Antiochus sent Heraclides of Byzantium to ask for terms of peace. He had orders to await

[1]Niese II p. 738; also Livy XXXVII. 33.7.

the arrival of Publius Scipio, who had been delayed in Greece. When the great Africanus arrived, Heraclides offered to give up Antiochus' claims on Lampsacus, Smyrna, the Troad and all those towns that had joined the Romans and also to pay half the expenses of the war. The greed of the Romans had been whetted by their victories and in no case would Eumenes agree to anything short of the utter humiliation of his enemy. The allies demanded the whole cost of war, the renunciation by Antiochus of all his rights over Greek cities in Asia Minor and the evacuation of all Asia Minor north of the Taurus range.

Heraclides had no authority to offer more than he had already done; but he tried to bribe Publius Scipio with a large sum of money and the promised release of his son, who had been taken prisoner in the earlier fighting. The Roman declined the money, but gladly accepted the release of his son; at the same time he refused to treat with Antiochus on equal terms. Had the king, said the arrogant Africanus, asked for peace on those terms before the Romans had crossed the Hellespont, he, Scipio, might have granted it. Now that Antiochus had let the Romans cross into Asia and let himself be bitted and mounted,[1] he must accept what terms Scipio chose to dictate to him.

Antiochus, at the head of an unbeaten army, could not possibly agree to these monstrous conditions. He felt that they could hardly be worse after a defeat. When the Salian festival was over, the Romans marched to Troy, where the inhabitants greeted them as the descendants of Aeneas and his companions. The army was here reinforced by the Pergamene contingent under Eumenes' brother Attalus and the march continued. Publius Scipio fell ill and handed over his command to Cnæus Domitius. While Scipio was ill, his son came to him from Antiochus' camp. Scipio sent his thanks and in return advised Antiochus not to fight until he, Scipio, returned to the army. What Scipio meant has never been made clear; but Antiochus could not have followed Scipio's advice had he wished to. He had withdrawn to Magnesia, but he could not retreat for ever without demoralising his army. Nor was there any such safety in retirement, as the Parthians afterwards found, for Bactria and Parthia were no sure refuges for a Seleucid king.

On the banks of the river Phrygius, there was a slight cavalry action between the Romans and the king's Gallic and Parthian horse. On the left bank of the river the consul pitched his camp under fire from Antiochus' light troops. During four days the Romans deployed in front of Antiochus' lines, but the king would

[1] Polybius XXI. 15.

not move. Cnæus Domitius was afraid both of the approach of winter for it was now November, and of the recovery of Publius Scipio. He wanted to win a victory before Africanus resumed command. He gave out that he meant to force an action the following day on Antiochus, whether the king wished it or not. There was nothing for Antiochus to do, except fight or retreat. He elected to fight. His army with its various contingents of Syrians, Arabians, Medes, Gauls, Thracians, etc., numbered sixty thousand infantry and twelve thousand horse. He had fifty four Indian elephants. Nevertheless the size of his army was no indication of its real strength. His heavy cavalry and the great phalanx sixteen thousand strong were his only really trustworthy troops. Some of the contingents such as the Arabian scythed chariots and camel corps were more a danger than a help.

Cnæus Domitius' army was only thirty thousand strong; but it was composed of ten thousand Roman and ten thousand Italian infantry. Of these the Roman legionaries were in front on the left flank and the Italians immediately behind them. Next to the Italians came the Pergamene army under Eumenes. On the right flank were three thousand mixed Pergamene, Roman and Italian cavalry. In addition there were some light armed troops and archers and a body of Macedonian and Thracian volunteers. Lastly Cnæus Domitius kept close to himself four squadrons of cavalry. The Roman camp was guarded by a reserve of two thousand men under Marcus Aemilius.

The morning of the battle broke wet and misty, a circumstance that told in the favour of the Romans. Their smaller army covered a narrower front than that of Antiochus and the poor visibility hampered Domitius less than his opponent. The rain did no harm to the Roman swords and heavy spears; but it affected the bowstrings, slings and javelin thongs of the Seleucid light armed troops.

Antiochus' plan was to throw the Roman right in confusion with his scythed chariots, while he himself overcame the legionaries on the left by a determined cavalry charge. The plan worked well, where he commanded in person. At the head of the Seleucid right wing, he put to flight the Romans on the left of their line and also Cnæus Domitius' four squadrons. The fugitives hotly pursued by the Great King, fled to their camp, where Marcus Aemilius forced them to make a stand. Unable to carry the entrenched camp, Antiochus returned to the battle field, thinking that he had won a victory. When he reached it, he found that his army was broken beyond hope of recovery.

Eumenes, who on this day shewed the qualities of a skilful captain, turned Antiochus' plan to his own advantage. He sent against the scythed chariots all his archers and lightarmed troops and told them to shoot at the horses. The latter took fright and bolted back through their own lines, creating there the very disorder that Antiochus had hoped to create in the Roman ranks. Before the Seleucid left could extricate itself, Eumenes charged it will all his available cavalry and swept it away in helpless rout. The phalanx's right flank had been laid bare by Antiochus' charge. Its left flank was exposed by Eumenes' success. Cnæus Domitius collected all the men he could and ringed the phalanx in. The Macedonian spearmen formed a hollow square with the elephants inside; and the formidable sarissas kept off the short broadswords of the legionaries. Cnæus Domitius ordered his men to fall back and pelt the square with javelins, arrows and every other available missile. In the crowded ranks every shot took effect. Still the phalanx gave way not an inch until the elephants maddened by wounds broke outward and trampled their way through the square. The Macedonian spearmen then wavered, broke and fled to their camp. This the Roman general attacked with his whole force. It was at this point that Antiochus returned from his victorious charge. Attalus, Eumenes' brother, sent two hundred cavalry to check him; but the Great King easily routed these and rode close to the camp. There he saw his unfortunate phalangists beset on all sides, their long spears no longer of any use against the short Roman weapons. His experienced eye told him that nothing that he could do, was of any use. All that was left for him was to save his own right wing. With these he rode to Sardis and thence to Apamea, where he found his son Seleucus. From Apamea he sent envoys to the Roman consul and withdrew into Syria.

After the flight of Antiochus, a hideous massacre took place. Agreeably to their usual custom, the Romans gave but little quarter and Eumenes' only thought was utterly to destroy his enemy. In and around the camp fifty thousand of Antiochus' soldiers are said to have fallen. The Roman loss in wounded was heavy, but in killed they lost only three hundred infantry and twentyfour troopers. Of Eumenes' men only twentyfive were killed.[1]

Publius Scipio had recovered his health sufficiently to resume command immediately after Magnesia. Subject to the Senate's ratification, he dictated terms of peace not much harsher than those offered by him before the battle. The Great King must withdraw beyond the Taurus, pay as indemnity five hundred talents

[1]Livy XXXVII. 44, 2. Appian Syr. 36. Justin XXXI. 8.

down and two thousand talents on the Senate's ratification. Over and above these sums he must pay twelve thousand talents in twelve yearly instalments and supply the Roman army of occupation with all the corn needed by it. He must surrender Hannibal, Thoas and others of his staff specially mentioned and all prisoners, deserters, his navy and his elephants. He must restore to Eumenes all the possessions of his father Attalus and pay him a supplementary indemnity of four hundred talents. Antiochus agreed to the terms as laid down by the consul and also to the additional penalties imposed by the Senate, namely that he should not sail warships, save along the Syrian coast. His navy was limited to twelve men of war. He should not recruit mercenaries in Roman territory, nor shelter Roman fugitive offenders. For the fulfilment of the treaty, the king must send twenty hostages, one of whom should be his younger son Antiochus.

It remained to the Senate to allot the lands of Asia Minor and it must be admitted that they did not keep any for themselves. The Roman aristocrats found it more convenient to leave the administration to local dynasts and bleed them white. Eumenes received the greatest share of the spoil, namely Lycaonia, Mysia, both Phrygias, Lydia, Ionia, Magnesia under Sipylus, Pamphylia, all the royal forests and that part of Caria that bordered on Phrygia, the port of Telmessus in Lycia and all towns and cities north of the Meander, save those that were independent of Antiochus on the date of Magnesia. The Rhodians received all Caria south of the Meander and all Lycia except Telmessus.[1]

The Gauls of Galatia and Ariarathes of Cappadocia had been so ill advised as to adhere to Antiochus. Ariarathes hastened to make his peace. A contingent of his had fought at Magnesia. He was fined six hundred silver talents,[2] but Eumenes offered his services as mediator in return for the hand of Ariarathes' daughter Stratonice. Ariarathes accepted the offer and the fine was reduced to three hundred talents. Ariarathes and the Cappadocians became the friends of the Roman people.

The Gauls after the manner of that high spirited nation, would not submit so tamely. An allied Roman and Pergamene army marched against them under the consul Manlius, plundering all Asia Minor as they went.[3] The Gauls fought with courage, but were severely defeated at Olympos and Ancyra and their power broken. (189 B.C.)

[1]Niese II p. 748.
[2]Bevan II. p. 122. Livy XXXVIII. 39.6 Niese II, p. 759.
[3]The frightful plundering of Asia Minor by Manlius shows how little Roman policy was influenced by generous feelings.

The shock of Magnesia was felt all through the Great King's dominions. Parthia and Bactria at once made themselves independent. Armenia and Atropatene Media followed their example. There were left to Antiochus Cilicia, Mesopotamia, Susiana, Media and Persia; but on all his dominion weighed the terrible Roman debt. It was beyond the king's capacity to pay it from his ordinary revenues. There was only one way to meet it and that was by the plunder of temples. To effect this he himself took an army into High Asia; for there, too, the news of his defeat and the loss of his Macedonian veterans had weakened his authority. He invested his son Seleucus with the title of joint king and marched on Susa. In the neighbourhood of Elymais, now Luristan, was yet another temple to Ardvi Sura Anahita. It was reported to be full of gold and silver. Antiochus took a detachment of troops to seize it, thinking no doubt that the royal presence would overawe all resistance; but the fanatical inhabitants rose " en masse " and killed the king and every man with him. The angel of running water could effectively guard his treasures. The Jewish writer of Alexandria, who disguised himself under the title of Daniel has described the king's end in words, that have often been otherwise interpreted. " He shall turn his face towards the strongholds of his own land; but he shall stumble and fall and shall not be found." (187 B.C.) [1]

The end of Hannibal was no less tragic than that of the Great King. Sooner than surrender the Carthaginian to the Romans, Antiochus warned him after Magnesia to flee for his life. Hannibal entered the service first of Artaxias, king of Armenia and successor of Xerxes and he carried out the fortification of the capital Artaxata. From Armenia, Hannibal went to Gortys in Crete, where he received an invitation from Prusias king of Armenia to enter his service during the war which he intended waging against Eumenes and his ally Heracles. Hannibal accepted the invitation and won a great naval victory by the ingenious device of throwing on the Pergamene decks pots filled with poisonous serpents.[2] At the same time the Bithynian army under Hannibal's direction defeated the Heracleots and besieged their city. Eumenes, threatened by land and beaten by sea, appealed to Rome. Rome compelled Prusias to make peace and in the summer of 183 B.C., Titus Quinctius Flamininus went eastwards to settle the disputes of Pergamos and Bithynia. The ungenerous Roman insisted from the first on the surrender of Hannibal. Prusias refused to give him up but undertook to assassinate him. One night, a slave boy of Hannibal looked through his outer door and saw the house surrounded by armed men. He called to his

[1]Daniel II, 19 quoted by Bevan II p. 120.
[2]Cornelius Nepos—Hannibal.

master. The latter asked whether there was any door left unguarded. When he heard that every outlet was closed, he knew that he was at the mercy of his host's assassins. He calmly took some of the poison that he always carried with him. A few minutes later the ruffians forced their way into the house and found the prostrate form of Hannibal, indifferent to any hurt from their swords or daggers. Of all the great Carthaginian's friends and comrades, Death alone had not deserted him.

To mankind at large Magnesia was an irreparable disaster. The successors of Antiochus, plundered and blackmailed by the heartless consulars of Rome, let their kingdom crumble to pieces. So far from the Romans carrying on the Great King's work, they allowed Persia, Media, Mesopotamia and High Asia to fall away from civilisation; while they so robbed and depopulated by their slave trade Asia Minor and Syria, that the inhabitants in despair turned for help to the barbarians. The massacres of Mithridates and the slaughter of Carrhæ were the just punishment of Roman inhumanity.

Antiochus has not in my judgment received the praise to which he was entitled. He was brave, energetic and in eastern affairs eminently competent. His youth and manhood were spent in the re-establishment of Hellenic civilisation throughout the Near East and this he had all but accomplished at the time of the great disaster. It is easy to blame him for his conduct of the war against Rome; but his critics forget that he had inherited the oldfashioned tactics and formation consecrated by the victories of Alexander the Great. Even Cæsar himself could not have made a phalanx win a pitched battle against the legions, perfected by the experience of the Punic Wars. It must also be remembered that Antiochus' troops, drawn mostly from Asia, were in no way equal to the Roman and Italian levies either in physical strength or moral. Antiochus had no more chance of a victory against Cnæus Domitius than the Maratha armies had against Lake or Wellington.

With Antiochus the Great ended the tremendous effort of Hellas for world dominion. The Seleucids waged no other war against Rome. Eumenes of Pergamos, the most faithful of Roman allies, lived to be humiliated and refused admittance to the Eternal City. The Romans made the testament of his son Attalus III a pretext to seize his country. The later Ptolemies allowed Egypt to be stripped one by one of her possessions and finally swallowed up in the monstrous jaws of Rome. Macedonia made a last struggle at Pydna under Philip's son Perses, but it was merely defensive and never gave the Romans any real concern. Antiochus was the last Hellenic king to stretch out his hands towards the whole heritage of Alexander.

GENEALOGIES
&
MAPS

GENEALOGICAL TREE OF THE PTOLEMIES.



See Beloch, Part 3—Vol. 2—p. 133.

PEDIGREE OF THE EPIROT KINGS.



This genealogical tree is chiefly taken from Dr. Julius Beloch's admirable Griechische—3rd Volume—2nd Part—p. 108.

GENEALOGICAL TREE OF THE SELEUCIDS.



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GENEALOGICAL TREE OF THE ATTALIDS.



See Beloch, Part. 3—Vol. 2—p. 159.

MACEDONIAN EMPIRE 323 B.C.
Miles
0 200 400 600
Alexander's Empire
ASIA
ADRIATIC SEA
R. Isker (R. Danube)
THRACE
MACEDONIA
BLACK SEA
GREECE
Athens
ASIA MINOR
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
CASPIAN SEA
ARAL SEA
R. Jaxartes
R. Oxus (Amu Darya)
(Syr Darya)
Khojend
SOGDIANA
R. Euphrates
R. Tigris
SYRIA
Alexandria
Opis
Artemita
(Merv)
Termez
Babylon
Susa
BABYLON
BACTRIA
Bactra
KUSH
HINDU KUSH
GANDHARA
Shami
(Herat)
Kabul
Aornos
Alexandria
(Ghazni)
Taxila
PERSIA
(IRAN)
PUNJAB
Sagala
EGYPT
ARABIA
PERSIAN G.
R. Indus
R. Beas
R. Nile
RED SEA
MAKRAN
Rajputana Desert
R. Ganges
Pataliputra (Patna)
(Benares)
MAGADHA
(GUJERAT)
(KATHIAWAR)
INDIA
DECCAN


KINGDOMS OF THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER
c. 250 B.C.
Miles
0 200 400 600
Seleucid Empire
Ptolemaic Empire
Macedonia (Antigonids)
Mauryan Empire
ASIA
ADRIATIC SEA
R. Ister (R. Danube)
MACEDONIA
BLACK SEA
GREECE
Athens
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
CASPIAN SEA
ARAL SEA
R. Jaxartes
R. Oxus (Amu Darya)
(Syr Darya)
SOGDIANA
R. Euphrates
R. Tigris
Opis
Artemita
Seleucia
Susa
Babylon
BABYLONIA
BACTRIA
Bactra
HINDU KUSH
Kabul
GANDHARA
Alexandria
EGYPT
Alexandria
PERSIA (IRAN)
Taxila
PUNJAB
Sagala
R. Beas
R. Indus
PERSIAN G.
ARABIA
R. Nile
RED SEA
Rajputana Desert
R. Ganges
Pataliputra (Patna)
Benares
MAGADHA
(GUJERAT)
Vidisā
(KATHIAWAR)
INDIA


KINGDOMS OF THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER
c. 175 B.C.
Miles
0 200 400 600
Macedonia
Seleucid Empire
Graeco-Bactrian Empire
Kingdom of Pergamon
Ptolemaic Empire
Parthia
ASIA
ADRIATIC SEA
R. Ister (R. Danube)
BLACK SEA
GREECE
Athens
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Alexandria
R. Euphrates
R. Tigris
Artemita
Seleuceia
Susa
Babylon
Alexandria
PARTHIA
CASPIAN SEA
ARAL SEA
R. Jaxartes (Syr Daria)
R. Oxus (Am Darya)
Bactra
GRAECO-BACTRIAN EMPIRE
HINDU KUSH
GANDHARA
Kabul
Taxila
Sagala
PUNJAB
R. Beas
R. Indus
R. Ganges
Rajputana Desert
Pataliputra (Patna)
(Benares)
MAGADHA
(GUJERAT)
Vidisa
(KATHIAWAR)
INDIA
ARABIA
PERSIAN G.
RED SEA
R. Nile



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